

Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service



A N N I V E R S A R Y
1 9 4 1 - 1 9 9 1

JPRS Report

Arms Control

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

DTIC QUAT

19980604 162

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-91-021

CONTENTS

3 September 1991

CHINA

Article Views CSCE's Recent Development [Lu Yaokun; SHIJIE ZHISHI No 14, 16 Jul]	1
Creation of Strategic Missile Force Recalled	2
Establishment of '2d Artillery Corps' [Zhang Jiajun; JIEFANGJUN BAO 29 Jul]	2
Development of Missile Force Outlined [ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE 3 Aug]	3
DPRK Proposal for Korean Nuclear-Free Zone Discussed	4
KCNA Cited [XINHUA 2 Aug]	4
Commentary Praises Proposal [RENMIN RIBAO 7 Aug]	4
Signing of U.S.-Soviet START Treaty Viewed	5
Roundup on Effect of Treaty [RENMIN RIBAO 5 Aug]	5
DPRK Response Cited [XINHUA 5 Aug]	5
Premier Backs Idea of South Asian Nuclear-Free Region	6
Meets With Pakistani Senate President [XINHUA 12 Aug]	6
Further Report [Islamabad Radio 13 Aug]	6

EAST ASIA

JAPAN

Tokyo-Beijing Disarmament Statement Seen Likely [KYODO 8 Aug]	7
---	---

NORTH KOREA

NODONG SINMUN Discusses Denuclearization [KCNA 8 Aug]	7
U.S., South Urged To Accept Denuclearization [Pyongyang Radio 19 Aug]	8
U.S., ROK Urged To Act on Denuclearization [KCNA 19 Aug]	8
Korean Denuclearization Appeal Adopted in Nepal [KCNA 22 Aug]	9
Cuban Support for Nuclear-Free Plan Reported [KCNA 22 Aug]	9

SOUTH KOREA

Changing Nuclear Policy on Peninsula Viewed [Kang Song-chol; THE KOREA HERALD 9 Aug]	10
Denuclearization Discussion With North Possible [SEOUL SINMUN 9 Aug]	11

NEW ZEALAND

Foreign Minister on Limits of Antinuclear Stand [Hong Kong AFP 8 Aug]	11
---	----

VIETNAM

USSR-U.S. Summit Meeting, START Treaty Viewed	11
'Big Step' Brings 'Hope of Peace' [Duong Quang Minh; Hanoi Radio 3 Aug]	11
START Called Highlight of Summit [Hanoi Radio 3 Aug]	12
DPRK News Conference on Nuclear Free Zone [Hanoi Radio 3 Aug]	12

EAST EUROPE

POLAND

Soviet Troop Train Leaves Country [Warsaw Radio 21 Aug]	13
USSR Begins New Round of Withdrawal Talks [PAP 21 Aug]	13

LATIN AMERICA

CUBA

Foreign Ministry Lauds DPRK Call for Korean NFZ [Havana Radio 20 Aug]	14
---	----

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

INDIA

Commentator on U.S.-USSR START Agreement [K. Subramaniam; Delhi Radio 10 Aug]	15
---	----

ISRAEL

New Foreign Ministry Department on Disarmament [MA'ARIV 11 Aug]	15
---	----

SOVIET UNION

GENERAL

Sergey Kortunov Calls Arms Talks 'Obsolete' [S. Kortunov; MOSCOW NEWS No 25, 23-30 Jun]	16
Costs of Arms Cuts, Defense Conversion [A. Kireyev; MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 7, Jul]	16
Future of Soviet Nuclear Potential Viewed [P. Bayev; NOVOYE VREMYA No 30, Jul]	23
Dispute Over INF, CFE Treaty Compliance Obligations	24
USSR Said To Violate 'Spirit' of Accords [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 1 Aug]	24
'Rejoinder' Hits Idea of Violation in 'Spirit' [K. Mezentshev; SELSKAYA ZHIZN 13 Aug] ...	25
U.S., USSR Disarmament Progress Viewed [V. Ovchinnikov; PRAVDA 6 Aug]	26
New World Security System in Wake of Moscow Summit Foreseen [S. Rogov; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 31, 7 Aug]	26
10th European Nuclear Disarmament Convention Held	29
To Meet in Moscow for First Time [M. Ivanov; TASS 8 Aug]	29
Convention Opens [M. Ivanov; TASS 14 Aug]	30
Regional Disarmament in Latin America [S. Batsanov; IZVESTIYA 8 Aug]	30

START TALKS

START Negotiator Assesses Treaty Achievements [Yu. Nazarkin; IAN 2 Aug]	31
Scientist Defends Need for Nuclear Arms Cuts [Yu. Khariton; IZVESTIYA 9 Aug]	32
'Studio 9' Program on Significance of START Treaty [V. Zorin, et al; Moscow TV 10 Aug]	32
Dzasokhov Confident of Ratification [Moscow International 10 Aug]	38
Security Benefits of Treaty Questioned [A. Silyantsev; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 10 Aug]	38
Yazov Describes Treaty Implications [RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 13 Aug]	40
Yazov Denies START Destroys Strategic Balance [INTERFAX 13 Aug]	41
START Agreement Has 'Serious Deficiencies' [P. Vladimirov; SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 21 Aug]	42

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Cooper Remarks on GPALS Cited [P. Vasilyev; IZVESTIYA 6 Aug]	44
Senate Vote for ABM Deployments Criticized [V. Chernyshev; TASS 12 Aug]	45
Correspondent Questions U.S. SDI Program [P. Vasiliyev; INTERFAX 15 Aug]	46

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Poland Ready for Troop Withdrawal From Germany [TASS 14 Aug]	47
--	----

NUCLEAR TESTING

Scientists Defend Continued Testing [I. Andryushin, et al; NOVOYE VREMYA No 26, Jun]	47
--	----

Physicist Makes Case for Keeping Nuclear Arms [V. Nechay; DEN No 12, Jun]	50
'Nuclear Explosions' in Kuzbass Asserted [Moscow Radio 2 Aug]	53
Military Analyst Bogachev on Nuclear Test Ban [V. Bogachev; TASS 6 Aug]	53
Consideration of Swedish Test Ban Proposal Urged [M. Zubko; IZVESTIYA 9 Aug]	53
Festivities To Mark Closure of Semipalatinsk [Moscow Radio 12 Aug]	54
Military Writer Urges Nuclear Test Ban [V. Bogachev; TASS 13 Aug]	54
TASS Reports U.S. Nuclear Test in Nevada [TASS 15 Aug]	55
Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Program 'No Big Secret' [I. Bentsa, V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA 19 Aug] ...	55

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Document on CW Inspection in Poland Submitted to CD [S. Sedov; TASS 8 Aug]	55
Destruction Plans for Chemical Arms Store Reported [F. Tyumakov; Moscow Radio 12 Aug]	56

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Commentary Supports DPRK Denuclearization Proposal [Moscow Radio 3 Aug]	56
U.S., ROK Response to DPRK Korean NFZ Proposal Viewed	56
South's Reaction Hailed [S. Tikhomirov; PRAVDA 10 Aug]	56
'Agree to Consider' Tactical Arms Removal [V. Kozyakov; Moscow Radio 12 Aug]	57

WEST EUROPE

FRANCE

Defense Council on S45 Missile Cancellation [M. DuFresne; LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 22 Jul]	58
--	----

GERMANY

SPD Defense Expert on Reduction of Bundeswehr [M. Opel; DPA 6 Aug]	59
Soviet Officers To Inspect Bundeswehr Divisions [DPA 21 Aug]	59

NORWAY

Soviet Kola Exercise Force Strength Halved [O. Storvik; AFTENPOSTEN 26 Jul]	59
---	----

Article Views CSCE's Recent Development

HK0708130391 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI in Chinese
No 14, 16 Jul 91 pp 10, 11

[By Lu Yaokun (0712 5069 0981): "CSCE Seeks New Development"]

[Text] From 19 to 20 June this year, the first conference of foreign ministers under the CSCE held a meeting in Berlin, Germany, in accordance with the regulations of the "Paris Constitution for a New Europe," which was adopted by the CSCE's Paris summit meeting held last November. The main agenda item of this meeting was to officially admit Albania into the CSCE as its 35th member, thus bringing all Europe under the organization; set up "an emergency mechanism for coordination and cooperation"; and issue a statement on the situation of Yugoslavia.

One of the CSCE's major subjects under discussion was the security of Europe. The meeting agreed to set up an organ to prevent conflicts and settle disputes. All CSCE countries unanimously agreed that "the center for prevention of conflicts is an appointed organ of the CSCE in its dispute-settling mechanism." They also decided to set up communications "hot lines" between various countries to keep each other informed and mediate conflicts. In addition, the meeting also arranged for next year's CSCE Helsinki summit meeting. The second conference of foreign ministers is scheduled to open in Prague on 30-31 January next year.

Since the CSCE's Paris summit meeting last November, some new and complicated factors have been added to the already easing situation in Europe. Although they have reached an understanding on the implementation of the European conventional disarmament agreement, the United States and Soviet Union still have a long way to go before they can reach an agreement on second-phase talks. The Warsaw Treaty Organization and CEMA have been disbanded officially. In the Soviet Union, the political situation is turbulent, the economy on the decline, national contradictions intensified, and the future of reform unpredictable. East European countries have encountered numerous difficulties in their efforts to carry out economic transformation. The Yugoslav situation is extremely grave. The gap between the rich and poor in East and West Europe has widened with each passing day. In short, there are various hidden factors of instability and "unpredictable risks." Under such circumstances, all participating countries hoped that this foreign ministerial conference could discuss issues currently confronting Europe, so as to seek ways and means to guarantee Europe's future security and stability.

After two days of arduous discussions and consultation, all participating countries unanimously agreed to set up "an emergency mechanism for coordination and cooperation." With such a mechanism, when an emergency crisis takes place in a CSCE member country that lacks the ability to handle this crisis, the country concerned should immediately inform the high-ranking official committee established in accordance with the "Paris Constitution for a New Europe." Within two to three days after it receives the

approval and support from 12 member countries, this committee can hold a session to work out measures to prevent conflicts and handle crises. This move indicates a breakthrough in the principle of "unanimous adoption," which the CSCE has practiced for many years.

Since it was mainly worried about the interference of the West in its domestic ethnic conflicts, the Soviet Union adopted a negative attitude toward this agreement from the very beginning, insisting all member countries have the veto power. Turkey also opposed the agreement, for it did not want to be restricted by the Cyprus issue. After negotiating with each other, participating countries finally reached agreement by adding to the document's preface "the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs."

The Soviet Union had many things to worry about in this meeting. First of all, it hoped that through this meeting, it could improve the diplomatic environment, strengthen its own position, and exert its influence on Europe's future security and cooperation. Therefore, the Soviet Union was eager to set up an all-European peace and security system and carry out negotiations on the issue as soon as possible. At the meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh even proposed the signing of an "All-European Security and Cooperation Treaty" on the basis of the CSCE. Due to its present weak position, the Soviet Union did not have its wish fulfilled. On the contrary, it had no alternative but to make many concessions. On the issue of establishing "an emergency mechanism for coordination and cooperation," the Soviet Union had to give up its demand for granting the veto power to all countries. In addition, it had to allow representatives of its three Baltic republics to attend the meeting's opening and closing ceremonies as guests of three northern European countries' delegations.

The United States wanted to use this meeting to strengthen the "newly established democratic political system" in East Europe, so as to push forward the evolution process of the Soviet Union and East European countries. That explains U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's intention when he proposed setting up strategic targets for a "Europe-transatlantic community from Vancouver to Vladivostok" on 18 June shortly before the opening of the Berlin conference of foreign ministers. On the issue of CSCE-NATO relations, rather than allow the CSCE system to weaken NATO's position or hinder NATO from exercising its role, the United States preferred the CSCE to act as a supplementary body to NATO. Such being the case, the United States adopted a prudent attitude toward the decision to set up "an emergency mechanism for coordination and cooperation."

From Germany's point of view, with the United States still occupying a dominant position in NATO and France still acting as its major rival in the European Community, the CSCE is precisely the place for Germany to give greater play to its political role. Under such circumstances, Germany hopes to consolidate the evolution of East European countries by further systematizing the CSCE. Meanwhile, Germany will also help expedite the establishment of a new European security system, so that it can maneuver

among and expand its influence on the United States, the Soviet Union, and East and West European countries. In addition, taking advantage of being a host country and executive chairman of the meeting, Germany has vigorously advocated the idea of systematizing and structuralizing the CSCE.

The Berlin conference of foreign ministers not only represents a step forward for the CSCE toward systematization and structuralization, but has also turned the CSCE from a "political forum" into an organ with "the real ability to take action." However, the meeting has not achieved any substantial progress on a number of major issues which have a bearing on Europe's security. On the issue of disarmament talks, for example, participating countries only agreed to carry out informal discussions on the issue through their representatives stationed at the Vienna Center for Prevention of Conflicts, thus making preparations for future talks. Although they all expressed the hope to carry out cooperation between West European countries and the Soviet Union and East European countries in such fields as economics, science and technology, and environmental protection, participating countries failed to produce concrete suggestions, plans, or measures. Some countries even adopted a skeptical attitude toward the CSCE's systematization and structuralization, considering it difficult for the CSCE to play an important role or win the unanimous cooperation of all member countries in settling disputes. Western European countries still consider NATO their guarantee for security. A Finnish diplomat even said: "The CSCE only has gums; its teeth have not yet emerged."

Creation of Strategic Missile Force Recalled

Establishment of '2d Artillery Corps'

HK1208144291 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 29 Jul 91 p 2

["Newsletter" by special correspondent Zhang Jiajun (1728 1367 6511): "For Sake of Casting 'Sword of China'"]

[Text] In Beijing's Great Hall of the People on 19 October 1966, waving his strong arm, Premier Zhou Enlai solemnly proclaimed:

"After the success of a nuclear explosion, some people derided us as having bombs but no guns, which means that we have only atom bombs but no delivery vehicles. We must launch atom bombs with missiles and answer the challenge of the media with action!"

Immediately after this, a special unit mastering modern sophisticated weapons quietly came into being under the Chinese Army. Zhou Enlai personally fixed its name: The 2d Artillery Corps.

I

A baby is born 10 months after conception. Efforts to build this strategic nuclear counteroffensive force had started several years before. In early 1963, the Central Military Commission decided to build a strategic missile position. A year later, tens of thousands of officers and men from 88

units throughout the Army started tackling the issue of building the first strategic missile operational position.

It was an untraversed ancient forest deep in the mountains and it was also the coldest season in a year. After clearing out the knee-deep snow, the officers and men started a great but strenuous undertaking by pitching tents and building stoves.

However, the state which had just tided over three years of natural calamities could only give them a minimum guarantee in life and work. Because of the dripping water in tunnel work, the soldiers' work clothes, which were already threadbare, were often saturated with water and, when they knocked off for the day, turned into a hard "sheet of ice" before they reached the barracks. The commanders and fighters engaging in high-intensity and overloaded operations could only eat a limited amount of husked gaoliang [Chinese sorghum], corn bread, and broiled soya bean. The shortfall had to be made up with wild vegetable. A soldier died in the tunnel, with a lump of wild vegetable still in his mouth.

Cutting a tunnel into a mountain represented a collision between the human body and the mountain rocks and a magnificent song shaking heaven and earth. The two graveyards lying quietly at the foot of the barren mountain were the most solemn and stirring notes of the magnificent song. Among them was a battalion commander called Liu Changlin, who laid down his life while trying to save soldiers from a dangerous situation. He was only 34 at that time. Thirteen years later, his wife again sent his eldest son, who had just turned 18, to join this unit.

If the stones quarried by the officers and men of this unit over the past dozen years or so were to be built into a stone wall one meter high and 2.8 meter wide, it would stretch all the way from Shanhaiguan to Badaling. It may well be called a section of the great wall built by contemporary Chinese missile soldiers!

This is only part of the great army pioneering an undertaking. Almost at the same time they entered the mountains, units assuming the same mission advanced into ancient mountains of central China, dense forests in the south, high plateaus in the west.... As a result, group after group of strategic missile positions of different types, launching methods, and models which could attack, defense, store, command, and live appeared on the vast lands of China.

II

It is difficult to lay the foundation, it is even more so to develop it.

China's strategic missile unit, a modern unit on the high plateau, has developed and increased its combat effectiveness under extremely simple, crude, and difficult conditions.

People still remember the scene of its first "seed unit," the surface-to-surface missile training unit, undergoing training:

An angle steel was used as a launching pad, bed boards were made into a distributing box [pei qi xiang 6792 3049 4630], red willow twigs were braided into a thrust chamber, wood was used to make a program controller, yellow earth was molded into a gyroscope, and carrots were made into explosive devices.... At that time we could see these colorful and grotesque simulators in every battalion.

It was a rare training ground—

On a barren hill in an open country. Following the command "Occupy the position," the "equipment" went into action one after another in an orderly way, with operators pulling the straw rope, running down the "thrust chamber" in step, and cried out in a resounding voice: "The 'cable' has been laid!"...

All were unreal and yet they were real. Through training under such conditions they succeeded in launching the first missile, realizing the aspiration of the Chinese nation from one generation to another.

Ever since it possessed nuclear weapons, China has made a solemn promise to the world that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. The option of striking only after the enemy has struck calls for higher quality and quicker ability to react on the part of our strategic missiles. To this end, the officers and men of the 2d Artillery Corps have made unremitting efforts.

In the spring of 1977, the 2d Artillery Corps organized a large-scale exercise during which a missile regiment conducted a mobile firing practice with live ammunition. In line with the idea of "mobile operations," the officers and men going out of their position for the first time overcame all kinds of difficulties in logistic support, and fired four missiles one after another in a very short time according to schedule and sequence, thus raising to a new level the survival and counteroffensive capabilities of our strategic missile units.

Fully aware of the heavy responsibility on their shoulders, the commanders and fighters readily trained their fighting skills hard under various harsh environments. In the midwinter of 1985, a unit tested a certain type of missiles at minus 47 degrees Celsius. After they arrived at the site, 80 percent of the officers and men caught cold and the faces, hands, and feet of 95 percent of the comrades were frostbitten. But the test went on intensely all the same. The whole procedure lasted about six to seven hours, during which experts, with tears in their eyes, implored the commander to let the fighters go to a building a few dozen meters away to warm themselves up for a moment. The commander hardheartedly refused, for he knew that the test involved not only equipment but also men. Only by bringing forth an "all-weather" unit can it engage in mobile operations under any harsh natural conditions. When the test ended, the commander went to one side, stealthily wiping the painful tears with his sleeve.

In four years, they conducted numerous tests, including joint training with all weapon systems, night operations, highway mobile transport, and jolting shocks, and traveled

270,000 km. The officers and men withstood the cold at minus 47 degrees Celsius and the heat at 49 degrees Celsius, as well as violent rains and raging winds, and successfully completed the tasks. They were cited and issued an order of commendation by the leaders of the 2d Artillery Corps and the Ministry of Aerospace Industry on many occasions.

III

With the development of modern warfare, the training of the 2d Artillery Corps also advanced to a higher level.

In the autumn of 1986, a large-scale campaign exercise in nuclear counteroffensive operations was launched over a vast area.

Under the well-conceived command of a modern command network consisting of many systems, special trains fully loaded with missile weaponry and valiant fighters and long lines of camouflaged military vehicles, and aircraft laden with special equipment quietly set off from plains, forests, and skies.

As soon as the order for a counterattack was issued, China's strategic missiles roared! Military-green strategic missiles of different types took off in the direction of the "targets."

There were bolts from the vast sky and claps of thunder over the vast land. With their unique might, the "swords of China," of which we are proud, were defending the security of the socialist motherland!

Development of Missile Force Outlined

HK0308072691 Hong Kong ZHONGGUO TONGXUN
SHE in English 0508 GMT 3 Aug 91

["China's Missile Force Now in its Third Decade"—ZHONGGUO TONGXUN SHE headline]

[Text] Beijing, August 3 (HKCNA)—China is equipped with a strategic missile force which includes middle-range missiles, long-range missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles and tactical missiles for air and sea defence, as well as all necessary ancillary equipment.

This strategic missile force, though set up in the 50's, was not made public until the holding of a large-scale military review celebrating the 35th anniversary of the founding of New China on October 1, 1984.

The missile force, formerly described as the "second artillery force", has successfully test fired thousands of different missiles over the past three decades with a success rate of one hundred percent.

Missile research started in China in the mid-50's. The research institute specializing in the study of missiles was set up in October, 1956. In November, 1964, the Chinese Government set up a special department to handle and organize all research and production of strategic and large-sized missiles. This department also developed a carrier rocket and created China's space industry. The first successful nuclear warhead missile test was carried out in

October, 1966 and in October, 1982, China had its first successful trial of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the Pacific Ocean.

Research on tactical missiles was initially based on information provided by the Soviet Union. The T-2 ground-to-ground missile, the No. 1 "Red Flag" ground-to-air missile, the No. 1 and No. 2 "Thunderbolt" air-to-air missile and the No. 1 "Upper Reach" warship-to-warship missile were successfully produced based on similar types in the Soviet Union's armoury. Some of the missiles were put into mass production laying the foundation for China's tactical missile industry.

In recent years, a research development centre for air-to-air missiles has been set up in China to concentrate manpower and resources on the study and production of this type of missile. Sea defence missiles have also been listed as a key research item in recent years and various models of air and sea defence missiles are now being successfully produced.

DPRK Proposal for Korean Nuclear-Free Zone Discussed

KCNA Cited

*OW0208203391 Beijing XINHUA in English
1524 GMT 2 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang, August 2 (XINHUA)—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is ready to consult with the United States on the issue of building a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, a Foreign Ministry official said here today.

The official told the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA) that DPRK and U.S. embassies in Beijing have contacted at a councillor level and that DPRK has presented its Foreign Ministry statement on the issue to the United States.

According to KCNA, the statement proposed building a nuclear-free zone through consultations between the two sides of the peninsula and under the guarantee by the United States, the Soviet Union and China.

The statement, in particular, demanded that the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The U.S. State Department was reported to have said Thursday that DPRK's statement and all its other proposals advanced before should be directly consulted between the two sides of the peninsula.

Commentary Praises Proposal

*HK0908151091 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
7 Aug 91 p 6*

["Short commentary": "Positive Proposal To Ensure Security, Stability of Korean Peninsula"]

[Text] Recently, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK] issued a statement, putting forward three new proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula. The new initiative requests that the northern and southern sides of Korea agree to establish

a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, negotiate with each other on all legal and operational matters, and sign a legally binding joint declaration by the end of 1992 at the latest. The new initiative also calls on the United States and the nuclear countries around the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union and China, to give legal guarantees to the Korean peninsula's nuclear-free status after it declares itself to be a nuclear-free zone, and expresses the hope that nuclear-free countries in Asia will support this initiative. This initiative advanced by the Korean government is of great significance. It is a fresh constructive effort made by the Korean government and people to ensure the security and stability on the Korean peninsula and eliminate the danger of nuclear war.

As early as June 1986, the DPRK Government published a statement announcing that Korea will not test, produce, stockpile, or import nuclear weapons and will not permit the establishment of any military bases, including those with foreign nuclear weapons, or the passage of foreign nuclear weapons via its territory or territorial waters and airspace. The statement also demanded that the U.S. Government withdraw all its nuclear weapons from within the boundaries of South Korea and cancel all battle plans involving the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. However, the above suggestion put forward by the Korean government for establishing a nuclear-free zone and peace zone on the Korean peninsula has failed to call forth any response from the United States and South Korean authorities. In recent years, some changes have taken place in the international situation, and a relaxed atmosphere has also come into being in the situation of the Korean peninsula. The Korean government has noticed that the United States recently refrained from opposing the establishment of nuclear-free zones in principle, providing that they are based on agreements between interested parties, and supported the efforts to develop the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa into nuclear-free zones. Recently, the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States signed a treaty on reduction of offensive strategic weapons, convincing the Korean government that this provides "another objective possibility" for realizing the objective of turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. Under such circumstances, the DPRK Government once again published a statement, expressing the hope that the United States and South Korean authorities will follow the trend of the times, make concerted efforts with the Korean government, and contribute to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

As true friends of the Korean people, the Chinese people have always been profoundly concerned with the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. It is totally justifiable for the Korean government and people to demand that the United States withdraw all its troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and establish a nuclear-free peace zone on the Korean peninsula. This proposition reflects the desire and fundamental interests of the entire Korean people, is conducive to the realization of Korea's peaceful reunification on its own initiative, and will help safeguard peace in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. It is our hope that the northern and southern sides of Korea

will facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula through dialogue and negotiation with the United States at an early date.

Signing of U.S.-Soviet START Treaty Viewed

Roundup on Effect of Treaty

HK0708050591 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
5 Aug 91 p 6

[Roundup dispatched from Washington by staff reporter Zhang Qixin (1728 0796 2500): "How Many Strategic Arms Will U.S., U.S.S.R. Actually Reduce"]

[Text] On 31 July, U.S. President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev signed the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in Moscow. If the treaty is approved by the legislative bodies of the two countries and becomes effective, the United States and the Soviet Union will each reduce, over seven years, their three types of strategic arms delivery vehicles (land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers) to 1,600, and the warheads they carry to 6,000. Since the treaty has some special provisions, the actual amount of strategic nuclear weapons the two countries can possess will be more than the above mentioned quotas stipulated by the treaty. Therefore, the question of how many strategic arms the United States and the Soviet Union will reduce has become of concern.

According to data from U.S. papers and magazines and relevant research units, the treaty's provisions regarding numbers can be briefly analyzed as follows:

First, the 1,600 delivery vehicles provided for by the treaty refer to ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and mobile missile launchers installed in silos and submarines. The Soviet Union will reduce its approximately 2,500 pieces by about 36 percent, the United States will reduce its 1,800 or so by about 11 percent, and the Soviet Union will reduce its heavy land-based SS-18 missiles by 50 percent, that is from 308 pieces to 154 pieces.

Second, the treaty provides that the total amount of each side's warheads is 6,000, of which warheads on land-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles must not exceed 4,900. Accordingly, the Soviet Union will reduce these two types of missile warheads by approximately 50 percent (that is, from 9,405 to 4,900) and the United States by approximately 35 percent (from 7,506 to 4,900).

Third, the treaty has a special provision for counting bomber-carried cruise missiles. Those air-launched cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 km carrying nuclear warheads are included in the warhead quota as provided by the treaty. Moreover, the warheads for air-launched cruise missiles carried by each U.S. bomber are counted in quantities of 10 and each Soviet bomber in quantities of eight. But, in fact, each U.S. bomber can carry 20 cruise missiles and each Soviet bomber can carry 12. Furthermore, each side is allowed to install 880 sea-launched cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 km and carrying nuclear warheads, but they are not included in the warhead quota. Accordingly, the United States can increase its

air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles from its current 1,967 to 2,740, and the Soviet Union can increase its from 780 to 2,180.

Fourth, the treaty also has a special provision for counting air-launched short-range cruise missiles and nuclear gravity bombs, by which each bomber is allowed to carry 20 short-range cruise missiles or bombs, but only one warhead is included in the quota. In this way, the United States can possess 2,720 short-range cruise missiles and bombs, and the Soviet Union can possess 960.

Exactly because of the two provisions mentioned above, although the warhead quota for the United States and the Soviet Union is nominally 6,000 pieces each, they can each possess more warheads than the quota.

DPRK Response Cited

OW0508055391 Beijing XINHUA in English
0446 GMT 5 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang, August 4 (XINHUA)—The signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is a "significant step" in the process of complete nuclear disarmament, a spokesman from the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) said today.

The Korean Government expressed the hope that the signing of the treaty could "lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons," the spokesman added.

According to the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA), the spokesman said the signing of the START treaty once again created "objective possibilities" for making the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free zone.

He said that a large number of American nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea were a direct result of the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

With the START treaty signed, confrontation between the two superpowers has been relaxed, thus it is time to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, the spokesman said.

He reaffirmed the DPRK's declaration that it was ready to make the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons.

The spokesman urged all parties concerned to take the opportunity of the signing of START to begin either bilateral or multilateral negotiations in a bid to create a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula.

In a declaration issued on July 30, the DPRK Foreign Ministry suggested that both parts of Korea open negotiations on a possible nuclear-free zone on the peninsula, and asked for international guarantees on the proposal from the United States, Soviet Union and China.

Premier Backs Idea of South Asian Nuclear-Free Region**Meets With Pakistani Senate President**

*OW1208134091 Beijing XINHUA in English
1318 GMT 12 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] Beijing, August 12 (XINHUA)—Chinese Premier Li Peng met with the chairman of the Pakistani Senate Wasim Sajjad and his party here this afternoon. [passage omitted]

The two leaders also exchanged views on the current international situation and the situation in southern Asia. [passage omitted]

The Chinese premier said that China appreciates the proposition that southern Asia should be a nuclear-free region, and hopes that countries in this region will maintain friendly relations with each other, live in peace and solve their conflicts through peaceful means.

Further Report

*BK1308160691 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 1500 GMT 13 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] Chinese Premier Li Peng has appreciated Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's efforts to help find a political solution to the Afghan problem. Talking to a high-level Pakistani delegation led by Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad in Beijing, the Chinese premier said the trilateral talks among Pakistan, Iran, and Afghan mojahedin based in Pakistan and Iran is a welcome step in the right direction. [passage omitted]

The Senate chairman thanked the Chinese premier for his support for Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's proposal for a five-nation conference on declaring South Asia a nuclear-free zone. Li Peng told him that this is a positive initiative which has placed Pakistan in a better position. He described nuclear nonproliferation as a good cause and Pakistan's efforts for making South Asia a nuclear-free zone as constructive and praiseworthy.

JAPAN

Tokyo-Beijing Disarmament Statement Seen Likely

OW0808024291 Tokyo KYODO in English 0204 GMT 8 Aug 91

[Text] Tokyo, August 8 (KYODO)—The likelihood is high of a joint Tokyo-Beijing statement on disarmament and arms controls being issued during Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu's visit to China beginning Saturday, government sources said Thursday.

Kaifu, during his four-day visit to China, is expected to urge Chinese leaders to support a Japanese proposal to create a united nations register that would bring openness to the international sale of arms. He will also urge Beijing to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the sources said.

In his meetings with Premier Li Peng and other Chinese leaders, Kaifu will press Beijing to join a 1987 regime which sets guidelines for the transfer of technology that can be used in the production of missile systems, the sources said.

China, which is one of the world's leading arms exporters, has admitted supplying Pakistan with missiles that other governments feel could exceed the missile technology control guidelines.

Government sources suggest that in the joint statement China will support the creation of the U.N. register on conventional arms transfers and will "understand and obey" the spirit of the NPT and the missile technology controls.

"This carries epoch-making significance," said one source, since "it will be the first time for China to make an international declaration about its responsibilities to disarmament and arms control."

Still, there remains the question of whether China will accept verification of its compliance with the missile technology control regime and other accords, the source added.

A separate government source said, "there are some aspects of China's actions that we just cannot read."

In Hiroshima on Tuesday, Kaifu praised China for its participation in a U.N. conference last month in Paris which discussed reducing the flow of arms to the Middle East.

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen indicated during his visit to Tokyo in June that his country's readiness to sign the NPT in the near future.

Among the five nuclear powers, only France and China have yet to sign the NPT, which took effect in 1970.

France, however, also declared in early June that it was willing to sign the treaty.

NORTH KOREA

NODONG SINMUN Discusses Denuclearization

SK0808103891 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1000 GMT 8 Aug 91

["Denuclearization of the Korean peninsula Is Matured Demand of the Times"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang, August 8 (KCNA)—If the danger of nuclear war is to be removed from the Korean peninsula and sure guarantee of peace be secured there, it is necessary to get the U.S. troops and nuclear arms withdrawn from South Korea and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone, says NODONG SINMUN today in a signed article titled "Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula Is Matured Demand of the Times".

The article says:

Turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone is a vital demand of our nation.

As long as there exist nuclear arms in South Korea, our nation cannot live in peace even for a moment, and if a nuclear war breaks out in the Korean peninsula, our people in the North and the South will be the first to suffer the most horrible disasters.

That is why the South Korean people of all walks of life as well as the people in the North regard it as the most important matter related to the survival of the nation to ward off the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and are fighting for the settlement of this problem.

Removing the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula and achieving a durable peace there is the common desire and demand of the world people as well, the article notes, and continues:

It is clear to anyone that if another war breaks out on the Korean peninsula, with a large number of nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, it will immediately turn into a nuclear war and further, its flames will quickly spread beyond the boundary of Korea.

If the Korean peninsula is to be denuclearised, the North and South of Korea should agree upon this and jointly declare it, and the United States and nuclear weapon states around the Korean peninsula should legally guarantee the position of the Korean peninsula as a nuclear-free zone once an agreement is reached and declared as such.

The government of our Republic has already put forward a proposal for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and solemnly declared at home and abroad that it is ready to take all necessary steps for its realisation. Now it depends on the attitude of the United States and the South Korean authorities.

If the United States and the South Korean authorities make a disinterested approach to our peace initiatives and join in our sincere efforts for the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and in the current of the times, the danger of nuclear war can be rooted out from the Korean peninsula.

U.S., South Urged To Accept Denuclearization

*SK2108100191 Pyongyang Korean Central
Broadcasting Network in Korean 0021 GMT 19 Aug 91*

[NODONG SINMUN 19 August commentary: "They Should Join in Keeping Step With the Trend of the Times"]

[Text] A series of changes has occurred in the situation in different parts of the world, but tension is growing on the Korean peninsula alone, far from being eased. What is all the more grave is that unlike in other parts of the world, the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is increasing with each passing day, greatly threatening not only our people but the people of Asia and the world. This is entirely because the United States is running counter to the general trend and keeping a large stock of nuclear weapons in South Korea, thus resorting to the policy of nuclear blackmail.

Due to the nuclear war maneuvers by the United States, a nuclear war to invade the North can occur at any time on the Korean peninsula. If this is carried out, the people of Asia and the world as well as our people will suffer the holocaust of a nuclear war.

No other place in the world is as dangerous as here, where the source of a nuclear war can be created. This is arousing great worry and uncertainty with each passing day among the world people who treasure justice and peace. Thus, the world's people are strongly demanding the immediate withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Eliminating the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and guaranteeing solid peace are pending issues of this era which cannot be delayed any longer. In particular, the international situation today urgently demands an immediate end to the presence of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea, which are a product of the cold war era.

A condition for eliminating the danger of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula is being provided. The deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea by the United States is a direct outcome of its nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Today, the United States says that Soviet-U.S. relations have moved to reconciliation and cooperation from antagonism and confrontation, and that the two sides have agreed not to start a nuclear war against each other. These developments have created an objective possibility for turning the Korean peninsula into a zone free from nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, the U.S. authorities have expressed support for the proposal for establishing nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. They have taken the position that they do not oppose in principle the establishment of nuclear-free zones on condition that the parties concerned reach an agreement. If this is the case, the United States must no longer avoid denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

The changing situation at home and abroad today presents a mature demand for achieving as soon as possible denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, which is a pending issue in the world's politics.

The DPRK Government has proposed to denuclearize the Korean peninsula and has laid down detailed ways of implementing it, out of a noble desire to remove the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and to preserve a durable peace and security in Korea and the world. Also we have already clearly elucidated that we do not have nuclear weapons and that we have no intention or capability of producing them.

Our position and proposal regarding the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is receiving wide support and welcome from our people and the people of the world with each passing day, due to its justness and feasibility. The South Korean people are also demanding the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons and denuclearization on the Korean peninsula.

This issue is dependent upon the attitude of the authorities of the United States and South Korea. There is no ground or excuse for the United States and the South Korean authorities to refuse to accept our proposal.

Determining what kind of attitude to take on the issue of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will be a test in judging whether the United States and the South Korean puppets truly hope to achieve Korea's peace.

The United States and the South Korean puppets must join us without delay in our efforts and in keeping step with the trend of the times to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

U.S., ROK Urged To Act on Denuclearization

*SK1908061391 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0507 GMT 19 Aug 91*

[Text] Pyongyang August 19 (KCNA)—NODONG SINMUN today urges the United States and the South Korean authorities to immediately reciprocate the DPRK's efforts for the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and keep step with the trend of the times.

The news analyst says:

Some changes have taken place in the situation in different parts of the world, but tension is growing on the Korean peninsula alone, far from being eased. This is entirely because the United States keeps a large stock of nuclear weapons in South Korea and resorts to the policy of nuclear blackmail.

The international situation today urgently demands an immediate end to the presence of the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons in South Korea, a product of the era of the cold war.

The deployment of nuclear weapons in South Korea by the United States is a direct outcome of its nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Today, the United States says that the Soviet-U.S. relations have veered to reconciliation and cooperation from antagonism and confrontation. And

the two sides have agreed not to start a nuclear war against the other side. The developments have created an objective possibility of turning the Korean peninsula into a zone free from nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, the U.S. authorities express support to the proposal for establishing nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, South Asia and Africa and take the position that they do not oppose in principle the establishment of nuclear-free zones on condition that the parties concerned reach an agreement.

If so, the United States must no more shun the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.

The DPRK Government has proposed to denuclearise the Korean peninsula and laid down detailed ways of implementing it, out of a noble desire to remove the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and preserve a durable peace and security in Korea and the world.

There is no ground or excuse for the United States and the South Korean authorities to refuse to accept our proposal.

Korean Denuclearization Appeal Adopted in Nepal
SK2208110191 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1002 GMT 22 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang August 22 (KCNA)—An appeal to all the political parties, governments, public organisations and people in Asia and the world was adopted at the conference of political parties and public organizations for denuclearization of Korean peninsula against U.S. nuclear threat to Asia which was held in Nepal.

The appeal said:

The imperialists are these days trying to force "nuclear inspection" upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea which has neither intention nor capacity to develop nuclear weapons. It is aimed to cover up the dangerous U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and divert elsewhere the attention of people in Asia and the rest of the world.

Stressing that all the peace-loving states of the world including Asian countries, political parties, public organisations and people should heighten vigilance against the U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and rise as one in the struggle to remove them and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone, the appeal calls upon them:

Firstly, the North and South of Korea should agree on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and make a joint declaration thereof for the removal of the source of the nuclear war from the peninsula and the rest of Asia.

We extend firm support and solidarity for the new peace proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that the United States, and the Soviet Union and China, the nuclear weapons states neighboring on the Korean peninsula, legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula once an agreement is reached and declaration is adopted to this effect, and that the non-nuclear

weapon states in Asia support the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and respect its nuclear-free status.

Secondly, the peace-loving countries and people of the world should actively join in the concerted efforts to force the United States and the South Korean authorities to open to the public all the nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in the southern half of the Korean peninsula and immediately accept international inspection of them.

Thirdly, we strongly demand that the U.S. and South Korean authorities present, without delay, a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea and discontinue unconditionally the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises from next year on.

Fourthly, a powerful struggle should be waged to force the United States to give legal commitment not to make nuclear attack and pose nuclear threat against the DPRK and other Asian countries.

We call upon all the governments, parliaments, political parties and public organisations in Asia and the world that love peace and justice to support the struggle of the Korean people for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country and to take an active part in the struggle for building a new world, free and peaceful, by removing the danger of nuclear war from Asia and expanding ceaselessly nuclear-free, peace zones in the region.

Cuban Support for Nuclear-Free Plan Reported
SK2208054491 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0436 GMT 22 Aug 91

[Text] Pyongyang, August 22 (KCNA)—The DPRK's proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula was supported by Cuba.

PRENSA LATINA reported Tuesday from Havana as follows:

Cuba expressed its support to the DPRK's proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone to contribute to world peace and security.

The Foreign Ministry of Cuba stated in its note that to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms at present is, no doubt, one of the major preoccupations and desires of mankind.

The Korean Government put forward a new and concrete proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula where the United States has a large nuclear arsenal and other means of mass destruction.

The note stressed Cuba has always opposed the presence of mass destruction weapons, nuclear arms in particular, and that is why it strongly supports the proposal.

Another reason why Cuba supports this proposal is that it is conducive to peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world, the note added.

SOUTH KOREA

Changing Nuclear Policy on Peninsula Viewed

SK0908033491 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 9 Aug 91 p 2

[The "News Analysis" column by staff reporter Kang Song-chol]

[Text] A significant turning point in efforts to resolve the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula may be in the offing.

Recent developments signal that Seoul and Washington could soon come up with a new policy regarding the Korean nuclear issue.

Seoul has already expressed its willingness to talk directly with North Korea over nuclear nonproliferation on the peninsula.

Some experts have also hinted at the possibility of Seoul's accepting the linkage idea over North Korea's nuclear weapons development program and U.S. nuclear arms allegedly posted in the South.

The expected policy shift is believed to have been high on the agenda during the Seoul-Washington policy consultations talks held in Hawaii this week.

Noteworthy in recent developments is Seoul's increasingly flexible and progressive stance over the nuclear issue, departing from its past defensive position.

The change of attitude may reflect Seoul's recognition of the need to resolve the nuclear issue for a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, political analysts say.

Seoul's chief policy-makers even appear to think that they can use the nuclear question as a leverage in improving ties between the two Koreas.

First major signs of a policy shift on the part of Seoul and Washington came early last month when President No Tae-u met with U.S. President George Bush in Washington.

The two presidents then were said to have agreed that Seoul would play a leading role in any future negotiations with North Korea on nuclear matters on the Korean peninsula.

No's national security adviser, Kim Chong-hui, said No and Bush agreed on a "leading-supporting role" concept regarding military matters on the peninsula.

Kim's remark was interpreted by many analysts as suggesting that the United States will not have direct, secret negotiations with North Korea and that Seoul should conduct any negotiations with the North.

About a month after the summit, the Seoul government expressed willingness to talk directly with North Korea over the nuclear question.

Such a position will likely be conveyed to the North again in the fourth inter-Korean prime ministers' talks in Pyongyang late this month.

A key factor in Seoul's new policy may be the virtual acceptance of the idea of linking north Korea's nuclear development project with the reputed U.S. nuclear arms in South Korea, say analysts.

Seoul and Washington have been urging the North to open all of its nuclear plants, including nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities, for international on-site inspection without conditions.

The North in return has been calling for the withdrawal of, or similar inspection of U.S. nuclear weapons in the South.

The north has recently again come up with its proposal for a "nuclear-free" Korean peninsula.

Seoul and Washington are expected to retain their position on rejecting the linkage idea, at least officially.

But many analysts believe that they will likely try to have the North understand that the U.S. nuclear arms may be pulled out depending on its attitude over its nuclear weapons development program.

The acceptance of the linkage concept may be out of political considerations to encourage the North to completely give up its plan to produce nuclear arms.

In purely legal terms, the North's opening of its nuclear facilities for international surveillance cannot be related to other matters, as Pyongyang is required to do so as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

One possible option under consideration by Seoul may be to declare that there exist no U.S. nuclear weapons in the South when the North is judged to have discarded its nuclear development program, according to analysts.

Some reports have said that the United States has already informed the Seoul government of its plan to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the South.

The need to pull U.S. nuclear weapons out of South Korea has been raised recently by politicians and scholars on both sides. They argue that it is no longer necessary to station the arms in the South, considering advancement in arms technology and changes in political situations on and around the Korean peninsula.

Whether the reputed U.S. nuclear weapons are pulled out or not, the U.S. government is expected to maintain its neither-confirm-nor-deny (NCND) policy over the existence.

Officials of the Seoul government have said they also support the NCND policy, reasoning that it would help serve as a deterrent against an armed aggression from the North.

Seoul's new policy on the nuclear issue may be expressed via No's Liberation Day speech Aug. 15 or his speech before the U.N. General Assembly Sept. 24.

Denuclearization Discussion With North Possible
SK1008063791 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
9 Aug 91 p 1

[Text] It was learned on 8 August that during the 5 August working-level delegates' contact for the fourth round of North-South high-level talks, the government conveyed its willingness in the future to "carry out negotiations" between North and South authorities regarding the North Korean side's proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, as long as the North side does not link the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula and nuclear weapons possessed by the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and completely accepts international nuclear inspection.

This kind of viewpoint by the government suggests that the government is changing its existing policy due to the recent changes in the security situation on the Korean peninsula. In the past, the government had said that North Korea's claim that U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea must be withdrawn and that a nuclear-free zone must be established on the Korean peninsula "are not subject to negotiation." It is noteworthy that discussions were made on the possibility of holding negotiations for the first time on the "nuclear issue" during the North-South official contact.

NEW ZEALAND

Foreign Minister on Limits of Antinuclear Stand
BK0808143291 Hong Kong AFP in English 1422 GMT
8 Aug 91

[Text] Wellington, August 8 (AFP)—New Zealand cannot allow its antinuclear beliefs to dominate its foreign policy any longer, Foreign Minister Don McKinnon said Thursday.

In a speech, he said there was a need for a more "realistic," more "sophisticated" approach to foreign policy.

A previous labour government passed antinuclear laws in 1986, effectively banning American warship visits here. As a consequence, New Zealand's membership in the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and U.S.) military pact was suspended.

Mr. McKinnon's government has pledged to honour the anti-nuclear laws while striving for a new pro-Washington relationship, with Mr. McKinnon saying that if New Zealand wanted to be part of the "new world order" it had to recognise the totality of its interests and strike a balance between them.

"That means accommodating things like the environment, trade access and security responsibilities in our overall approach," he said. "We cannot afford to let a single issue dominate a relationship to the exclusion of all else."

Mr. McKinnon said only those with an inferiority complex would think working with others meant subordinating themselves to the other's position.

He said those who thought New Zealand was leading the world in its antinuclear policies should recall no other country had emulated the ship-visit legislation.

VIETNAM

USSR-U.S. Summit Meeting, START Treaty
Veiwed

'Big Step' Brings 'Hope of Peace'

BK1108150191 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network
in Vietnamese 0015 GMT 3 Aug 91

[Essay by station correspondent Duong Quang Minh]

[Excerpts] The ninth USSR-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow has concluded. At the meeting, the USSR and the United States discussed many issues concerning their bilateral relations, as well as international issues of mutual concern.

Two results emerged from the meeting:

1. USSR President Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush signed the USSR-U.S. agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons. The two sides agreed that within seven years the USSR and the U.S. will cut the number of intercontinental missiles on the ground and in submarines. They will reduce the number of heavy bombers as well as the number of nuclear missiles in those planes. After seven years, each side will have no more than 6,000 nuclear missiles, and 1,600 intercontinental missiles on the ground, in submarines, or in planes. The agreement also bans any development of strategic offensive weapons. The two sides also agreed that the agreement will be in force for 15 years and it may be extended for additional five year periods if there is no new agreement to replace it.

2. The USSR and the United States released a joint communique concerning the Middle East, in which the two sides confirmed that they would try their best to speed up and support a peaceful national reconciliation process between Arab countries. The communique also pointed out that the two countries, as cochairmen, will contribute their parts in convening an international peace meeting on the Middle East next October.

In a joint news conference on 31 July, President Gorbachev and President Bush stressed that to a considerable degree the summit meeting reviewed the two sides' recent cooperation and allowed them to increase their mutual understanding.

The world has been following the two sides' efforts both to improve the state of their relations and to decrease the amount of confrontation in international relations.

The USSR-U.S. agreement on the reduction of strategic weapons still has to wait for approval by their respective parliaments, but the signing of the treaty is considered to be a big step along the road to the disarmament of nuclear weapons. This document will further push back the danger of annihilation by nuclear weapons and increase mutual trust.

Together with the previous agreements, this agreement brings in the hope of peace and strengthens international security. There will not be any disasters such as happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki 46 years ago. [passage omitted]

The public is happy with the agreements between the USSR and the United States at this summit meeting and wants these agreements to become reality.

START Called Highlight of Summit

*BK1208102191 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network
in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 3 Aug 91*

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The recent summit meeting between USSR President Gorbachev and U.S. President Bush in Moscow is a big international event which has attracted the attention of the world public. This is the ninth summit meeting between the USSR and U.S. in the last six years. This time it was held while the international and USSR situations are undergoing rapid and complicated changes.

At the meeting, the two sides spent a great deal of time discussing their bilateral relations and international issues of mutual concern.

It is noteworthy that the USSR and the U.S., after nine years of negotiations, have signed an agreement to reduce by 30 percent on both sides their strategic offensive weapons.

According to the agreement, known as START, within seven years after the agreement comes into force, the two sides will progressively reduce their strategic offensive weapons so that by the end of the term of the agreement, each side will have no more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 intercontinental missiles and cruise missiles based on the ground, on submarines, or on heavy bombers. [passage omitted]

This USSR-U.S. summit meeting has an important meaning. The most prominent result is the signing of the START agreement. This is a big step along the road to nuclear disarmament. The agreement will further push back the danger of annihilation by nuclear war, improve the international atmosphere, increase mutual trust, and create conditions for the strengthening of common peace and stability.

After the 1987 INF agreement, the recently signed START agreement is another important step fulfilling the people's

aspiration for disarmament in order to abolish the danger of a war of annihilation and to build a permanent peace.

The struggle for the implementation of complete and thorough disarmament is a long-lasting one. But the START agreement brings back the hope of further agreements in the future.

The USSR-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow has further strengthened cooperative bilateral relations although the two countries still have some disagreements. The improvement of relations between the two powers is beneficial for both, encouraging the tendency toward dialogue and cooperation in international relations.

The meeting is considered to be an important international event and its positive results—especially the signing of the START agreement—have been welcomed by the public.

DPRK News Conference on Nuclear Free Zone

*BK1908070991 Hanoi Voice of Vietnam Network
in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 3 Aug 91*

[Text] This morning, the representative of the DPRK Embassy held a press conference in Hanoi to introduce the statement of DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs on turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

Representatives of the party Foreign Relations Department, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a number of representatives of central and Hanoi press agencies attended the conference.

The DPRK embassy representative stated that at present, there are about 1,720 nuclear weapons stored in South Korea. The Korean peninsula is becoming a global target area because of this large number of nuclear weapons.

The DPRK Government, based on its noble aspiration to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war in the Korean peninsula and to contribute to a permanent peace in Korea, Asia, and the world, has proposed many peace initiatives to build a nuclear free zone in the Korean peninsula. The current situation is now ripe for such action.

The DPRK Government suggests that North and South Korea agree on creating a nuclear free zone in the Korean peninsula and issue a joint communique on this matter.

U.S. and nuclear weapons countries close to the Korean peninsula should guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula.

The non-nuclear weapon countries in Asia should support and respect turning the Korean peninsula to a nuclear-free zone.

POLAND

Soviet Troop Train Leaves Country

*LD2108175491 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1500 GMT 21 Aug 91*

[Text] The first train carrying Soviet troops, which left Bialogard yesterday, has already left Poland. A few minutes after 1300, after the Polish frontier services had finished inspecting the train, the entire consignment left for Mamonovo on the Soviet side of the border.

USSR Begins New Round of Withdrawal Talks

*LD2108174591 Warsaw PAP in English 1046 GMT
21 Aug 91*

[Text] Warsaw, August 21—Poland and the USSR began Wednesday forenoon the 11th round of negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops based in this country. The talks are expected to last three days but they may end earlier, officials said.

CUBA

Foreign Ministry Lauds DPRK Call for Korean NFZ

*FL2008175691 Havana Radio Progreso Network
in Spanish 1625 GMT 20 Aug 91*

[Text] The Cuban Foreign Ministry has declared its support for the DPRK initiative to (?declare) the Korean

peninsula a nuclear-free zone [NFZ]. The Cuban Foreign Ministry has stated that the DPRK proposal is a great contribution to world peace since the United States has concentrated great military reserves in that territory which endanger the entire Asian region.

INDIA

Commentator on U.S.-USSR START Agreement

BK1008124091 Delhi All India Radio General
Overseas Service in English 1010 GMT 10 Aug 91

[Commentary by K. Subramaniam, director of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis]

[Text] The START agreement signed in Moscow on 31st July 1991 indeed represents a turning point in history. For the first time since the strategic arms race began with the Soviet TA-16 bombers and the ICBMs, which could raze the American mainland in the mid-fifties, this is the first cutback on the arsenal. However, the treaty finally signed, did not come to the expectation held out earlier during the course of discussions. The often-mentioned goal was to reduce the arsenal on either side to 6,000 warheads. In the end, the Soviet arsenal is being slashed to 7,000, while the U.S. gets away with 9,000. Reflecting the quality of the balance of power, this treaty too is an unequal one. The explanations for this unequal cuts are very arcane.

The American literature and media highlight that the most dangerous weapons are eliminated first, and consequently the most severe reduction in the Soviet SS-18's from 308 to 154. That alone accounts for 1,540 warheads. The bulk of U.S. warheads are in the submarine-borne missiles and they will continue to be. It could be argued that since submarines are not under such tight control of the central national authority, as the land-based missiles, they are more dangerous. There are all kinds of justifications in favor of one point of view or the other. Since the Soviets need the American and Western goodwill more than the other way round, they appear to have given up their earlier stand of equality and equal security and accepted a treaty which projects the U.S. as a senior military power.

In reality, these figures do not matter since 7,000 warheads in the hands of the Soviet Union can destroy the U.S. several times over as 9,000 warheads can. The deterrent potential of 9,000 warheads is not more than that of 7,000 or for that matter of even 2,000. The [word indistinct] game of numbers, dimensions of assured destruction and the argument of about first and second strike are all recognized today as apparently sophisticated but phony justification for some arbitrary number of missiles arrived on an ad hoc basis. Thereafter, installations of the MIRVs—Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles—started and swelled the warhead total to between five to six times.

There are realistic expectations that this agreement will be followed by more negotiations to cut the arsenals further. They are reasonable expectations because there is clear realization that a nuclear war cannot be won and, therefore, should not be fought. For the purpose of deterrence, these insane arsenals do not make any sense. One suggestion has been that the present missiles should be replaced by single warhead ones, in which case the same number of

missiles will have only one-fourth or less number of warheads. Another view is even five percent of the present arsenals in survivable mobile vehicles can exercise the same degree of deterrence as the present or proposed ones do.

The START does not prohibit R and D and production of new missiles in place of the present ones, though there are stipulations on issues like launch weight. Just as there is radioactive decay in nature, assuming that a nuclear war is not likely to be fought among nuclear-weapon powers, the world should be able to look forward to a decay in the nuclear arsenals, since maintaining the arsenals will cost money. However, the R and D establishments of both sides may be expected to come forward with various proposals for new generation weapons.

Till now, the arms race was fueled by the anticipation of what was considered feasible in terms of R and D on one's own side was bound to be attempted by the adversarial sides and achieved. Such anticipation is no longer justifiable in a world that has ended the cold war and is attempting to develop an international society in place of the anarchic system we have been used to. What is, therefore, needed beyond arms control is the mutual restraint on weapon-oriented R and D. At least, in the initial stages, both U.S. and the Soviet weapon laboratories and military industrial complexes are bound to resist any such proposals. There is, however, a view that it is the defense R and D-led growth of the U.S. that has resulted in its losing its competitiveness to Europe and Japan. If the economic competition with Europe and Japan intensifies and the other view gains further ground, the Americans may consider it in their own interest to switch over their enormous R and D assets away from military application toward civilian one. At present, such a long-range vision is not evident in the U.S. leadership. Its economic competitors—West Europe and Japan—have no interest in weaning the U.S. away from military R and D.

ISRAEL

New Foreign Ministry Department on Disarmament

TA1108134291 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew
11 Aug 91 p A1

[Report by 'Imanu'el Rosen]

[Text] In the aftermath of U.S. President George Bush's disarmament initiative, a new department has been set up in the Foreign Ministry to deal with conventional and nonconventional disarmament in the region.

The department will be headed by a former Israeli ambassador to Norway. According to security sources, the new department came into being because it is believed that disarmament will be one of the first issues on the agenda of the peace conference scheduled for October.

GENERAL

Sergey Kortunov Calls Arms Talks 'Obsolete'

91WC0148A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 25, 23-30 Jun 91 p 13

[Article by Sergey Kortunov, candidate of historical sciences: "End of Arms Control?"]

[Text] Disarmament talks, based on the East-West stand-off, also are becoming obsolete before our eyes. They are slow to react to rapid developments in bilateral and multilateral political relations, while striving for an unwieldy all-embracing agreement which answers all problems.

These negotiations were set up under an atmosphere of confrontation between two war machines which no longer compete on an equal footing. Owing to a number of internal political factors, the USSR, whether its military and industrial complex wants it or not, will have to give up the arms race.

One of these factors is transition to the market and privatization of enterprises. As a result, the USSR's ability to compete effectively with the U.S. in armaments becomes doubtful. Strategic parity with the U.S. was ensured under the command system, which allowed unlimited financing of military programmes to the detriment of the civilian economy. But it will become more and more difficult to do this with each passing year.

Another factor is democratic reforms. Their aim is to create a law-governed state in which resources and finances will be distributed not in the interest of the military and industrial complex, but in strict conformity with the priorities of national security, as determined by the Supreme Soviet.

De-ideologizing Soviet society will also encourage radical disarmament. It will show the absurdity of opposing the West with military structures based on distorted ideas about the development of world civilization.

Yet another factor is the mounting influence of Republics. Their striving for independence and their decisions to make their territories nuclear-free zones may compel the country's leading military and political bodies to revise, without any negotiations with the Americans, Soviet strategic and tactical weapons deployment, and to curb military activity in general.

There is no need to fear such a scenario. Such developments are normal for any civilized country. The U.S., Britain and France have had to deal with similar concerns.

All these factors clearly show that the old disarmament scenario is no longer valid. Actually it means an end to arms control as it was understood in the 1960s-1980s. It is naive to think about the on-going strategic offensive weapons negotiations or that the Vienna talks will proceed as previously.

Meanwhile there are calls in the West for a respite in disarmament in order to determine general problems in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Costs of Arms Cuts, Defense Conversion

91WC0137A Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 7, Jul 91 (signed to press 21 Jun 91)
pp 11-22

[Article by Aleksey Pavlovich Kireyev, senior consultant of the International Section of the CPSU Central Committee and doctor of economic sciences: "The Price of the 'Peace Dividend'"]

[Text] Attempts to assess the economic effectiveness of the foreign policy of the USSR were activated when the country began to slide even further into the abyss of the crisis and it was urgently necessary to seek additional means to patch breaches appearing here and there. The consumer psychology rose up against excessive expenditures for administration, space, defense, and everything else that did not visibly add anything to the increasingly empty store counters.

The question of the economic effectiveness of foreign-policy actions arose seriously for the first time in 1988 after the signing of the INF Treaty. At that time it was declared that the national economy received a real yield of tens of millions of rubles (R) in 1988 just through the conversion of industrial capacities involved in the production of these missiles. In addition, R300 million previously designated for military expenditures were put into the social sphere.

It was not possible to receive a satisfactory answer to the questions arising about how much the very process of the elimination of missiles will actually cost and what efforts and means will be required for this. Only a few times did debates arise in the press about the fact that perhaps the missiles should not have been destroyed through the method of blowing them up and burning them out, inasmuch as this leads to the loss of a large quantity of costly rare-earth metals (including gold, platinum, and silver), the ecology is harmed, and their potential for peaceful purposes is not utilized. But the treaty had already been signed and the destruction was proceeding precisely in accordance with the agreed schedule and no one was about to look into the economic details.

The next burst of interest in the problem of the size of the "peace dividend" occurred after the 28th CPSU Congress, where the corresponding data were presented. As E.A. Shevardnadze declared, the "peace dividend" from the realization of the foreign-policy course of the USSR based on the new thinking was supposed to amount to R240-250 billion over the five year period.¹

This figure is more than imposing—it is one-third of the Soviet GNP, about half of national income, and almost R1,000 for each one of us. It is also a considerable sum per year: R50 billion is half of the deficit in the state budget and equal to practically all Soviet imports.

Inasmuch as I do not know the methodology of the calculation, one must suppose that the indicated figure included all direct and indirect "dividends" that in one way or another have to do with the new foreign-policy course of the USSR. Clearly it was a matter of the

intensification of international economic cooperation and an increase in the amount of aid from the West to the processes of reform in the USSR, the reallocation of resources from military to peaceful purposes as a result of the settlement of regional conflicts, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from abroad, the lessening of the general military confrontation, including in Europe, and many other factors that certainly have a positive influence on the international economic climate but are not well suited to statistical accounting and quantitative expression. It is possible that all of this is not so. But I repeat that the methodology of these calculations is still unknown.

The most tangible and easily accessible source of a "peace dividend" is the reduction of the military budget. Until quite recently this problem could be viewed only on the general theoretical level. Now that in October 1990 the USSR for the first time sent to the United Nations data on its military expenditures in accordance with the standard system of reporting used in this organization and after the confirmation of the military budget for the current year in January 1991, there is some information to consider.

Along with expenditures for the national economy, science, and agricultural subsidies, defense outlays are a most important component of the expenditure part of the Soviet state budget, comprising 15-16 percent of it in 1989-1990. Until the announcement that Soviet military expenditures in 1989 amounted to R77 billion rather than about R20 billion, as was formerly thought, the major part of them, according to my estimates, were registered in the class of expenditures for the national economy (approximately one-third) and in the class of expenditures for science (about one-half).

In 1990 as compared with 1989, as was announced, the military expenditures of the USSR were reduced by R6.3 billion (8.2 percent). In 1991 as compared with 1990 (in constant 1990 prices), it is planned to make still another reduction—by R5.6 billion (8.5 percent). Altogether the savings within two years is supposed to amount to about R12 billion. This would seem to be the "peace dividend" of the new political thinking, for the expenditures of our state budget are being reduced and according so is its deficit.²

On closer examination, however, it turns out that it is not that simple. Above all the increasing inflation forces one to consider the same statistical indicators in constant prices (in the prices of a particular year) and in current prices (here they are called operating, actual, real prices, etc.). The severest property of inflation is the fact that through an increase in prices it "eats away" a substantial part of budget resources. In the current year, such was the fate of military expenditures as well: as a consequence of price increases of 25 to 65 percent for raw materials, finished output, services, and also wage rates, the military budget, having declined in constant prices, increased to R96.6 billion in current prices, or by almost 27 percent, in comparison with the previous year.

Considering that the average estimates of the rate of inflation for the national economy are somewhere around

12 to 14 percent, it is obvious that the military sector is experiencing a hyperinflation that is consuming budgetary resources twice as fast as in the economy as a whole. It follows from this that the saving of resources in the military budget is not even sufficient to cover the increase in the prices for output, which is remunerated through it, and additional state expenditures are required, not to mention some sort of "peace dividend."

In addition, in discussing the military budget, the military people have reasonably noted that they themselves are claiming a substantial part of that "peace dividend," which is obtained on paper if one computes the budget in constant prices. It is clear that funds are needed for military reform, the withdrawal of forces from abroad, a social security program for soldiers and members of their families, the construction of housing, etc. So they do not intend to turn "their" money over to anyone else.

An important reason why it is not possible to obtain any sort of a tangible "peace dividend" from the reduction of military—just as, by the way, any other expenditures—is the huge deficit in the state budget. Because it is one of the primary sources of all our economic woes, the task of reducing and eliminating it in the reordering of the budgetary pie must have absolute priority in comparison with all other interests.

The reduction of budgetary outlays, whether they be military or any others, objectively lowers the level of state consumption and hence the rate of economic growth. The rate of capital turnover is diminished and as a result equal-sized investments in the military sector yield less profit. The loss of part of state consumption has repercussions on other branches of the economy that are linked in some way or another with the defense sector and forces them to make additional capital investments, including through budgetary means, to compensate for the lost production.

So that it is almost certain that a reduction of military expenditures will be accompanied by a proportional increase in budgetary investments in other branches of production, which may be quite significant in volume, considering the scale of the Soviet military economy and the degree to which most outwardly civilian branches are "grounded" in it. And in this case an increase in the budgetary financing of civilian branches may fail to give an adequate increase in the production of peaceful output, for it will have the nature of a replacement of lost military production.

But the most noticeable blow to the potentially possible "peace dividend" from the reduction of military expenditures will of course come from the transition to market relations, which is already being expressed in generally higher prices. Even despite the fact that price-assignment rather than price-setting tends to prevail in the defense sector, it will not be possible to maintain the previous price level for military output. Information is already reaching the press that, for example, the new price set by the government for one tank is more than twice the former price.

A chief of rear services of the USSR Armed Forces complains that the contract prices under which the army has to buy part of the output from civilian branches have multiplied: merino wool went from R20 to R52 per meter, cloth for a field uniform from R3 to R10.5 per meter, cotton nearly doubled in price, etc. Monopoly enterprises are demanding that the Defense Ministry allocate building materials, motor vehicles, and personnel for their needs and frequently that it pay for their output with foreign exchange. Under such conditions, it would be at least naive to count on an absolute reduction of the military budget and the possibility of utilizing the achieved "peace dividend" for civilian purposes. Most likely it can only be a matter of the nonincrease in the military budget by seeking internal budgetary reserves to cover the growing outlays.

Still another potential source of a "peace dividend" on which we are counting as we go the way of a lessening of international tension is the conversion of the defense branches of industry.

In accordance with the given political situation at the dawn of perestroyka, conversion was supposed to become one of the factors in the improvement of the well-being of the nation and the increase in the production of consumer goods and equipment for the processing of agricultural output. Overcoming difficulties, conversion was called upon to help saturate the consumer market, raise the technical level of civilian branches, and strengthen the export potential of the country.

According to available calculations, over the seven years of conversion (1989-1995) it is planned to increase the actual volume of tape recorders issued by a factor of 1.4, refrigerators, television sets, radio receivers, and freezers by a factor of 1.5 to 1.6, electric vacuum cleaners by a factor of two, sewing machines by a factor of 2.3, and video recorders even by a factor of 33. The military-industrial complex is already producing the lion's share of these goods. At the end of the 1980's, they infused several dozen enterprises for the production of equipment for the timber and food industries into it, calling on them, through the corresponding programs and decrees, to raise the output of this equipment to a higher qualitative and quantitative level on an urgent basis.

This was the argument: in all the years of Soviet authority, we spared nothing to strengthen the defensive capability of the country, often giving the best production, material, and manpower resources to this sphere. Now, when social and economic problems have worsened, the people have the right to demand that the military-industrial complex provide effective help in resolving them. In reality, a situation has come about in which the defense industry turned out to be the last trump that we could present to the approaching calamity and imbalance in the economy so that we can somehow at least clothe and feed the people.

The draft of the State Program for the conversion of the defense industry for the period through 1995 was composed on an emergency basis. In it, as is customary in documents of this kind, the products list and volumes of civilian production that were entrusted to several hundred

defense enterprises undergoing conversion were broken down to the last screw. After all, the "advantage" of the centralized planning system was precisely in the fact that Gosplan knew "better" what some faceless machine-building plant or machine shop somewhere in the Urals should produce.

Initially there was euphoria: the high-tech defense enterprises will give to the empty Soviet market video and audio equipment, stereos, and other such output that can be sold to the rich at insane prices ensuring a high standard of profitability to the enterprises undergoing conversion. But very soon it was found that the defense industry was being asked above all to produce prosaic kneaders, electric abattoirs, and canning lines that no one was in a hurry to acquire at prices several times higher than those of the prevailing price lists.

The euphoria died away when it was discovered that the cutting of the production of arms only diminishes the load on production capacities, a part of which simply stand idle, but does not permit their use for the issue of peaceable output. After all, it is not possible to alternate armored personnel carriers with trucks on the slowing military conveyor—the production technology is different. Some of the equipment turned out to be so exotic that it cannot be used at all except for military production.

They then began to calculate what quantity of resources have to be invested to reorganize or even simply to mothball military production before harvesting the "peace dividend" from its conversion. Unimaginable sums for the current state of the Soviet economy were invested in the state program of conversion: R9 billion for the reorganization of some defense enterprises for peaceful needs and another R31 billion for the creation of new capacities for the production of civilian output at defense enterprises.³

Of course it was telling that the military-industrial complex became accustomed to perceiving the terms "cost accounting" and "self-financing" as something abstract that does not affect it. They were always given as much money as they asked for. So why not try it again? You want conversion? they asked. You will get it but pay several billion from the budget for it. If you also want an increase in peaceful production, then this will cost you another 30 billion.

To somehow justify the situation that has arisen, numerous interviews with high-ranking leaders of the military-industrial complex began to appear in the press, in which they assured the taxpayers that major supplementary investments are needed only at the beginning. But later, when the conversion gets going strongly, the "peace dividend" will rapidly flow into their pockets.

It is extremely difficult to make forecasts in our dynamic time and no one can say what will happen with the conversion process after 1995. Most likely the present leaders of the military-industrial complex will no longer be around and the new ones will say that they are not responsible for the mistakes of their predecessors.

It is quite clear that one cannot expect any sort of a significant "peace dividend" from the conversion of the defense industry either today or in the next few years. Most likely it itself will require major supplementary capital investments.

Considerable hopes are linked with the physical reduction of arms and armed forces: it is no longer necessary to bear the burden of operating expenses or to repair and test armadas of weapons that will be eliminated in accordance with the Soviet-American agreements on the destruction of chemical weapons and on the reduction of strategic offensive arms and the multilateral treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. Besides the unilateral reductions of armed forces already undertaken by the USSR, this will also make it possible to reduce their number significantly, freeing tens of thousands of highly qualified specialists for the national economy.

The reduction of individual types of arms also implies a reduction of their production. In the West in this instance, they usually calculate how much of the budget will be freed by abolishing some military program or other. In addition, not all of the arms being cut—under the Vienna treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, for example—are subject to physical destruction. Part, and a very significant part, of the combat aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles are subject to conversion for national economic purposes. There are already numerous projects for the peaceful use of the "nuclear triad": the launching of artificial satellites into space, the building of mobile laboratories on heavy bombers to monitor the ecology of the air space, and the use of submarines as excursion ships and the like. It is not without reason that all of this can be seen as a "peace dividend" of disarmament.

But no estimates are being presented of the potential gain for the peaceful economy if yesterday's armored personnel carrier will transport reindeer breeders of Chukotka and howitzers will drive piles. It is obviously primarily because they simply do not exist. It is well known from experience that the self-sufficient military economy is striving to raise the prices for its own output—after all, the state pays for everything—which are often a magnitude higher than the prices for analogous output in the civilian sector. The extremely inflated expenditures for purchases of arms and military equipment, which in 1990 were about 44 percent of the military budget here as compared to 27 percent for the Americans, speak for themselves.⁴ The cases of the ten-fold exceeding of list prices for such peaceful output as kneaders or cheese dairies that are occurring in defense enterprises undergoing conversion indicate that they are not able to produce goods even with the same overhead expenses as inefficient civilian enterprises. For practically all military equipment, they apriori incorporate a multiple artificial raising of costs, in part dictated by the extreme demands on quality, durability, etc. that are not required for civilian goods. So it is by no means such a simple matter to cover these enormous expenses even through the most intensive utilization of yesterday's military equipment for peaceful purposes.

The question of the realization of the disarmament agreements already signed is acquiring an importance of its own. Usually no estimates are given of their cost in the process of the development: the sides only approximately estimate the cost of inspections, various means of destruction, and expenditures for the protection of the environment and for service personnel. Especially since the elaboration of disarmament agreements, particularly in the last stage, usually proceeds in extreme haste; the participants try to coordinate their signing to a previously set date or a certain state visit. The real scope of expenditures required for the realization of particular agreements becomes clear only when the corresponding state program is drawn up and the kinds of possible outlays are calculated.

The example of the disposal of chemical weapons is most illustrative in this connection. In the USSR, the production of chemical weapons was stopped back in 1987 and so no advantage has been obtained from this. At the same time, in accordance with the draft state program, there are three versions for the disposal of chemical weapons: do this directly at their storage sites, establish two regional centers, or build a single state center.

The first version requires the expenditure of R1.1 billion, the confiscation of 24,000 hectares of land, and the involvement of 6,000 to 7,000 service personnel. The implementation of the second requires R540 million in capital investments and R100 million for the reconstruction of railroads and for security. The cost of the third version is not being revealed, although it is known that on the order of R2.5 billion will be needed for the performance of the entire state program. But if one also considers the substantial indirect expenditures, above all for the support of the ecology, then the real outlays may turn out to be even higher.

At the present time, there is simply no money for any of these versions. But in accordance with the Soviet-American agreement on the disposal and nonproduction of chemical weapons, each of the sides is supposed to begin to dispose of them no later than 31 December 1992. By 1995, the annual rate of disposal must reach no less than 1,000 tons. It is necessary to destroy half of all reserves by the end of the decade and by the end of 2002 the sides have obligated themselves to reach the minimum level of reserves of 5,000 tons of toxic substances each.

The end of 1992 is not far off and it is possible that when the time approaches we, just as in the case of the INF Treaty, will have to hurry, feverishly buy facilities for the disposal of toxic substances in the United States, or, what is even worse, burn or blow them up through home-grown methods, thereby threatening the ecology. In accordance with Point 10 of Article 4 of the treaty, of course, it is possible to modify the time for the realization of the agreement but this is politically disadvantageous, for it undermines public confidence in the seriousness of the intentions of the sides.

Judging by the aggressive reaction of the military people to any comments with respect to the necessity of considering alternative versions for the disposal of chemical weapons

that would make possible even a partial compensation of the expenditures for their production one can presume the following development of events. The Soviet military-industrial complex will be able to put a highly expensive state program through parliament, obtain the necessary billions (and since the government has no money, it is clear that it will simply have to print it), and "rest on the laurels" of disarmament, having ensured itself work of importance to the state for many years to come. And all critical comments in this regard will be dismissed quite simply: they will say that it was the president who signed the treaty and not the Ministry of Defense and the chemical industry produced the toxic substances, not the Ministry of Defense, so call them to account. If you want us to dispose of the chemical weapons, then give us two or three billion rubles and, if the government makes the corresponding decision, so be it—we will do you the favor.

One cannot preclude the possibility that an analogous dead-end situation could also arise in the course of the implementation of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. Under it, our country will have to eliminate (destroy or convert for use in the national economy) about 19,300 units of arms and equipment, including 1,300 combat aircraft, 7,600 tanks, 9,600 armored vehicles, and 760 artillery systems.

This Vienna treaty sets forth for the first time the possibility of utilizing part of the equipment to be eliminated for civilian needs. Of the above-named quantities, we have the right to convert 750 tanks and 3,000 armored vehicles into universal truck tractors, bulldozers and fire-fighting, emergency, quarrying, and drilling vehicles, cranes, and other kinds of equipment for the national economy. The cost of such conversion and utilization is not indicated in the treaty and apparently was not calculated prior to its signing.

It is difficult to say what a Soviet tank costs but an American M-1 "Abrams" costs about \$3 million. The most improbable peaceful occupations are being thought up for Soviet tanks—from tractor trucks for the taiga to a silage presser for the cattle yard. If one assumes that our tank costs less (because of the distorted system of prices for raw materials and supplies, low wages, etc.), then it turns out that in translating dollars into rubles, even at the official rate, one silage presser will cost an enormous amount of money. It would be interesting to know what kolkhoz or farmer will agree to purchase it?

As for the elimination of conventional arms, Hungarian economists have calculated that from \$4,000 to \$12,000 will be required to dismantle one tank, for example. That is a considerable sum regardless of the rate for the conversion of dollars into rubles. It is quite obvious that expenditures for the elimination and utilization of conventional weapons cannot be covered through the minimal gain for the national economy from the utilization of their parts and components for peaceful purposes.

So in this area of practical disarmament, the "peace dividend" turns out to be nothing more than a phantom that one would like to see and get a hold of. The trouble is that this is not possible.

Disarmament leads to a serious structural reorganization and often to an absolute reduction of defense branches of industry and armed forces. This, in turn, means the freeing of large numbers of people employed in these areas and the necessity of redistributing them among other areas of employment. In the West, the elimination of jobs as a result of the cutting of military programs was always the strongest argument of the military-industrial lobby against the antiwar movement. This forced public organizations, trade union activists, and antiwar forces to present various kinds of projects to compensate for the jobs lost as a result of disarmament through the development of alternative peaceful production. But under the conditions in which the market was saturated with practically everything, it seemed improbable that an adequate scale of such production could be assured and hence projects of this nature did not elicit much enthusiasm among working people.

In the years of perestroika, we for the first time ran into the social side of disarmament when we announced a unilateral reduction of armed forces by half a million and the withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe and also when we began to implement plans for the conversion of the defense industry, which, according to the most conservative estimates, will affect the fate of no fewer than four million people.

Western experience in resolving the social problems of armed forces shows that this is a pure load on the budget and that there can be no talk of any sort of a "peace dividend" here—even if one takes into account the fact that highly qualified personnel from the military sphere will go into peaceful production, thereby permitting an improvement in its efficiency and quality of output and the creation of new goods. In any case, this yield may occur only after several years and therefore it is practically impossible to assess its true scope, whereas pensions and benefits have to be paid to people today. For example, the American Veteran's Administration, with a budget of many billions, deals with a broad number of questions ranging from life insurance to the maintenance of military cemeteries.

Here no aggregate assessment was made of the expenditures for the resolution of the social questions arising in the disarmament process. Essentially they amounted to various kinds of supplementary payments to workers freed only as a result of the conversion of the defense industry. Separate assessments were made of the social outlays in connection with the reform of the armed forces. But those employed in the defense industry and military people saw only the state budget as a source of financing for the needs that are arising, counting on the moral responsibility of the society toward those who are defending it.

These demands came into contact with other social questions that the parliaments of all levels dealt with primarily and most often they took the form of general declarations of intentions not supported by any sort of serious economic calculations. True, the government made more specific decisions on compensation, preferring not to mention the sources of funding for such compensation. In most cases, obviously, the printing press went to work, filling the

channels of the already sick monetary turnover with new and increasingly devaluated paper money.

We have not yet fully calculated the negative social consequences of the disarmament measures already implemented and of those in the future and we are not aware of them. One cannot exclude the possibility that in the future it will be necessary to spend greater and greater sums from the state budget to overcome them, sums that will substantially cover the incipient savings from the reduction of military orders.

How can the "peace dividend" be earned? How can it be transformed from a hypothetical idea to a practical reality? How can one see to it that disarmament not only strengthens international security, which is not well understood by the ordinary person, but also improves the conditions of his daily life?

It is quite obvious that it is impossible to implement disarmament without cost. Based on the laws of natural science, the level of these expenditures must be commensurate with the outlays for the development of arms systems. It is known from thermodynamics that just as much energy is required to destroy a substance as to synthesize it. Thus, improvement of the economic indicators is possible primarily through the rationalization of the very process of disarmament and the efficient peaceful use of resources being released, production capacities, and combat systems and their components undergoing cuts.

Historically it happened that for us the point of departure for the disarmament process was always negotiations between states culminating with the signing of bilateral or multilateral military-political agreements or the corresponding unilateral political decisions made by the highest bodies of authority under the pressure of domestic (reduction of the military budget) or international (withdrawal of troops from the countries of Eastern Europe) circumstances. Only after this did state programs in the USSR begin to be formulated for practical actions in some area of disarmament or other and very frequently it turned out that in practice it was difficult or even impossible to realize the achieved agreements in the indicated time and to receive a "peace dividend" in the process. Such a course of actions is very much reminiscent of the neo-stagnant steps in Soviet diplomacy, when at first they issued a glaring slogan (like "economic security") and only then did everyone begin to think together what it might mean and how it could be explained to our partners abroad.

With the signing of major agreements and the adoption of unilateral measures, the disarmament process is attaining such a momentum that structural changes in production forces are required. There is a dramatic economization of foreign policy in general and of its disarmament course in particular.

From this follows the **first conclusion**: among the most important elements of the prenegotiation process, along with an analysis of security questions, the balance of power, etc., one must include a detailed study and economic justification of the practical feasibility of the

planned arms reduction measures. It is theoretically possible that such a study may show too high outlays for the realization of the planned steps, which the USSR cannot afford at this time. This will require a change in political priorities as well. The slogan "disarmament at any price" is unacceptable today.

In this connection, in my opinion, the above-mentioned agreement between the USSR and the United States on the disposal of chemical weapons is a mistake. For us, from a technical point of view, their prolonged storage does not present any problems but there are practically no disposal plants or economically efficient technology. The Americans, as the chemists say, long ago began to "leak" and they would have to start disposing of their toxic substances in any case. But, after calculating everything, they adroitly involved us in this process, forcing us to spend billions on a crash basis. I cannot shake the thought that the agreement was prepared for the next summit meeting: it was simply necessary to sign something. After all, is it not so that the more agreements are signed, for some reason the more successful the visit is considered to be?!

Second conclusion: it is necessary to implant into the disarmament process the idea of cost recovery, which clearly at first will be nothing more than a good intention but may be materialized as a "peace dividend" as this process takes final form. It is sufficiently obvious that cost recovery of disarmament is an attribute of our foreign policy. It is not very pressing for the West, where arms cuts are seen as a source of new state orders for private corporations and, accordingly, as a factor stimulating economic growth.

It is conceivable that the economic approach to disarmament may even evoke the opposition of our partners in negotiations (as has already occurred in the course of the preparation of the INF Treaty), who in a number of cases are counting not without reason on the economic component of pressure on us as a means of achieving political compromises most advantageous to themselves.

For the USSR, the most capital-intensive and painful component of the disarmament process is the restructuring of the production base of the defense sector for the issue of peaceful output, that is, conversion. The people have even begun to use the expression "fell under conversion," which is generally used in explaining the reasons for the decline in wages, personnel cuts, and the loss of privileges. Indeed, this is a substitution of terms. This is not conversion but its absence under the conditions of the reduction of military orders. Such problems should not arise in competent conversion.

Hence the **third conclusion**: international agreements, just as unilateral steps in the disarmament area, must be linked with the course of economic reforms within the country and, in the optimum variant, organically include conversion, thereby making it not a function of sporadically attainable agreements and decisions but possibly the backbone of the technological restructuring of the entire national economy. This, in turn, will make it possible not only to determine more precisely those spheres where we,

from an economic point of view, are more prepared for political steps toward disarmament but also ensure real openness of the Soviet economy to the world.

Considering that the relative share of the military sector in our economy as a whole is excessively large, it is clear that the possibility of its transfer to a market course and consequently of its integration with the world market depends to a critical degree upon the introduction of market relations into the process of the conversion of the military economy. Only market relations based on a balance of supply and demand and the interests of profit maximization will truly reject all ideological considerations and will make it possible to implement conversion based not on momentary market considerations but on the interests of extracting the maximum "peace dividend."

All of this leads to the **fourth conclusion**, that in the process of disarmament the economy must become the object of national and international regulation with the help of instruments especially designed for this. But not such instruments as the law on conversion in the USSR, the draft of which got hung up somewhere in the Supreme Soviet. Rather it is the fruit of the efforts of the military-industrial lobby that is striving if not to preserve the status quo then in any event to carry out conversion administratively, through the mediation of directives from the Center, clothing them in the garb of the law.

At the national level, the state is asked merely to define its priorities precisely and to work out the means for the economic stimulation of the defense industry for their achievement and other than that to untie their hands. That is, in the stage at hand it is a matter not so much of the law on conversion as of a concept for the development of the economy under the conditions of disarmament. The mechanism for its realization must be the market and the objective the maximum "peace dividend."

At the international level, it is necessary to study the economic questions of disarmament in the course of the negotiation process while consolidating the achieved agreements in the articles of the understandings to be signed or the addenda to them. It is conceivable that the partner interested in accelerating the process of disarmament in some specific area or other may offer the other side the necessary credits, technology, etc. for this. There is already a precedent—the financing by the united Germany of the withdrawal and stationing of Soviet forces beyond the borders of its territory. Such an approach will permit a more even distribution of the costs of disarmament and an improvement of the economic efficiency of this process as a whole.

Fifth conclusion: The Soviet military doctrine in general and the mechanism of its realization in particular is in need of substantial correction. Extremely little was done in the years of perestroika for the realization of the principle of reasonable defensive sufficiency. Whereas some changes did take place from the political point of view, this principle is not used at all in the economic sphere of defense production: the gross production of military equipment is continuing, expenditures on military science

are declining, and appropriations for the social needs of military people are inadequate. Apparently it is now time precisely for an economic reassessment of our military doctrine.

And finally, the **last conclusion**: under the conditions in which the military departments have to be convinced to destroy arms and they refuse, for "the duty of the soldiers is to look after his weapon," it would be expedient to segregate all disarmament expenditures in a separate line of the expenditure part of the state budget. And accordingly, reduce the budgets of the military departments and force them to fight among themselves for appropriations under this line.

Such appropriations may be rather large. Just to take disarmament measures (elimination of arms, performance of inspections, reconstruction of former military facilities, etc.) and to calculate the expenditures under several basic treaties (on the disposal of chemical weapons, the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, the reduction of conventional arms in Europe, inspections under the INF Treaty, etc.), then my very conservative estimates show that in the next five years without conversion of the corresponding capacities on the order of R4-5 billion and significant sums in foreign exchange will be required. And the largest share of the outlays will be for agreements on chemical and strategic offensive weapons.

And in general, so as not to grope in the dark and not to nourish any extra illusions about the "peace dividend," it would be reasonable to ask the appropriate departments to fill out a very simple table. Its first column would show estimated indicators of the savings from: the reduction of expenditures for the development, production, purchase, servicing, and storage of military equipment; the use of this equipment and its parts, metals, and materials in the national economy; sales of reduced arms and their parts within the country and abroad; personnel cuts; the issue of civilian commodities at converted military production facilities; the difference in the cost of maintaining forces in the USSR and abroad; compensation for the military and social infrastructure established abroad; and other items.

The second column should include data on outlays for: the dismantling, disassembly, and destruction of military equipment; the conversion of its parts for national economic needs; the preparation of equipment for sale and its realization; the demobilization, job placement, and social security of personnel being cut; the conversion of the corresponding production capacities; the redeployment of forces from abroad; the establishment of a military and social infrastructure in the new places of their deployment; and other items. The third column would show the real magnitude of the "peace dividend" obtained by means of the simple subtraction of the indicators of the second column from the data of the first. And by no means will the result always have a plus sign.

Mountains of incriminating materials were written on the exorbitant social and economic price of the arms race in the years of international tension. The price of the reverse

process—disarmament—is also proving to be considerable. This price must be paid but there is no need to overpay. The scientific course that could conditionally be called “economic disarmament” could show the way to the obtaining of a significant “peace dividend” tomorrow after having paid a moderate price for disarmament today.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 5 July 1990.
 2. PRAVDA, 16 December 1989; IZVESTIYA, 12 January 1991.
 3. KOMMUNIST, No 1, 1991, p 55.
 4. IZVESTIYA, 12 January 1991.
- COPYRIGHT: MID SSSR. Obshchestvo “Znaniye”. “Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn”. 1991.

Future of Soviet Nuclear Potential Viewed

PM0808155591 Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA
in Russian No 30, Jul 91 (signed to press 23 Jul 91)
pp 22-23

[By Pavel Bayev, candidate of Historical Sciences under the “Ongoing Debate” rubric: “The Nuclear Trump at the Negotiating Table. Will We Transfer Our Tests to Nevada?”]

[Text] The USSR’s nuclear interests can no longer remain “something which is hushed up” and camouflaged by nuclear-free rhetoric. The debate is pressing, and if it had as its introduction the political scientists’ considered judgments (for example B. Padyshv’s column in the March issue of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN), then the decisive demand from the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics technocrats brought it back to the mainstream of material and highly rational deductions. An emotional protest from the “Greens” camp or from the Committee for the Defense of Peace should in theory have been the response to the article in NOVOYE VREMYA issue No. 26, but I fear that this would have been a “dialogue of the deaf.” In my view what is most dangerous of all in the discussion which has begun is the dangerous and monolithic nature of the assessments, and in my analysis I will try to single out the problem’s external and internal aspects.

Nuclear Attributes of a “Superpower”

One of the traditional postulates of Soviet foreign policy has been the commitment to noble nuclear-free ideals. Having gained a confidence in tank armies, the Soviet leadership bravely stated that it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. In going over to the new political thinking, this postulate was developed into a program for a nuclear-free world, and its “author” did not fail to remind us of its successes in his recent Nobel lecture. I would like to refrain from making platitudinous analogies, but this program is something akin to the food program: Good intentions completely compensate for the absolute impossibility of implementing them.

At the moment the strategic situation dictates the need for political reliance on nuclear devices. With the conclusion of the Paris Treaty and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR appeared for the first time confronted by the fact of NATO’s quantitative and qualitative superiority in all components of military potential. The existence of nuclear weapons evens out this superiority and makes the building of an ideal balance and the removal of obvious imbalances superfluous. I venture to posit that it is just this argument (the nuclear “safety margin”) which may play a decisive role in the ratification of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe by the Union parliament. But irrespective of this procedure’s result, the effect of nuclear deterrence gives NATO an opportunity to plan reductions significantly lower than the “ceilings” agreed upon in Vienna, and gives us the chance to finally set about implementing the military reform.

This naturally does not signal the necessity to preserve existing nuclear arsenals. During the cold war both sides were drawn into a senseless nuclear technologies race. The North Atlantic alliance unilaterally halted at least its quantitative escalation. But to this day there is no certainty as to whether we have stopped and, to be honest, the nuclear research specialists’ article does not increase the certainty. You get the impression that the Union leadership is banking on the start of talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and has been saving up the “bargaining chips” by postponing the most pressing steps in curtailing the nuclear programs. In an attempt to push these talks forward, our propaganda appealed to the dying antinuclear movement in the West, and as a result the momentum was lost and today the future of talks is very unclear.

But this does not mean that the resolution of nuclear questions has come to a hopeless standstill. After the final settlement of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Weapons, the agreed parallel reduction of nonstrategic nuclear forces to minimal levels opens up unique opportunities for cooperation by the “European four.” Its aim may not only be a new quality of military stability, but also the coordination of nuclear programs and even the creation of structures for cooperation. Today this still seems like an abstraction but leading Western experts, whom no one would suspect of smug complacency, are discussing options which are no longer for a minimal deterrence but for “deterrence by cooperation.” In this way, the nuclear factor may become not a source of conflict and distrust, but an important stabilizing element in the all-European military security structure.

On the way to nuclear cooperation, apart from political problems (see later), two categories of obstacle are evident. First, there is the problem of physically destroying the nuclear munition, and here I would like to hear the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics experts’ authoritative opinions, as well as their opinions about the possibility of joint technological programs. Second, there is the absolute secrecy of all information concerning the Soviet nuclear arsenals. NATO specialists say in confidence that they know up to 90 percent of this information (although I cannot discount this being

a bluff), but a new level of openness and trust is necessary with regard to one's partners and to public opinion at home.

If we succeed in resolving these questions and a nuclear structure in Europe based on cooperation begins to be formed, we can suppose that it will, to an ever greater extent, reorient itself to repulse challenges from outside. The Gulf war with its nuclear and chemical subtext forces one to take these challenges completely seriously. And here the threat from the south may become even more dangerous for the USSR than for the West, even though we do not need the Near East's oil. The Union's borders are becoming all the more penetrable to national, religious, and other sources of instability, and the vulnerability of our southern "underbelly" is becoming greater before our very eyes. It is difficult to predict whether nuclear weapons will be a stabilizing factor here, but such a function cannot be altogether ruled out.

In this way the usefulness of nuclear weapons to the USSR in this transitional period between it being a militarized superpower and a partner on equal terms is beyond question. But guarantees of external security also have a negative aspect—the risk of internal instability.

Control Over the "Button"

The USSR's disintegration is today becoming the most serious nuclear threat to Europe. The defense minister's categorical statements that "under no circumstances will nuclear weapons be allowed to become split up" is hardly capable of reassuring anybody. And also the attempts to stimulate Western assistance for perestroika by means of downright nuclear blackmail (Russian nuclear revolt!) are for the moment producing results opposite to those desired. The possibility of losing control over the nuclear "button" is considered to be so serious that many people in the West are beginning to practically regard the Soviet idea of a nuclear-free Europe as the lesser of two evils.

Not being in possession of A. Kabakov's talent, I would not like to get into apocalyptic scenarios of several nuclear quasi-states arising from the USSR's ruins, hostile to each other and to the whole world. At the same time, it is clear that it is impossible to preserve the Union in its previous form and composition, and that the "nine plus one" formula gives only a chance of a resolution. And if the independent Baltic republics' nuclear-free status can be guaranteed, it is necessary to urgently resolve the problem of creating nuclear-free zones in the Transcaucasus and indeed in Central Asia.

The "sovereign" republics' claims to control their own nuclear potential for the moment can still be rejected, but are we ready to repulse the threat of nuclear terrorism? A series of tragic accidents with the most up-to-date weapons systems point to the high probability of a "military Chernobyl," and it is impossible to reduce it to an acceptable level in a nonprofessional army. Add to this the immutable fact that the Army today has become the basic source of arms for any "voluntary" formations, mafia-like groupings, and so on. No extraordinary protective measures can close off the channels by which nuclear warheads may be

misappropriated or seized, especially when they are being evacuated from hotbeds of tension.

The situation may only be defused by immediate and far-reaching reductions, primarily of nonstrategic systems (nuclear shells, mines, mobile tactical missiles) which will be the most attractive targets for terrorists. And we should in principle be prepared for the possible eventuality of it becoming necessary to put our nuclear facilities under international control, if we lose control over the situation.

Are the arguments in favor of preserving the nuclear status compatible with the alarmist assessments of the risk involved? I think that they are not mutually exclusive—on the condition of there being a realistic and responsible approach to adopting decisions on nuclear matters.

One of the most difficult will be resolving the question of tests, which, it seems, worry the three researchers most of all. This question comes at the juncture of external and internal problems. Tests on Novaya Zemlya are not acceptable even to Europe—remember the painful reaction to last year's discharges and the Greenpeace ship's mission. The tests in Semipalatinsk are unacceptable to Kazakhstan. So, could we transfer our tests to Nevada?

Dispute Over INF, CFE Treaty Compliance Obligations

USSR Said To Violate 'Spirit' of Accords

91WC0152A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian
1 Aug 91 p 4

["V.A." report and extracts from U.S. Administration publication: "Soviet Missiles in East Europe: When Did the White House Learn of Their Existence?"]

[Text] The Soviet press, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA included, has already reported on the complications which have arisen in connection with the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF). The problem is the fact, which has suddenly been revealed, of the Soviet Union's delivery of 72 SS-23's (operational-tactical missile-23) to Bulgaria, the GDR, and the CSFR. Yet this fact has been known to the Americans for quite some time, to which the document published below—the U.S. Administration's annual report "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements"—testifies. The report was sent by President Bush to the leaders of Congress at the start of March 1991 and subsequently transmitted via TASS channels. We publish a fragment pertaining to the SS-23 missiles. The NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA editorial office believes that this text contains certain important nuances which have escaped the notice of the Soviet public. Of course, the fact that the United States knew of the Soviet missiles in East Europe long before the present discussion of the problem by no means removes it from the agenda.

OBLIGATION: Article I of the INF Treaty specifies that each side will eliminate all of "its" intermediate-range missiles and will no longer possess such systems. Article V repeats the demand that each side eliminate all "its"

shorter-range missiles pertaining to the categories "listed in the Memorandum of Understanding." Article VI prohibits the production and flight testing of any intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. Put together, these provisions also in fact contain a ban on the transfer of the systems limited in accordance with the treaty after the treaty has been signed: each side must eliminate all its intermediate- and shorter-range missiles [RSMD] and does not have the right to manufacture such weapons in the future for any purpose, transfer included. (...)

HISTORY: At the start of 1990, when the GDR officially declared that it was eliminating the SS-23 missiles deployed on its territory, the United States learned of the existence of the SS-23 missiles in the three East European countries for the first time. The Soviet Union declared that it had redeployed the SS-23 missiles in the GDR, CSFR, and Bulgaria prior to the INF taking effect. None of these countries is a party to the INF Treaty. The SS-23 are shorter-range missiles, which are listed in the INF Treaty. The Soviet SS-23 missiles should have been eliminated by 1 November 1989.

A document of 19 May 1989, submitted to a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, by Soviet representative Khromov points out that 450 SS-23's had been manufactured. As is clear from this document, of these, 239 were eliminated in accordance with the INF Treaty, and 211 were fired for testing purposes or "supplied to Warsaw Pact countries." It does not specify the countries which received the missiles; it does not adduce data on the quantity and class of the missiles obtained by these countries; and it does not specify how many of these 211 missiles were used in testing. The United States now has information that the Soviet Union made approximately 70 SS-23 missiles available to the three above-mentioned East European countries. As of this time the Soviet Union has not clarified the status of any of the remaining 211 missiles—the number specified in the Khromov document—despite the United States' repeated attempts to obtain such information.

CONCLUSION: On the basis of the facts available as of this time, the U.S. Government cannot conclude that the Soviet actions concerning the transfer of the SS-23 missile systems signify a violation of the INF Treaty. But the facts available do not relieve the Soviet Union of responsibility. One way or another, the fact that the Soviet Union failed to notify the United States of the existence of SS-23 missile systems in the GDR, CSFR, and Bulgaria in the course of the negotiations and in the interim period preceding the GDR's statement testifies to a lack of good faith. The USSR is under a political obligation to contribute to the elimination of this entire class of missiles of Soviet manufacture. The United States is concerned about the existence of these systems and will continue to seek from all the parties concerned facts permitting an incontestable conclusion as to their ownership. (...)

As of this time the Soviet Union has not clarified the status of these missiles, despite the United States' repeated attempts to obtain such information. There is, therefore, serious concern that the Soviet Union has or had SS-23

missiles which have not been declared and dismantled in accordance with the procedures specified by this treaty.

Does this story not remind you, reader, of another, more recent one—involving tanks redeployed beyond the Urals and reassigned to the command of the Navy on the eve of the signing of the CFE Treaty? It is this document which has now been submitted to the U.S. Congress for ratification. However disturbing, the cliché "the Soviets cannot be trusted" has still not become an anachronism, and it is not without reason, after all, that the report quoted above has become an annual.

Yes, formally the Soviet Union is right in both instances. But there is not only the letter but also the spirit of the treaty, not only the legal but also the political responsibility of the parties. However high-flown it sounds, responsibility for the fate of peace. Petty legal chicanery does not become a superpower. If, of course, we wish to continue to call ourselves such.

'Rejoinder' Hits Idea of Violation in 'Spirit'

91WC0152B Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
13 Aug 91 p 3

[By Konstantin Mezentshev: "Who Needs Disarmament 'Stakhanov-Mania?'"]

[Text] One is not surprised when one comes across a paragraph in a New York newspaper exciting public opinion to the effect that the problem of our TU-22m bombers (Backfire in English) has remained somewhat separate from the main wording of the Soviet-American treaty on strategic offensive arms [SNV], for example. Or when one sees in Moscow on a television channel a heated debate on the alleged undue concessions to Washington undermining the security of the USSR contained in this same treaty.

This is both normal and understandable. Very few things have as yet attained the level of planet-wide interests. For this reason journalists and politicians are concerned primarily about the interests of their own countries and their own fellow citizens.

But one opens up, let us assume, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. It carries extracts from a U.S. Administration document entitled "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." It maintains that the naive United States missed several years prior to the INF Treaty taking effect the Soviet side transferring some of its SS-23 missiles to the CSFR, Bulgaria and the GDR. (How this could have happened given the dense satellite electronic surveillance of the Soviet Union and its former Warsaw Pact allies, God and the Pentagon alone know. There is muddle everywhere, however.) Naturally, these missiles were not destroyed. Something needs to be done with them. But on the basis of the current facts the authors of the report write, nonetheless: "...the U.S. Government cannot conclude that the Soviet actions...signify a violation of the INF Treaty."

The Soviet journalist, who signed only his initials, accompanied the extracts from this report to Congress with a

brief comment, in which he reproaches our country for, although not having violated the treaty, having acted badly, all the same. The poor Americans were almost fooled. As also in the case of the tanks transferred from Europe "...beyond the Urals and reassigned to the command of the Navy on the eve of the signing of the CFE Treaty."

It is offensive when one encounters elementary incompetence. Doubly so in a respected newspaper.

"On the eve," in the case of the tanks, is computed at a minimum of three years. This is the first point. Second, the arms race has brought the world to a state where simply no disarmament document can be up to date.

Take, for example, that same just-mentioned conventional arms treaty. Serious military experts (not only Soviet) now believe, for example, that our side took insufficiently into account the possibilities of the transfer of NATO forces into the "Turkish pocket," hard by the USSR border. Which, incidentally, was borne out in the course of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis—in fact, not in theory.

But I began to write this rejoinder by no means to reprove the anonymous author from NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA for being unpatriotic. I would simply like my colleagues to remember that they are read not only by the Russian-speaking population of New York's Brighton Beach. Despite the end of the cold war and the warm, informal relations taking shape between the Soviets and Americans, we remain, for all that, different great powers. And our interests, although not hostile, are different.

These relations are regulated by documents in international law. And each will, within the framework of what has been signed, uphold the interests of his own country. Not the other way around. Living by the law is by no means "legal chicanery," as NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA believes. It is this which becomes a "superpower," not disarmament "Stakhanov-mania."

As far as the problems in respect to the missiles are concerned, specialists on both sides understand their complexity and intricacy full well. They understand and are beginning increasingly in their solution to rely on one another's good will and the new political thinking. These factors worked in first-rate fashion in both the instances raised by the newspaper, incidentally.

U.S., USSR Disarmament Progress Viewed

PM0708142591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Aug 91 Second Edition p 5

["My Opinion" report By Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "From Hiroshima to the World"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The sides spent nine long years moving toward the treaty signed in Moscow. And a further seven years have been set aside to implement it. As a result, so skeptics point out, by 1999 Moscow and Washington will have approximately the same number of warheads as in 1982, when the talks on strategic offensive arms began. Let us agree, however, that any brakes are better than no brakes. There is also cause to ponder

something else. If the USSR and the United States have scrapped just approximately one-third of their strategic arsenals by 1999, the idea of entering the 21st century without nuclear weapons is hardly realistic, although it still has value as a guiding line.

Be that as it may, mankind is moving toward a nuclear-free, nonviolent world. The unilateral Soviet moratorium, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, and the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms are milestones on this path. It is important for the disarmament process to develop without protracted pauses. However, THE LOS ANGELES TIMES points out, the two presidents' opinions on this question differ. Whereas the Soviet leader proposes moving on without delay, his U.S. partner is in no hurry to resume the talks. In the new treaty, the newspaper points out, the United States has managed to avoid any mention of naval arms. And the White House is least of all interested in somehow limiting the U.S. superiority on the seas in the year before the elections.

Account must, however, be taken of the fact that, with new heights being scaled, other problems have taken on a different complexion and become topical and acute. It is necessary to curb the arms race on the seas and prevent it in space. Chemical weapons must be totally banned and their stockpiles destroyed. A mechanism is needed to impede the spread of nuclear and missile technology and any means of mass destruction. The potential of trust accumulated since the end of the "cold war" enables Moscow and Washington together to set about creating a system of lasting security under conditions of openness, stability, and predictability. [passage omitted]

The global problems which mankind has encountered on the threshold of the new millennium have been drawn into a tight knot. And they can only be resolved comprehensively, by tackling the chief element—nuclear disarmament. For this generates trust, releases material and intellectual resources for creative purposes, and, most importantly, spares the human race the fate of the victims of Hiroshima.

New World Security System in Wake of Moscow Summit Foreseen

91UF1047A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 31, 7 Aug 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Sergey Rogov, doctor of historical sciences: "The USSR and the United States: Partners in a Multipolar World? Reflections After the Moscow Summit"]

[Text] It would seem that President Bush's visit to Moscow is taking place within the framework of the usual ideas about Soviet-American summit meetings. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, proclaimed as historical, has been signed. A number of steps have been taken in the economic field that remove some of the obstacles to trade and economic cooperation. All of this is enough to state that, by the traditional criteria, the Moscow summit is a success.

But I would not be in a hurry to reach that conclusion. For whereas during the cold war years any step aimed at

reducing Soviet-American tension undoubtedly was of positive significance, today this, in my view, is not enough.

Previously the maximum that could be achieved in top-level diplomacy was limited by the ideological confrontation ("who will bury whom?"), mutual denials, and delegitimation of the two systems. Accordingly, the aim of the leaders of the United States and the USSR was merely to reach agreement on such "rules of the game" as would make the rivalry between the two "superpowers" more predictable and less costly, so that the confrontation would not get out of control and lead to mutual catastrophe.

Now the cold war is a thing of the past and in relations between the USSR and the United States, instead of ideological dogmas, the real interests of the two powers are being moved to the forefront. It is precisely these mutual relations that define a new model for Soviet-American relations. Among the state interests, economic interests connected with demand in both the domestic and the international markets were and remain a priority.

The ideological conflict led to the militarization of economic cooperation between the USSR and the United States. Military force became the measure of power for the "superpowers" in their global confrontation. And the administrative command system, economic boycott notwithstanding, did cope not badly with the organization of the arms race. We were able to reach parity not only in the nuclear sphere but also in conventional weapons, and not only with respect to the United States, but also West Europe, China, and Japan, that is, with all the other power centers in the world arena.

But for us the price of parity was too high. For over the course of at least two generations we lived under the conditions of a wartime economy (in 1991 the proportion of spending in the Union budget is 36 percent, almost the same as in 1941). The Soviet military-industrial complex produced as many weapons (missiles, tanks, guns, warplanes) as were made throughout the rest of the world. We were behind only in naval forces, although we did create the world's second largest navy after the American Navy.

The result is well known: Our society was unable to withstand that great pressure. The steady decline in the living standard, the inability to meet minimum consumer requirements, and the progressive lagging in the technological sphere brought our economy to the brink of collapse. Today we remain a "superpower" only on the plane of the gigantic arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. But this excessive military might in no way gives us prestige in international affairs. It is clear that alone we cannot maintain military balance with all the major participants in international relations. We must achieve PARTNERSHIP with the key centers of power. This will enable the USSR to preserve its important role in world politics.

The United States, too, has paid no small price for the arms race, although it spends on defense not 25 percent of GNP, as we do, but about 10 percent, and now five percent. Militarized priorities in the economy have led to a situation in which the United States has lost many of its leading positions in the world market, and even more because out of

purely ideological considerations ("containing communism") with its own hands it helped competitors to their feet—Germany (which spends three percent of GNP on defense) and Japan (just one percent).

The end of the cold war signifies also an end to the bipolar system of relations. The disappearance of the "socialist community" is only one side of the coin. The other side is less dramatic, but the fundamental loss by the United States of the role of the one and only leader of the West.

True, it has recently been reasoned, particularly since the Persian Gulf war, that Washington has become the "only superpower." But here they forget to say that for the first time since the American War of Independence the cost of this expedition was paid for completely by the allies of the United States—Japan and Germany, and also Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

In fact, a new multipolar system of international relations is being formed. And there are still no guarantees that a multipolar world will be more secure than the bipolar world. For the most terrible world wars in the history of mankind occurred precisely when a multipolar structure existed in international relations. Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was merely a portent of the cataclysms that may occur if there is no new system of international security to replace the nuclear discipline of the cold war.

The main task for the present period is to organize an orderly transition from a bipolar to a multipolar structure in international relations in order to guarantee that the process is peaceful and stable. The dilemma lies in how to encourage the necessary political changes without upsetting military-strategic stability, and how to strengthen stability without blocking political changes.

It is obvious that in the foreseeable future our country's restructuring and the restoration of the economy will be of priority importance for us. Moreover, movement of the Soviet Union out of crisis is largely linked to overcoming international isolation and integrating our country in the world economy. Cooperation with the United States and the other developed states of the West will obviously be essential in solving both short-term tasks (for example, those relating to shortages of food, medicines, and so forth) and long-term tasks (the structural reorganization of the economy). It is becoming clear that for the Soviet Union, maintaining its positions in the international arena during the 1990's will depend largely on its ability to establish nonconfrontational cooperation with the United States.

In turn, they are beginning to understand in America the strategic importance of relations with the USSR for the building of the new world order. It would seem that the Americans should take advantage of our domestic crisis in order to consign us (as Reagan once promised) to the "trash can of history." Instead of that, when he was in Moscow Bush called for an "outline of prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations built not on military confrontation but on economic cooperation, and cooperation in the field of security."

It is, therefore, a dangerous anachronism to regard ideas about the ineluctably confrontational nature of our relations with the United States and the West in general. With the end of the ideological confrontation it has become clear that the degree of divergence in the interests of the USSR and the United States is not all that great.

However, the powerful military-industrial complexes are being preserved, along with excessive armed forces and the traditional ideas about the methods of military force to ensure security. In this regard, not only the United States but we also are displaying an inconsistency that is leading to loss of tempo and complicating consolidation of the positive changes in the international arena. Obviously, the unilateral actions that led to the unjustified delay in ratification of the treaty on conventional arms reductions should not be repeated. It would also be a mistake not to note the significant reductions in the military budget and armed forces of the United States and the re-orientation of the American war machine away from preparations for global confrontation with the USSR and toward low-intensity conflicts in the "third world."

The mistakes in accomplishing the conversion of the defense industry are also exerting a negative influence, as is the growth in the proportion of military spending in the Union budget. This is not only hampering us in achieving an economic return from arms reduction agreements but also preventing the organization of closer cooperation with the West in solving the strategic task of integrating the USSR into the world economy. There can be no doubt that without change in the approach to this problem we will be unable to count on receiving large-scale economic and technical assistance from the West.

The old mechanisms for ensuring security, both national and at the interstate level, are today ineffective. The Warsaw Pact has therefore disappeared, and NATO is trying urgently to find a new meaning for its existence. Moreover, even achievements in arms control negotiations, such as the INF treaty and the treaty on reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe, and the treaty on limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms, which has just been signed, are no longer adequate. For their purpose was to achieve "ideal parity," a mirror-image equality of the forces of those engaged in military confrontation. But now, when the main reason for that kind of confrontation has been removed, these agreements to some degree preserve the earlier model of confrontation by promoting retention of the stereotype of "the enemy."

Of course, START was necessary and essential for both sides. Whereas the 1972 agreement on reducing offensive strategic arms (SALT-1) only established limits for increases in the numbers of strategic missiles but did not establish limits for nuclear warheads, and the SALT-2 agreement, signed in 1979 but not ratified, reduced the number of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons by 5-10 percent, the new treaty reduces the strategic arsenals of the USSR and the United States targeted one against the other by 30-35 percent.

On the whole the treaty makes it possible to maintain strategic stability by preserving the situation of "mutual assured destruction" into the 1990's. But it does not block modernization, and it virtually encourages the sides to build up the aviation component of the strategic offensive triad. This may "eat up" the savings from the cutbacks (a B-2 bomber costs more than \$800 million, and how much does a Tu-160 cost?). Competition will probably also grow in the sphere of strategic defense, not only and not so much in the development of ABM's but also the development of air defenses, and also antiship weapons.

I think that this is the crux of the problem that the USSR and the United States face today. The legal principle of "everything that is not forbidden is permitted" makes sense in domestic affairs, but not in the strategic sphere. Meanwhile, even with the entire unprecedented system of checks envisaged by the START treaty, many methods for continuing the arms race remain open.

This also explains the lack of enthusiasm about START among the experts, for it reflects the old model of verification of arms as a method for jointly making decisions in the sphere of security. This kind of model to regulate military competition gives the sides freedom of action within established frameworks, and in the absence of coordination stimulates the vicious circle of "action and reaction."

In fact, the historical task facing the two countries goes far beyond the framework of regulating confrontation. Continuation of military rivalry under conditions in which American military spending this year equals the federal budget deficit, while here it seems that the situation will be even worse, is not simply senseless but becomes a major threat to the vitally important interests of the USSR and the United States. M.S. Gorbachev, therefore, has invited America to a "fundamental transformation of our mutual relations for the sake of universal peace, stability, and progress."

Together with the dismantling of the legacy of the cold war it is necessary to achieve the institutionalization of the positive process in the world arena as quickly as possible. To resolve this task what is needed is a mechanism of mutual security for the USSR and the United States as an integral part of new universal system of international security now taking shape. The mechanism of mutual security should include a system of joint bodies constantly to agree the diplomatic, military, and economic positions of the two states in all matters affecting their interests.

The functions of this mechanism should not be limited to negotiating for the purpose of signing specific agreements, but should include permanent dialogue to ensure that decisions reached by the leadership of the two countries are made giving due consideration to each other's interests both through officially recorded agreements and coordination of actions without the formal conclusion of treaties.

It is a question of switching from "negative" to "positive" decisionmaking in the sphere of security. It is time to understand that there is no such thing as an ideal treaty, but there is a process that requires close cooperation at the

political and military levels. Obviously the new character of Soviet-American relations and the presence of parallel and joint interests in the field of security make it possible to pose the question of switching to "positive" joint decisionmaking. It is essential to lay the cards on the table, exchanging with the other side the long-term plans for military development, including the deployment of strategic forces.

A standing consultative commission, negotiating institutions for strategic and space weapons, bodies to verify the INF Treaty, a center to reduce the nuclear danger, and other common institutions should become integral components of such a system. However, in terms both of the composition of the instruments and of their aggregate quality, the mechanism of mutual security should be set at a level higher than the present level of Soviet-American cooperation. It is obviously necessary to consider the question of setting up on a permanent basis bodies such as a committee of foreign and defense ministers and a commission to maintain communication between the general staff of the USSR Armed Forces and the U.S. chiefs of staff.

The mechanism of mutual security for the USSR and the United States requires an unprecedented level of glasnost and openness between them, including in the military sphere. A regime of transparency is needed, which should be backed not only by a system of reliable verification, including on-site monitoring and inspection, but also by the adoption of standards of openness in military activity. This degree of glasnost and openness in the military sphere, if, moreover, it is guaranteed by the ruble and the dollar and by the Supreme Soviet and the Congress, will help in resolving the question of intentions and combat possibilities not only today but also tomorrow. This kind of approach will make relations between the two powers more predictable than will the most stringent methods to verify treaties of "prohibition."

In order to ensure predictability and irreversibility in the matter of dismantling the mechanism of military confrontation between the USSR and the United States, the process of parallel arms reductions should be augmented by a process of dismantling the economic foundation for the arms race. Agreement on efforts in this matter, and joint technical solutions will provide the best guarantee that there will be no quick return to confrontation.

It is advisable to set up a joint Soviet-American commission on conversion that could coordinate the efforts of the two countries in solving similar management, technological, and social problems. The creation of a international conversion bank with the participation of the USSR, the United States, and other major states is also possible. This bank could provide credit for the larger expenditures that the re-orientation of some enterprises will require, or spending to retrain the work force at plants that simply have to be closed down. Perhaps joint-venture enterprises could also be set up with support from this bank.

Extensive cooperation is also necessary to restrict trade in weapons and military equipment, including nonproliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and technologies for

ballistic and cruise missiles. Agreements reached with the United States in this sphere could become the prototypes for international agreements on these issues. Neither should we exclude re-orientation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls and setting up a new international organization to monitor deliveries of weapons and military technology to the developing countries. This would be of great importance for the development of Soviet-American cooperation with respect to regional conflicts in the "third" world.

If the Moscow summit is followed by real steps to institutionalize the new partnership between the USSR and the United States, then this top-level meeting really will go down in history as a key event in creation of the new world order.

10th European Nuclear Disarmament Convention Held

To Meet in Moscow for First Time

*LD0808174191 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT
8 Aug 91*

[By Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, August 8 (TASS)—To discuss the socio-political situation in the Helsinki region following radical changes of recent times, to elaborate fresh approaches to problems in the framework of European integration processes, these tasks will be discussed by participants in the 10th Convent for Nuclear Disarmament to be held for the first time in Moscow.

A TASS correspondent was told at the forum organising committee that active members of independent anti-war, human rights, ecological and humanitarian movements, as well as representatives of socialist, liberal and Greens parties of the West will gather in the Soviet capital between August 14-17.

Among those invited to the forum are Maj. Britt Theorin, one of the leaders of Swedish Social Democrats, Swedish ambassador at Disarmament Conference, Ken Coates, chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the European Parliament, Bruce Kent and Edward Thompson, leaders of Britain's anti-war movement.

Organisers regard the 10th Convent for European Nuclear Disarmament as a new contribution to the elaboration of the principles of new political thinking, tackling problems of comprehensive observance of human rights. One of the central places in the political programme of the convent is occupied by issues of inter-ethnic conflicts and ways to settle them, problems of refugees and emigration.

The forum is also expected to focus on ecology and economic demilitarisation. Another salient feature of the convent is that new Soviet mass organisations and movements, which have emerged in the years of perestroika, take part in preparations for it. These include the coalition "Civic Peace", Society "Memorial", the Social Democratic Party of Russia, the association "Let's Save the World and Nature", and the all-Union Writers' Association "April".

Convention Opens

*LD1408120491 Moscow TASS in English 0933 GMT
14 Aug 91*

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, August 14 (TASS)—Activists of independent antiwar, human rights, environmentalist and humanitarian movements of countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) take part in the tenth convention for nuclear disarmament in Europe that just opened in Moscow. It is the first time such a forum is held in Moscow.

The convention will discuss the socio-political situation in Europe resulting from recent cardinal changes and will look for new approaches to the solution of problems in the framework of processes of European integration.

Among those invited for the convention are Swedish ambassador to the conference on disarmament in Geneva, one of the leaders of Swedish Social Democratic movement Maj Britt Theorin, chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the European Parliament Ken Coates, leaders of the British antiwar movement Bruce Kent and Edward Thompson.

The convention is expected to contribute to the further development of the principles of new political thinking and solution of problems of the observance of human rights.

Ethnic conflicts and the ways to overcome them, as well as problems of refugees and emigration hold an important place in the convention's political programme. The forum will also discuss environmental protection and demilitarisation of the economy.

Another characteristic feature of the convention is that new Soviet public organisations and movements that emerged in the years of perestroika participated in its preparation. They include the Civic World Coalition, Memorial Society, the Russian Social Democratic Party, Save the World and Nature Association and All-Union Writers Association "Aprel" (April).

Regional Disarmament in Latin America

*91WC0145A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Aug 91
Union Edition p 5*

[Interview with Sergey Batsanov, chairman of a special committee on chemical weapons, by A. Cherepanov: "Weapons On the Table or Under the Table"]

[Text] A seminar of many days on disarmament questions in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin ended in Mexico. This was perhaps the first such stately regional conference of Latin American diplomats on such a complex subject and it took place at the initiative of the United Nations.

Ambassadors of several countries participating in the Geneva talks were invited to the Mexican capital. Sergey

Batsanov, our representative at the Conference on Disarmament and the chairman of a special committee on chemical weapons, was also present and spoke several times to those assembled.

[Batsanov] In the last session of the UN General Assembly, they talked about the fact that the disarmament process is proceeding only in Europe and between the superpowers. Other regions of the world remained completely out of it. A decision was made to activate regional disarmament processes with the help of the United Nations. In Latin America, Africa, Asia.

In Latin America, by the way, there are processes of stabilization of the general political situation under way even over and above our wishes. From this point of view, the experience of Central America is very interesting. It has taken the path of disarmament and the strengthening of confidence-building measures. The European experience is being utilized here as well. The subregion is obtaining expert help through the United Nations.

[Cherepanov] But what is the idea of this seminar? To share experience and to give recommendations?

[Batsanov] No decisions were made at the seminar. Nevertheless, it had exceptional practical importance. We are encountering a situation in which in some regions, including Latin America, they have a poor grasp of the very subject of disarmament: they do not know either yesterday's or today's realities, they are unfamiliar with documents, and they have a poor understanding of how questions of disarmament and security and questions of confidence-building measures are resolved. From this point of view, the meeting had an enlightening nature.

[Cherepanov] Considerable time was dedicated to the discussion of a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. That is somewhat strange. As far as I know, there are no such weapons in Latin America.

[Batsanov] The idea of this seminar arose in Venezuela. Of a seminar about a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which we came very close to signing. On its global nature. The regional aspect is very important so that it can attain a universal character. When the time comes to join the convention, the countries will look at their neighbors, at what they are doing. And Latin America can join such a convention rather quickly. An interesting idea was heard here: for all of the Latin American countries to sign the convention at the same time.

One of the key problems of Latin America in the area of security is that of the establishment of its own security mechanism—of the European type but without copying it mechanically. And here they think that the basis for it on the continent could be the Treaty of Tlatelolco (under this treaty, Latin America and the Caribbean Basin were declared a nuclear-free zone—A.Ch.). Its acting mechanism would be very suitable.

Especially since Brazil and Argentina declared that the treaty had gone into effect. Thus, only Cuba refuses to sign the document, justifying this by saying that the revolution

has the right to defend itself by any means. Not having either nuclear or chemical weapons, the Cuban leadership reserves the right in the event of a real external threat to begin production of these kinds of weapons as well. By the way, being guided by precisely this argument, Cuba refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Here in Mexico, to be sure, the Cuban representative for the first time stated in detail his own country's viewpoint on the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, which largely coincides with the final approved text.

[Cherepanov] Is there much talk in the Third World today about a North-South confrontation? Was this felt at the seminar?

[Batsanov] In the 1970's and first half of the 1980's, to take the disarmament area, the position of the Soviet Union was unequivocal—it did not hesitate to support any initiative by a developing country or group of such countries. We were in the same camp with them in this connection. We needed a majority in the UN General Assembly and this is how we achieved it.

Our support for such initiative gave us the image of a country involved in disarmament for purely propagandistic purposes, to put constant pressure on Western Europe and the United States. Seeing our willingness to support any bold plan or program, our Western partners lost interest in us as a serious side in negotiations.

The situation is different today. We are trying to analyze all proposals soberly and from a position of realism. Unfortunately, this is causing a certain amount of irritation in the Third World, including here in Latin America.

This is part of the North-South problem. In principle, there is a global danger of a North-South confrontation as well as in the security area. As soon as the subject of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was brought up at the seminar here, one could feel their dissatisfaction. The Third World would very much like for the superpowers to disarm first.

But this was heard in the background of the seminar. The main thing was the interested conversation that took place—a specific conversation on regional disarmament, on measures for security and trust, and on contacts and the exchange of experience.

START TALKS

START Negotiator Assesses Treaty Achievements
PM0908150091 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE
in English 2 Aug 91

[Interview with Soviet START Treaty negotiator Yuriy Nazarkin by Vladimir Markov; date, place not given; first paragraph is introduction: "Soviet Start Negotiator on the Treaty"]

[Text] Vladimir Markov of Novosti Press Agency talks to Yuriy Nazarkin, who led the Soviet delegation at the talks to formulate the Start treaty.

[Markov] Without challenging the historic significance of the Start treaty, I wonder why it has not been possible to cut Soviet and American strategic nuclear arms by 50 per cent or more, as originally planned?

[Nazarkin] In working out the Start treaty we have done all that seemed optimally possible to set in motion the process of reduction of such weapons and continue it. Fifty percent was indeed mentioned. But the reference was to 50 percent cuts in individual parameters of strategic arms. And these parameters have been kept to. For example, we agreed to reduce the aggregate throw-weight of ballistic missiles approximately by half. The treaty states this. The same applies to reduction of heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles.

To be sure, deeper cuts would have been preferable. But even the reductions agreed on are given seven years to carry out. It is essential, furthermore, that this should be done without detriment to the environment.

In order to push on with the reduction of strategic arms, the Soviet Union and the United States a year ago agreed to carry out fresh talks on strategic stability. So the process will continue.

[Markov] The Start treaty still allows both parties to carry out programmes to develop new weapons. Do you think this is a shortcoming of the treaty?

[Nazarkin] The treaty, naturally, does not ban all nuclear arms. If it had set itself such a task, then we could have pressed for ending appropriate military programmes. I agree that we should have the goal of creating a nuclear-free world, although its full achievement is unrealistic.

Unfortunately, in politics, I believe, the force of inertia is by far stronger than in the physical world. In politics it is impossible to revert a process momentarily, unlike in physics. In politics, this requires a more or less gradual turnaround.

The meaning of the treaty signed by the Soviet and American Presidents, in my view, is that the buildup of strategic arms has now been stopped and the process is now in the descendent. So the main purport of the treaty, from my point of view, lies in changing the inertia of the strategic arms race and also, of course, in actual cuts of such arms.

[Markov] As leader of the Soviet delegation at the Start talks, what do you intend to do in the near future?

[Nazarkin] I will be bringing the content of the treaty and a number of bulky accompanying documents to all levels of departments expected to observe these understandings.

Besides, we have already begun preparations for the ratification of the treaty. Some people in the Soviet Union will certainly claim that we have gone too far in meeting the Americans in some respects. In the US, there will be claims that the American administration made heavy concessions on other aspects. But to see the treaty in proper perspective it cannot be carved up into parts, but considered as a whole.

Indeed, we made concessions in some areas, while in others it was the US that made them. The result has been a balance of interests. So the treaty reducing the threat of war and strengthening stability benefits both the Soviet Union and the United States, all countries and nations.

Scientist Defends Need for Nuclear Arms Cuts

PM0908130491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2

[Letter "From the Editorial Mailbag" by Academician Yu. Khariton: "A. Nevzorov and N. Petrushenko Acted Unscrupulously"]

[Text] The Leningrad Television Channel broadcast a program entitled "Panoptikum" ("600 Seconds" series) 30 July and 2 August on the situation in our defense industry illustrated by the example of the Arzamas-16 closed city, where I work. The program's organizers, USSR People's Deputy Colonel N. Petrushenko and television journalist A. Nevzorov, who I did not know before, made unscrupulous use in this program of my name and others' for their own political aims—notably to kindle distrust toward the new nuclear arms reduction treaty with the United States—and to attack the USSR leadership's policy, going so far as to accuse it of "treason." I resolutely reject such a position, and I would like to bring my opinion to the public's attention.

As for nuclear weapons, it is perfectly clear that in the radically changed international conditions, and also and especially in view of the acute economic crisis that our country is experiencing, a reduction of appropriations for military needs is necessary and inevitable. The small number of centers for nuclear weapons research and development, where our most highly skilled scientific and design cadres are concentrated, must be preserved for least two reasons: First, as long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, disbanding these scientific collectives would be simply dangerous. Second, the expenditure for these centers is insignificant against the total expenditure for defense. The United States has such centers—they are the world famous Los Alamos and Livermore centers—and a great deal is being done to preserve them. In our country they are the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (Arzamas-16) and the All-Union Scientific Institute for Technological Physics (Chelyabinsk-70), which until recently were known to very few people.

The nuclear arms reduction process is an exceptionally complex process, and it may be subject to inaccuracies and isolated mistakes. I am profoundly convinced that even if these do exist, they are the result of the exceptional complexity of the situation rather than anyone's malicious intent. As for the program creators' attempts to accuse the USSR leadership of "treason," they can only be described as completely unfounded and insulting. Incidentally, the authors fraudulently sidestepped an entirely reasonable agreement with the Ministry of Atomic Power Engineering and Industry to make their program available for an advance viewing.

I have worked on questions connected with the development of nuclear arms for more than 50 years. I am sending this letter to the IZVESTIYA editorial board profoundly convinced that despite the efforts of Petrushenko and Nevzorov the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms between the USSR and the United States which Presidents Gorbachev and Bush signed in Moscow a few days ago will make hundreds of millions of people throughout the world sigh with relief.

'Studio 9' Program on Significance of START Treaty

PM1308131591 Moscow Central Television First
Program Network in Russian 1540 GMT 10 Aug 91

["Studio Nine" program presented by Professor Valentin Sergeyevich Zorin with A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee, and V.V. Zagladin, USSR presidential adviser]

[Text] [Zorin] Hello, comrades. As usual, we're meeting again at the Ostankino TV Center's Studio Nine to discuss important topical questions of international politics. Well, there is no doubt that the most important and significant event in the world of late has been the Soviet-U.S. summit. The press stopping reports from news agencies and correspondents in Moscow are now being replaced by a period of in-depth analysis and analytical articles whose authors are trying to work out just what has happened and how important it was. I think that we, too, will be trying to make such an analysis today. It is all the more important because it has to be said that the commentaries have been ambiguous. Most of the comment has been positive, making a very high assessment of the results of the Moscow summit. But you can also find negative statements in the international press. I want to start our discussion today with a question which I will ask both guests. First, though, let me introduce them. Our guests today are Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and USSR presidential adviser Professor Vadim Valentinovich Zagladin. I would like to ask both of you the same question—what was particularly important about the Moscow summit, and how did it differ from all previous summits? Let's start with you, Aleksandr Sergeyevich.

[Dzasokhov] It is very true that people's memories are short, but I think that this concept is hardly applicable to the subject we are discussing today. If we analyze it, we're talking about major and serious periods in Soviet-U.S. relations. First and foremost, we need to remember and, if you like, relive the atmosphere in which all we lived five or—even more so—10 years ago. The detente of the seventies found itself yet again subservient to ideological dogma. Our two states—two great powers—were again testing each other's strength in terms of the scale of the arms race. I recall that, back at the beginning of his presidency, President Reagan even said that we should be consigned to the ash heap of history. Times have changed—and a good thing too. I think that we should highlight the novelty and importance of a subjective factor—the purposeful and strong willed policies that have

recently been typical of representatives of both our states. What is new about the situation is not just that disarmament processes are really thorough, but that we are now essentially moving from the regulation of disarmament issues to collaboration in this sphere. This is a fundamentally new situation. Regarding the results, I would like our meeting here today to be free of any euphoria, because we still have a very long road ahead of us. I'd like to look at what we were unable to achieve during the talks. Certain problems were not raised at all and others cannot be considered a result of the talks. So what did we fail to achieve? Well, we didn't conclude an agreement on all-encompassing, comprehensive cuts in all kinds of weapons—including particularly dangerous weapons like nuclear arms. Some very controversial comments have been made. I'd like to say that the result of the two presidents' work is not some kind of condominium, much less a military-political alliance. That's not what it is, and there's never been any question of that. Nonetheless, both in the press and from various rostrums there have been assessments which are linked with the question you asked me. I'll just deal with this for a moment. First of all, Soviet citizens should know—and our press should deal with this matter appropriately—that people over there in America, in Washington, are currently rebuking the U.S. President for allegedly betraying U.S. national interests. Moreover, the opinion has recently been expressed that there is a real opportunity to move to a unipolar world centered on the United States—and that Bush is going to miss this opportunity. There have been many such comments. We too have a similar feeling in our public opinion. I am not sure it's the majority, but we need to look at the motivation behind such comments in our country. It is a very interesting point, and maybe we will come back to it in the course of this discussion. Because what is important here is not pigeonholing people but ensuring that there is a powerful, organized position. The genesis of these opinions is quite varied—on the one hand, there is not enough information about specific military-political issues, while on the other, certain people are not averse to exploiting this shortcoming in the interests of political gamesmanship.

[Zorin] Vadim Valentinovich?

[Zagladin] I'd frame the question slightly differently, while continuing what Aleksandr Sergeyevich said. Some time ago, approximately a year or two after perestroika began, when our leadership and president were shaping the foundations of our foreign policy, they put forward a number of general proposals and called on the world to think about them and join in them. One of these was that security, above all, should be safeguarded by political rather than military means. Another was that we should all accept that peace is indivisible and that the security of each individual should be ensured by equal security for someone else. Another point was that the world is interdependent and, therefore, everything that occurs at each stage of the struggle for security has an instant impact on all other stages. The final point was that we are all members of the same civilization and should therefore collaborate to make sure that this civilization survives and develops. These

were the general and somewhat philosophical approaches. They didn't meet with understanding and support right away—particularly from the ruling circles in the United States and other countries. But let's look at the Moscow summit results from the standpoint of these four principles. First, let's go back to 1985—the first of the 11 meetings between our country's leader and the two U.S. Presidents. There was obviously a psychological breakthrough back then. For the first time, both sides recognized and enshrined in the communique—even though it was highly difficult at the time—the impossibility of nuclear war and the need to do everything necessary to avert it. That was a psychological breakthrough. Now we're seeing 40 percent cuts—physical cuts—in the most terrible strategic nuclear arsenals. This is a material breakthrough which confirms that by using political methods and talks—and these talks lasted almost 10 years—we can and must increase security and reduce the risk of a nuclear catastrophe. One of the next meetings, in 1987, saw the signing in Washington of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. At the time we said that we were starting to move from enmity to reflection and from confrontation to partnership. Today we can say that this partnership is already starting to operate, and this does not apply only to nuclear weapons. I would like to recall some documents that even our press overlooked for some reason—the three Soviet-U.S. statements on the Near East, Yugoslavia, and Central America. The two great powers agreed not to intervene or throw their weight around in these areas but to ensure peace for the peoples living there. What is that, if not real partnership and real proof of how right both sides have been to recognize the principle of indivisible peace? The third element is that our political dialogue in the sphere of disarmament and local conflicts up to now has been clearly outrunning our economic relationship. America's share of our trade turnover and our share of America's has fluctuated between 0.5 and 1 percent. For the first time, a major step has been taken toward raising economic relations to a level commensurate with political relations. Of course, this will take some effort, but the steps that have been taken—it has now been agreed to grant our country Most Favored Nation status, and ratification of a trade agreement is in the works—are real steps which show that both sides have recognized the need for their ties and are thereby reaffirming the principle of interdependence.

[Zorin] I'm struck by a certain difference in the tone of our guests' assessments. Aleksandr Sergeyevich has—not without reason, in my view—drawn attention to what hasn't been achieved. Vadim Valentinovich has summed up the successes. In this connection, I'd like...

[Zagladin] We've already talked about what hasn't been achieved.

[Zorin] Right. That's why, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, I'd like to summarize as follows. Whatever aspect you look at, there's no doubt that a positive event has taken place. Nonetheless, there's been quite a bit of criticism, quite a bit of concealed and sometimes unconcealed dissatisfaction. Why is that?

[Dzasokhov] Well, it is very important for such criticism to always be sincere. That makes it easier to understand. In this connection I'd like to recap some of the points of departure in the Soviet-U.S. talks on strategic offensive arms [START]. This will help clarify your question. It was eight and a half years ago when, just as things were getting started, Washington, as is well known, began the SDI program. We were essentially faced with the condition—and sometimes the tone tended toward a demand—that we should abandon the ABM Treaty, which even now is very necessary. The atmosphere at the talks has changed and is now full of trust. Now we can talk about the tasks the Americans set for themselves and were unable to achieve, in order to respond to those who were showing a profound interest in the content of the talks, so to speak. First, the Americans linked this with the SDI program. They didn't achieve this goal, because we made the two issues separate. The documents signed by our two heads of state contain a very clear and separate section which states that, in the event of a particular threat to their national interests, the sides are entitled to withdraw from these treaty systems. That is, we covered our backs, so to speak, because we are in an ongoing process [my nakhodimsya v puti]. The second point was that our partners set themselves the goal of ruling out any discussion of nuclear-capable aircraft and sought to limit themselves to the question of ballistic missiles. They backed off of that position as a result of the talks and consequently failed to achieve their goal—although it was wrong from the outset, in my view. The documents which have now been signed make provision for regulating, albeit incompletely, the entire system of heavy bombers. It has now become known, following the Bush visit here, that the previously requested 132 B-2 bombers—commonly called stealth bombers—have been cut back to 75. That is, the response we agreed to is already being implemented. The next point is that they set themselves the task of ruling out any discussion of cruise missiles. The result was obvious—we just said it wouldn't wash. Now look at what we have agreed to. I would say that this would interest both viewers and political scientists. A total of 1,500 ballistic missiles and bombers will be cut under the treaty. They had been meant to deliver 8,000 warheads. Each of today's nuclear warheads is 10-15 times more powerful than the still-terrifying bomb that fell on Hiroshima. That's what has been happening, and it is very important.

[Zorin] Eighty thousand Hiroshimas?

[Dzasokhov] That's the whole point—80,000 Hiroshimas. And now, in implementing the treaty, we will be destroying in the space of seven years some 30 percent, and in material terms—you are right, Vadim Valentinovich—approximately 42 percent, of our warheads. But the treaty lasts for 15 years, so this means that for 15 years there will be strategic parity. It's very important to take all this into account. People may now say that we made concessions—of course we did. After all, you don't negotiate on the basis that there will not be any compromise. That's a prerequisite. Otherwise you wouldn't have talks, you'd have one side dictating its conditions. So what I want to say is: Yes, we too failed to achieve a few things. For instance, the

inclusion of sea-launched missiles in the talks is an issue for the future. We also failed to separate out the SDI issue—we had wanted to dispense with that concept altogether—and to agree some questions of principle. So we're talking about a search for compromise, while moving to a higher level of trust, openness, and depth in the entire monitoring process—that much is evident. And, particularly important—I'd almost call it necessary—is the new image of Soviet participants in talks. Many people took notice when, as we were finalizing the components of the Paris agreement on conventional weapons in Europe—and that agreement reduces those weapons by a factor of 2.5, which is a very large cut—the talks were attended by the leader of the foreign policy department and the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. So the diplomats and the military are not just pooling their efforts behind the scenes, they also are cooperating at official talks. That's very important.

[Zagladin] Just a moment. In order to prevent any confusion among our viewers—Aleksandr Sergeyevich, you said that sea-launched missiles weren't included. That should be missiles on surface ships.

[Dzasokhov] Absolutely.

[Zagladin] Submarine-launched missiles were included.

[Dzasokhov] That's right.

[Zorin] I think that Aleksandr Sergeyevich has basically answered the question of why some people are unhappy. It's natural. One side wanted to achieve everything, failed to achieve some points, and has been criticized for it. The other side also failed to achieve some points and people are exploiting that—some having good intentions, others not. I would just like to add one other idea about those who are currently unhappy with Moscow and the Moscow talks. The sharp reduction in strategic offensive weapons and the overall slowing of the arms race affect the very specific interests of some people. I know that it's hard to take figures in on TV, so I won't go overboard, but I would like to quote one for our viewers. A year ago one U.S. company alone—McDonnell Douglas—earned no less than \$10.3 billion from arms production. A definite agreement has now been reached in Moscow. You have mentioned figures on what is going to be reduced. This means that somebody is going to be losing this planned income, and that is naturally a source of criticism. Admittedly, in this particular case I have mentioned McDonnell Douglas as an example of the U.S. military-industrial complex. When we spoke of the military-industrial complex in the past, we thought of the U.S. military-industrial complex. But let's take a sober look at things. It's not just the Americans—we have our own military-industrial complex. It's perfectly possible that not all representatives of that complex will be happy about the direction in which things are moving. That's another source of the discontent which, one way or another, is now surfacing in the press.

[Zagladin] I don't think that's the only thing, Valentin Sergeyevich. For starters, nobody has given our military-industrial complex a \$10-billion handout.

[Zorin] But it did quite well all the same.

[Zagladin] It did quite well, but even that's not the point. These plants will not be destroyed; they will be reequipped. This is a very complex procedure. The workers and engineers who will need to retrain will find it difficult. They will have to learn new skills. This too is a problem that has to be considered.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Sergeyevich. It's just occurred to me that this most important document which has just been signed in Moscow—I'm referring to the START Treaty—will be passed on to you by the diplomats and the military. It will be passed on to the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and then to the Supreme Soviet for examination. This may be too direct a question, but I would like to ask you, as chairman of the committee, what the chances are—given the criticism we have mentioned—of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifying this most important document?

[Dzasokhov] We need to rule out immediately the possibility that there will be unanimous and immediate approval and, consequently, ratification. There is great interest in all the treaty's provisions. I believe that the road to ratification will be travelled through the serious measures that we will have to take. Both you and Vadim Valentinovich have mentioned that section of our population that has worked for decades as a separate community, unlike Western industry, which has always had links between military and civil production. From this standpoint, they were perhaps even the most brilliant representatives of our technical intelligentsia. Of course, they are now facing a very serious dilemma. First, they have no experimental base. Second, they don't enjoy the priority appropriations they used to receive. There are many other aspects as well. So, in a human sense, you are right—this is quite a difficult situation. I think that the priority for both parliamentarians and statesmen is to push ahead with the entire conversion program. There have been isolated success stories but, regrettably, there is no sign as yet of a well-organized system for switching to civilian production those military-industry structures that are subject to conversion as a result of the talks. This is an exceptionally urgent task. I would even say that I'm sympathetic and understanding about the situation our comrades in this sector are experiencing. Regarding the direct question you asked me, I accept that side of our task as well. We will have to think about it carefully. As far as the ratification process is concerned—and the Soviet-German documents showed this—I'd say that my prediction, of course, is that ratification will go ahead.

[Zagladin] Of course.

[Zorin] Thank you, I would just like to share some of my impressions. I am currently keeping a very close eye on U.S. Congress materials and all discussions of events in Moscow. You know, I have the impression that the situation on the Capitol is like the situation you described when you were talking about the Supreme Soviet.

I would now like to ask you to answer two letters from our viewers. Our viewers' letters generally play a very big role

in our work. There is still a fair amount of loyalty to "Studio Nine." Our audience is not satisfied with the flow of information and wants in-depth analysis. Letters from members of this audience represent a kind of compass for us and provide us with food for thought. I would like to pick two letters out of the mailbag and ask you to answer them.

Here you are, Vadim Valentinovich. Here is a letter from Comrade Volobuyev, a secondary school teacher from Ryazan. Here's what he says: Politics is no fairy tale. Nothing happens as if by magic. For decades, profound mistrust and enmity toward one another were fostered in the Soviet and U.S. peoples. These feelings were fostered in at least two, if not three, generations, and then suddenly there came a drastic move away from hostility toward friendship. Can this move be considered sincere and lasting rather than a political game that could change at any moment?

[Zagladin] In my view, this is an important question. Admittedly, our propaganda did not so much foster hatred of the American people as of U.S. imperialism and its representatives, but, needless to say, all these elements are intermingled. I can propose various ideas in response to this letter.

The first, in my view, is very important and consists of the fact that, along with fostering hatred, say, of our possible adversary, there were also other elements in the way our people were raised. First, there were the memories of the Great Patriotic War, World War II, in which both our peoples fought together, side by side, against one enemy. These memories—and they have never disappeared—will always remain. That is my first point.

Second, there is the fact that our people, all our country's peoples, have respected U.S. achievements in science and technology, particularly technology. Needless to say, sometimes this admiration for U.S. achievements went as far as absurd forms of pure plagiarism of anything American, including T-shirts and hats.

But there was always this respect for the U.S. people's talents regardless of the zero-sum idea being fostered in our minds that everything that is good for us must be bad for them, and vice versa.

Now when we compare, for instance, questionnaires and public opinion polls taken in our country and the United States, we can see that, despite decades of being encouraged to be hostile toward one another, the overwhelming majority of Americans and the overwhelming majority of Soviet people, regardless of nationality, now respect one another and harbor no suspicion toward one another and want to develop relations. Might this change?

This does not depend on the peoples—it isn't people who change. If you look at the two countries' ruling circles, there are not yet any signs of the possibility of a shift of this kind, but neither can we rule this out. Therefore, and I agree with my friends here on this, we have to work

without stopping, without taking a breather. It is reciprocity and the mutual development of mutual relations at all levels that is the best guarantee that there will be no change.

[Zorin] Aleksandr Sergeyevich, you too have a difficult letter to answer. It was written by a resident of Riga, Comrade (Aushkap), who evidently is a deep thinker and is trying to grasp the essence of the processes taking place. Here is what he says: Of course, we can only welcome the results of the two presidents' meeting in Moscow. Aren't we going to extremes again, as always? Two superpowers like the Soviet Union and the United States will never have interests that coincide. Both countries will always be rivals at the very least. That is, after all, grounds for enmity, and handshakes in the Kremlin are not enough to overcome that. There's the letter.

[Dzasokhov] Obviously, the question is indeed tinged with both the inertia of our thinking and the idea that we all developed over many years that Soviet-U.S. relations are always tense; I regard this attitude as part of the cold war period. Incidentally, those people who consider the Moscow meeting the first since the end of the cold war are right. You remember our trips to Malta and, earlier still, to Reykjavik. Of course, the atmosphere has changed, and the fallout from the cold war itself has already receded. It is therefore important from the methodological viewpoint to take note of the background against which our two states' presidents shook hands.

[Zagladin] After Paris and after....

[Dzasokhov] Yes. What do I want to say now? Needless to say, it would be totally unfeasible to think that our views both at the national and international levels should be considered absolutely identical.

The question of how we will flesh out the concept of a great power is another matter. If the parameters of militarization decline and constructive indicators rise, and if what we particularly need for our domestic interests and for our world economic relations—economic and trade dealings—should actually happen, then of course the field of our rivalry will narrow. If it does continue to exist, it will be completely different.

The volume of our trade relations has, after all, been mentioned here, and it is incomprehensible from the viewpoint of common sense: We are two great states, yet the volume of our trade with the United States is just two percent, and their trade with us totals 0.5 percent. This is an abnormal situation.

Therefore, I am absolutely in favor of encouraging everything necessary to ensure competition in science and technology exchange. What is more, if we are talking in a realistic and in-depth manner, I do not believe that we represent any competition for the United States in the world arena or the economic sphere—and that is the direction in which the world must develop, although there are still military tasks and security matters to be considered. That is clear, it goes without saying, at least for now.

On the international level, the Americans compete in these matters with today's Germany, with yesterday's and today's Japan, with the West European states, and even with the so-called three tigers that are rapidly appearing on the front lines. We need to integrate ourselves into the world economy, and London has sent a powerful signal. We must move toward this. We cannot remain an island.

So, I would like to say that we will of course have different views, but this is what is very important: It is often said that the Soviet Union and the United States have now begun to talk and they want to rule the world. For starters, that's just plain wrong; it's not the case at all. It's nothing like that at all. This does not mean that the former bipolar world, which is now becoming multipolar, is free of unpredictability. In this context, maybe, I've already found the source of our viewer's alarm here. It is Moscow and Washington's duty to ensure that a unipolar system does not emerge once the bipolar system has been replaced, and that we know that there are plenty of centers of power in the world.

Are not the events in the Persian Gulf or current events in Yugoslavia a reason for us to seek partnership with these centers of power through a constructive quest for an answer to these questions, increasingly ridding interstate relations of their confrontational nature? Might our interests rather develop in parallel and, in some areas, intersect, but not destructively?

[Zagladin] I would like to voice a couple of ideas here. I fully agree with what has already been said. We do indeed still have different interests, and that is a fact, but that does not mean that we do not have common interests. We do in fact have common interests.

For instance, preventing nuclear war is an interest we share with the United States. Each of our peoples and governments is interested in ensuring both regional and international security. It is no coincidence that environmental problems have constantly figured on the agenda during our talks for several years and that there has been some practical movement in this sphere. That is, there are spheres of common interests—and not only for our two countries—there are spheres in which our interests are different, and lastly there is a very specific sphere. This is a complicated factor, but it is real and exists virtually everywhere. In some areas our underlying interests may differ for whatever reason.

Take the Near East, for instance. The Americans themselves have said a great deal about the fact that they have deep-seated oil interests there. The common interest at the stage in question resided in punishing a criminal, punishing an aggressor, putting an end to aggression and war. So, our interests coincided on one level, but they may differ elsewhere next. While the motives may be different, the actions and interests are identical. It is a very complex sphere, and for that reason I also subscribe to what Aleksandr Sergeyevich said about the questions being understandable and our viewer's disquiet being understandable; there are a great many points here that require in-depth analysis, constant attention, and the appropriate action.

[Zorin] I think that one benefit of both the letters and our program is that not only do we talk to our viewers, but we also learn some things for ourselves and for politics in general, because people reflect and ponder and, evidently, have creative thoughts.

Let us come back—[coughs] excuse me—to the military problems discussed in Moscow. Needless to say, the strategic offensive arms reduction agreement is an outstanding event, an event that will indeed be studied for many decades as a key event. That is all true. There can be no two opinions on this. Let us look at the other side of the coin. A great deal will be destroyed, but there is enough left—and more—to destroy all life on earth several times over. There are no grounds for euphoria on our part just because we've signed and ratified this treaty!

On the other hand, I won't hide from you, my friends, one of my worries. When commenting on the meeting in Moscow, the military aspect is for some reason relegated to the back burner. I realize that the economy is very important, and regional problems are very important—that's all true—but I suspect that some press organs, in particular U.S. press organs—let me be frank and say it—reckon by and large that the work seems to have been done. Doesn't this mean that, now that the treaty has been signed, there will be some kind of pause, a switch to some different issues? At the same time, missiles carrying these formidable 80 Hiroshimas or more will be standing in our and in U.S. silos. That is a fact now and in the future. Aleksandr Sergeyevich?

[Dzasokhov] Valentin Sergeyevich, it's quite logical to put the question like that. We have to act to ensure that there's no pause. I would wing it, but I would bear certain considerations in mind. I think that we could now contemplate, on the basis of European experience, working to set up standing Soviet-U.S. or, maybe, new multilateral mechanisms. I think there would be much appeal in, for instance, an institute or structure to carry out regular, in-depth examinations of all military-political problems arising between the State Department and the USSR Foreign Ministry.

I can say that this exists. It is a question of the almost integral nature of this work. That's very important. There's a number of questions that are very characteristic of and topical for us. We must, of course, do everything we can to ensure that all the problems of military reform are dealt with. This is a very important issue.

Let us now talk about the military aspect. If my memory serves me, the U.S. federal debt [dolg], that is, the state debt, is now equal to U.S. military spending [sentence as heard]. This is a vast sum, and in our country I think that there is even more of a contrast in this ratio. There are grounds for the disarmament question remaining a top priority. It will be a priority if the process is continued without the pause that sometimes develops due to the human mentality following any major successes. There must be no breathing space here. I think that is how things will develop in this field.

[Zorin] Thank you. I would like to use the few minutes remaining to us for another question. You know that economic problems, including U.S. aid for our country's economic restructuring, occupied a considerable place in the Moscow talks. It is no secret that the view is current in our country that the Americans are not helping us for the sake of it. The following question arises: Is the United States, say, really interested, if everything goes well—and we hope that everything goes well, even if not immediately—in having another powerful competitor on the world arena in 10, 12, or 15 years? After all, the United States already has more than enough competitors today. So, is it worth helping the Soviet Union? Aleksandr Sergeyevich.

[Dzasokhov] I would first like to express the wish that U.S. legislators raise their interest in economic and trade cooperation to the level that we can sense in the U.S. Administration's activity. In actual fact, it has become practice for both the Senate and the Congress, both Republicans and Democrats, to compete with one another and constantly impose various embargoes or resolutions regarding volumes of cooperation. There are also, I would remind you, the restrictions imposed by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, and so on and so forth.

Needless to say, Most Favored Nation status is now taking practical shape. This is a topical issue. In my view, the administration must sense the legislators' support, and then our potential will be revealed.

But we too have opponents who say, with regard to the Soviet Union's economic might and our integration into the international economic system, that all these ideas may make the country an economic appendage, a supplier of raw materials. That is a serious reproach. We must constantly take preventive measures against being a so-called supplier of raw materials.

We have been a raw-material appendage to a considerable extent. We supplied the world market primarily with oil, timber, metal, and so on without any in-depth study. We have very poor technology, and therefore the tasks of our integration, notably in the context of the G-7 agreements, and the development of our scientific and technical ties with the U.S. are in the interests of enhancing our economic efficiency.

The most important thing is that the USSR may be an economic competitor at some stage, perhaps in the distant future—I don't rule this out. In the Pacific, the ocean of the 21st century. This forecast may develop via economic channels. But the immediate future is still bound up with the fact that we must raise the entire level of our economic and technical activity. At this stage, I see no reason for looking to get ourselves into the dangerous situation whereby from the U.S. standpoint we are competitors, but from our standpoint we are just a supplier of raw materials. As I see it, there is no danger of that.

Admittedly, major and landmark questions of this kind must be resolved in a competent and skilled fashion, but that depends on the protagonists, on the people concerned.

[Zorin] Vadim Valentinovich.

[Zagladin] We are coming to the end of our time and I would like to take a look at what we have said from a broader viewpoint. Our postwar foreign policy, despite the fact that it always proclaimed its noble aims, made many interesting proposals, and attained definite results—I would remind you of the Helsinki Final Act 1975—but nevertheless it failed to protect us from the arms race, an exhausting race that exceeded all normal needs and reasonable limits. Our pre-perestroika foreign policy significantly helped create the preconditions for the current crisis in the country, from which it has not as yet escaped. From the very outset the foreign policy of perestroika set about helping resolve the country's domestic tasks and thus, above all, normalizing the world situation, putting an end to confrontation, and establishing normal relations with the whole world.

So, the Moscow meeting represents a very important step on this path, whatever problems remain open or unresolved. It fits in with this both in the military-political context, in the political context, the economic context, and the international context. I think that this meeting is a symbol of our policy today—one of the most important symbols—it shows that this policy is indeed geared to resolving the country's pressing tasks—the tasks facing every Soviet person—and those problems that worry literally every one of us. But as in the past, now too—it has always been and will always be the case—foreign policy can do nothing if it is not upheld by a powerful support base, by the country itself, by its people, by every Soviet person. Ultimately the success of our reform plan, the success of perestroika within the country, and the success of our foreign policy activity are inextricably linked.

By and large we now have a situation where our domestic policy accomplishes many foreign policy tasks while our foreign policy resolves domestic issues in many respects. These aims are inextricably linked. I think that if we all consider properly what is happening in Moscow, along with all the problems that we have to resolve, our main conclusion will be this: Everyone must do everything they can to improve things within the country, then foreign policy will go better, and our lives will improve.

[Zorin] Well, we've used up our airtime. It only remains for me to thank you for taking part in this conversation and thank our viewers. I think that those viewers who want TV programs to provide answers to questions that interest them rather than just verbal sparring will have been helped by this program to find some answers to some of these questions. Thank you. Until we meet again. You've been watching "Studio Nine."

Dzasokhov Confident of Ratification

*LD1008195991 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 1900 GMT 10 Aug 91*

[Text] The chairman of the Soviet parliamentary Committee on International Affairs, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, is confident that the START treaty Presidents Gorbachev and Bush signed in Moscow on 31 July will be ratified.

Speaking in a Saturday TV broadcast, Aleksandr Dzasokhov said, that the treaty stood low chances of being ratified easily, let alone by a unanimous vote. He felt serious steps must be taken to ensure the ratification. He saw one of the national priorities in working out a well coordinated strategy for converting defense plants to civilian production. He stressed now that the START treaty had been signed, it would be inadmissible to procrastinate with the conversion. He put forward the idea of the immediate creation of permanent bilateral and possibly multilateral structures to promote new arms reductions.

Security Benefits of Treaty Questioned

*PM1208172591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 10 Aug 91 First Edition p 5*

[A. Silantyev article from the "Viewpoint" column: "Security or the Logic of Coordination?"]

[Text] One of the latest foreign policy ideas that Academician G. Arbatov is steadfastly defending at various levels is reducing military experts' role in arms reduction talks as much as possible.

Of course, that is if you decipher the idea from what has been said. In words and on paper everything seems to be on the level. We must give the supreme leaders more opportunities to hold talks—why should they delve into technical details? They need only make the major political decisions, and then it is up to the experts to knock into shape what the high parties have agreed upon.

Literally on the eve of Bush's visit to the USSR, Academician G. Arbatov got on his soap box once again and wrote: "We need a new model for arms reduction talks, and now is the time to begin elaborating it.... In particular, we need to give more real power to the political leadership and less to technical experts and the negotiating bureaucracy. We must also ensure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a leading role in the elaboration of negotiating positions in interdepartmental groups." (IZVESTIYA 26 July 1991)

To put it mildly, this depends on the people's lack of intelligence. There was a time in history, admittedly, when, during a private discussion in Reykjavik, President Ronald Reagan, who did not have a clear picture of the details, almost "handed over" half of the U.S. offensive weapons, but even before he returned to Washington, his NATO allies explained to him what was what. U.S. diplomacy did not let any other problems occur, and for a long time the favorite expression of then U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz was: "The problem lies in the details."

Now too experts have rejected top leaders' statements, evidently to G. Arbatov's great dissatisfaction. The Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty [START] envisages the reduction of USSR and United States nuclear arsenals by 30 percent overall. But after all, at one time the presidents of the two countries made a solemn promise was made to achieve a 50 percent reduction. Our side made that proposal, and G. Arbatov probably took an active part in advancing it.

Be that as it may, the START Treaty has been concluded. Until it is ratified, however, it remains a simple declaration. Both the United States and ourselves must ratify the START treaty in the U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet respectively.

What can we say about the new treaty? Undoubtedly it is a big step forward on the path to reducing the nuclear threat, and in that sense it should be unconditionally supported. At the same time, the impression that the treaty is not to our benefit is not going away.

For instance, the overall quantity of weapons was established at 6,000 units, but in fact the counting system under the treaty enables the United States to have approximately 8,800 units and the USSR to have even less—7,000. Furthermore, both Britain and France's nuclear forces are not covered by the treaty at all, and these are clearly not aimed at the Western hemisphere.

We are reducing our most powerful weapons—our heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles—by 50 percent, and we are giving up the manufacture of new types of these missiles in the future, whereas the Americans are not halving any of their offensive forces.

The United States seems to be reducing a significant quantity of its heavy bombers, and it is allowing us to have a greater number of these aircraft, but in fact it is removing this old hardware from its arsenal and proposing that we add it to ours.

On the other hand, the Americans have agreed to the modernization of our heavy missiles and the deployment of land-based mobile missiles, and they have started reducing their sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. Concessions have also been reached on many other questions where the American side had taken a tough stand.

In a word, the several hundred pages of the START treaty provide a great deal of material for all kinds of interpretations—even more so because a number of its articles are of an ambiguous nature.

As far as the purely military aspects of the treaty are concerned, it seems that we must trust the experts. They assess these issues quite well, but the USSR Supreme Soviet, as the supreme legislative organ, must be the one to adopt the political decision.

It is curious that President Bush is so optimistic regarding the treaty's fate in the U.S. Congress. He believes that, if it is ratified, the treaty will virtually "sail through the Senate." Such statements would undoubtedly not be made if the treaty did not suit the United States.

Essentially, the START treaty is the latest arms reduction agreement that the Americans have managed to "squeeze" out of the Soviet side. No new treaties of this type are envisaged in the foreseeable future. Now that it has taken definite steps toward reducing tension, Moscow cannot continue with disarmament on a broad scale. There was the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Short-Range Missiles which was received with enthusiasm in the United States. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces

in Europe was concluded. Even Senator J. Helms, who is categorically opposed to any arms control, supports its ratification.

The START Treaty is not quite as advantageous to the United States as the two previous ones were, but, according to American calculations, it still promises them more benefits than losses. Even these relatively modest achievements were jeopardized, however, and the unstable situation in the Soviet Union forced the U.S. Administration to quicken its efforts. The United States had to consolidate the positions it had won in the face of the unpredictable development of events in our country. After all, if the center disappears or is weakened too much and the republics move into the forefront, then there will be no one to hold talks with.

That is probably why, before the meeting with the seven Western developed countries that was so important to Moscow, President Bush sent a letter containing a request to exert pressure on our "bureaucrats" who were apparently torpedoing the START treaty. Reading between the lines, you had to bear in mind the 7+1 meeting in London, and also the unclear prospects of Soviet-American economic collaboration in the event that the date of the summit in Moscow, long overdue as it was, would be deferred again.

Following the final phase of talks in Washington, General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, gave a very high assessment of the professional skill and, very importantly, the civic stance of A.A. Bessmertnykh, minister of foreign affairs, who led our delegation. The treaty as a whole was quite well balanced, according to Defense Minister D. Yazov.

But here is a question: Do we need this treaty now? Evidently the Americans do. From the viewpoint of humanitarian values, new political thinking, and the associated liberation of mankind from nuclear disaster, the treaty is clearly a positive development. But is it from the viewpoint of our national interests?

Is now the right moment to actually reduce weapons, as opposed to just restricting them, that is, not manufacturing new ones? Should we spend money now on eliminating missiles which would scarcely be launched anyway? After all, this is a question of millions of rubles. Would it not be better to put this money to some other use?

The people's deputies should concentrate on this issue. If they decide that putting the treaty into force today is a priority for the Soviet electorate, then they can recall that American politicians make very active use of the practice of coordinating treaties with the solution of specific political problems.

This particularly concerns granting us the possibility of conducting normal trade with the United States. First of all, we curbed Jewish emigration (and then started to permit anyone to leave who wanted to, so the Americans immediately introduced quotas). Then we had a bad record on respecting human rights—even though, for example, things seem to be no better in China, but it still

has most-favored-nation status in its trade with the United States. After that, we behaved badly in Central America (not Panama, naturally). Then we adopted the wrong attitude toward the Baltic Republics. At the last summit meeting, the subject of the "northern territories" and Japan arose completely unexpectedly.

So we will never turn over a new leaf, regardless of any treaties and declarations of partnership and collaboration.

The granting of most-favored-nation status in trade is by no means everything we need. The promises of the seven in London contain almost no specifics, and at the moment we cannot feel any real support from the West for our reforms. We need:

1. Guarantees of large long-term credits on favorable terms for the urgent purchase of goods abroad and the development of vital promising sectors of our economy.
2. The removal of all restrictions on American exports to the USSR, particularly of modern technology—though not necessarily of a military nature, which the Americans are so afraid of.
3. Technical assistance in reequipping the communication infrastructure, especially telephone lines. The market will not work without reliable telephones, particularly as this now involves not just telephones but also faxes, computers, and, in the near future, televisions.
4. Recognition that the countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of the former GDR, are a sphere of the Soviet Union's vital interests. These countries will go their own way, and no one intends to hinder them, but both the United States and its allies should make clear statements that the NATO's zone influence will not be extended.
5. An end to assistance to Afghan armed groupings. Afghanistan still remains an open wound, largely due to Western financial aid.

The list of things we need could be continued, but that is not the main issue. The main issue is that the Americans should move on from sweet-sounding declarations—for which we have had a weakness since the times of "stagnation"—to real, concrete actions. Moscow has almost finished traveling to the half way point, and it is time to travel together. It is up to the American side to meet us.

In 1988, the "old" USSR Supreme Soviet put on a show when ratifying the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. Television cameras were set up, Soviet journalists were summoned, and foreign correspondents were brought in. Behind the scenes, the people responsible for foreign policy were asking the deputies, who had no understanding of these problems, to ask "pointed" questions. In general, they themselves both formulated these questions and then answered them. The treaty was successfully ratified just before President Ronald Reagan's visit to the USSR. Then there was just glasnost—not freedom of speech—and everyone observed the rules of the game.

Today, times are different. By no means does every draft law get through on its first reading. The discussion of the START treaty in the USSR Supreme Soviet will show what

interests each of the people's representatives are defending—Soviet (that is, state-national), American, human, or their own personal interests.

Yazov Describes Treaty Implications

*PM1208202291 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 13 Aug 91 p 3*

[Report from the "At First Hand!" column "specially for RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA" on interview with Dmitriy Yazov, USSR Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union, by IAN parliamentary observer VI. Ostrovskiy; place and date not given: "USSR-United States: A Fighting Draw?"]

[Text] "Half a loaf is better than no loaf at all," Dmitriy Yazov, USSR Defense Minister and Marshal of the Soviet Union, said regarding the signing of the Soviet-American START Treaty in a RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA interview.

Yazov noted: "If anyone speaks of the inadequacy of the strategic arms reduction being undertaken by the two powers, those people, or that media, should be reminded of this proverb." The marshal said: "It took the USSR and the United States almost 10 years to arrive at this treaty, and it was by no means a simple dialogue. As all the data on the nuclear systems subject to reduction in accordance with this document are now known, it only remains for me to comment on certain aspects of the agreement reached."

"I would like to draw your attention to the level of nuclear armaments of the two sides that signed this treaty. If you take as your starting point the indicators of this level in June 1979, when the Soviet Union and the United States signed the SALT II Treaty, which was subsequently not ratified by the U.S. Congress, it is apparent that, throughout these years, both parties basically adhered to the levels set at that time for strategic offensive arms. This fact is highly indicative that the leaders of the two powers recognize the special responsibility that rests with them as the possessors of the world's mightiest nuclear arsenals. Judge for yourselves: Whereas at that time the United States had 2,283 delivery vehicles and we had 2,504, today they have 2,246 delivery vehicles, and we have 2,500.

"Of course, over the past decade weapons have been modernized, guidance systems have improved, accuracy of delivery to the target has increased, the nuclear warhead has been miniaturized, the missiles' range has increased. The negotiators took these processes into account, however, and all the parameters for the upcoming reduction in strategic offensive arms are very clearly designated in the present treaty. Neither side can exceed the levels set by this agreement. We know from the experience of the last 10 years that both we and our American partners will observe the accords reached.

"The United States is destroying 300 fewer delivery vehicles than we are, but it will eliminate 200 heavy bombers, which we are not doing. You will agree that one of these planes costs more than a missile. In my view, this is an example of reasonable compromise. The United States

met us halfway on another issue when it agreed to destroy 100 more of its weapons [boyezaryady] than we are destroying.

"It is currently being said quite widely that this treaty is supposedly disadvantageous to the Soviet Union. They are even trying to convince people who are not very sophisticated about military matters that it weakens us more than the Americans. I must say quite clearly that these conjectures are designed for gullible people and are directed, with no good intention, at the upcoming ratification of this document in our parliament. The main indicators concerning the arms that will be reduced and the levels of these reductions are widely known. An unbiased observer will come to the conclusion that as a result of the treaty's implementation, neither side will find itself in a detrimental position and no one's security will suffer. What is very important is that the deterrence factor is not disrupted, which means that the stability of the strategic situation is preserved. Decreasing the levels of nuclear equipment at the disposal of states like ours increases the reliability of their security. It is high time everyone understood this axiom.

"As for the talk of a reduction in the Soviet Union's military potential, it would be senseless to deny this. Honesty is the best policy. Our level of armament has been lowered by the elimination of intermediate- and short-range missiles, completed this spring; as well as the unilateral reduction in our troop strength by half a million servicemen. We are following our defensive doctrine in these processes and do not intend to do so to the detriment of our security."

Answering a question on how much the START Treaty will cost the Soviet people, the defense minister pointed out that the disarmament process in general costs a considerable amount. "As for the cost of the measures eliminating some of our strategic offensive arms stipulated in the agreement signed in Moscow, according to preliminary rough estimates they could cost us over 2 billion rubles. Of course, that is a considerable sum, but we must bear in mind that the destruction (or salvage) of strategic offensive arms, especially nuclear charges, the reactors of missile submarines, and missile fuel, demands constant and considerable expenditure. This problem faces not only our country, but any nuclear power, so it could be considered an international problem.

"Which is more costly: destroying or maintaining these nuclear arms? It would be wrong to phrase the question like that, because a matter involves not only economic factors, but also includes strategic and political factors—and these are not only national but are international in nature. After all, the processes you mentioned touch on the problem of the strategic situation's stability. According to our estimates, the cost of eliminating some of our strategic offensive arms ultimately will be economically beneficial. In any case, we would have had to tackle the problem of salvaging the obsolete components of strategic offensive arms. As far as the START Treaty is concerned, it is clear from the text that we are not completely disarming ourselves, but are reducing the most dangerous nuclear

weapon systems based on parity with the United States. Consequently, we are retaining sufficient forces and resources for our Armed Forces to be able to fulfill their duty to the fatherland and to their people.

"Incidentally, even apart from this treaty, the United States is reducing its level of armaments," the marshal observed. "In Moscow President George Bush assured the Soviet side that the reduction of over 100 U.S. military bases on the European continent is already being implemented. Britain is reducing its ground forces by 40,000 men; the FRG is reducing the strength of the Bundeswehr to three corps instead of the former four. I cannot say that in the course of the talks we are the only party losing something or yielding ground.

"There is also another problem that causes me considerable concern: The shortfall in men enlisted for compulsory service in the course of the annual draft of young men of the appropriate age into the Army. We are receiving virtually no recruits from six of the Union republics. As a result, we are significantly under strength in the military units, which of course weakens our Army.

"As for the withdrawal of our troops from Eastern Europe, their redeployment is taking place according to the concept of defense sufficiency. I hope that the majority of people now understand that we have no plans that in any way threaten our neighbors or our partners in the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The main thing that everyone must realize today is that disarmament is an irreversible process, and no other way to strengthen universal security exists."

Yazov Denies START Destroys Strategic Balance

*OW1308154891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1440 GMT 13 Aug 91*

[Report by diplomatic correspondent Petr Vasiliyev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The USSR Minister of Defence, Dmitriy Yazov, stated that the present version of the START Treaty, signed at the Moscow Summit, does not destroy the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. In an interview with the newspaper, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, the minister said that there were several stories going around to the effect that the given agreement was not advantageous to the Soviet Union. He described the stories as fantastic.

At the time of the Moscow Summit "DP" [Diplomatic Panorama] published an interview with the former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, in which he accused the military of dragging their feet in work on the agreement. "All of the basic and most complex problems regarding the treaty were resolved in the course of our negotiations with the Secretary of State in Houston during the meeting of the two presidents in Paris," he declared. "This includes problems connected with conventional weapons and strategic offensive weapons."

Mr. Shevardnadze described the subsequent complications as "artificial", arising only because the military wanted to "renegotiate" aspects of the treaty that had already been agreed upon, suggesting that they could force more concessions from the Americans. But, he continued, all their subsequent trips to Washington (i.e. the two trips of the USSR chief of Staff, General Mikhail Moiseyev) came to nothing. "They achieved nothing and returned to the same positions we had reached earlier. And in many aspects of the treaty they even made matters worse, by signing the treaty in conditions that were less advantageous to us. But the most important thing is that the treaty was signed. It is also good news that the impediments standing in the way of an agreement on conventional weapons have also been removed. These too arose artificially, thanks to the whims of some of our comrades," said Mr. Shevardnadze. And he singled out the military for special mention.

Furthermore, it was revealed to "DP", that during his meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze on the eve of the Moscow Summit, Secretary of State James Baker expressed regret that completion of the work on the START Treaty was delayed. Mr. Baker said that the delay had given the American right powerful ammunition in their campaign against the present administration and its attempts to normalise relations with the USSR. Their philosophy is that "you can't trust the Soviets, you can't do business with them". This ammunition was given them by the Soviet military, who started "redesigning" the agreed parameters of the START Treaty immediately after a series of unsuccessful attempts to work through several clauses of the treaty on conventional weapons.

Having arrived in Washington, General Moiseyev gave us a lecture on the necessary composition of the START Treaty. It felt as if somebody was trying to pull my tooth out, four days of agony, said Secretary of State Baker, according to one of the diplomats present at the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting.

Sergey Tarasenko, Mr. Shevardnadze's former assistant and now a member of the board of the Soviet Foreign Policy Association, told a "DP" correspondent that "after Houston the military accused us of weakening the Soviet Union's strategic position. But in the START Treaty just signed there are no new initiatives whatsoever."

Of the military's attempts to redesign the agreement, he said, "they simply were not prepared, they did not believe they would have to make any arms reductions".

"When in Reykjavik agreement was reached on the preparation for a treaty cutting nuclear weapons by 50 percent, the structure of armed forces and their future development should have been planned in advance. After all, strategic arms negotiations have been going on for ten years now," continued Tarasenko. "If they were hoping for a positive outcome the military should have thought about this from the very beginning. They should have worked towards a decrease of levels, planned reductions in strategic forces, in their numerical composition. This did not occur".

START Agreement Has 'Serious Deficiencies'

91WC0153A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 21 Aug 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel P. Vladimirov, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament": "Will the Compromises Justify Themselves"]

[Text] The recently signed Soviet-American START agreement defined a road that humanity will take in the future when resolving the tasks of nuclear disarmament. The main virtue of this treaty consists perhaps in the fact that, in the process of its development, a mechanism for limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons has finally been created. Any consequent steps in the realm of nuclear disarmament will signify even further development and improvement of the treaty provisions that have emerged. And that, of course, will afford us a significant gain in terms of time. Perhaps in the future precisely this will determine the success of the disarmament as a whole.

For the Soviet party the treaty was not achieved easily. The concluding phase of its preparation took place during the years of a noticeable weakening of the military and political importance of the USSR in the world. This could not help but be reflected in the content of the treaty. In its preparations the principle of equal partnership of the "contracting parties" was frequently violated by the Americans. In the new situation they demanded a reexamination of several treaty provisions which were agreed to earlier and had already become axioms, and they imposed their own unilateral approach to it. Such a process of adjustments to the treaty could have been contested but, inasmuch as the treaty was politically necessary, unfortunately there was no better alternative than to acknowledge the realities of the present day and to sign the treaty, even though it contains several doubtful compromises. After all, tomorrow our concession in this realm could become even more significant and the belief in the existing strategic parity ever less convincing.

The desire of the Americans not to observe the principle of equal partnership is connected to a significant degree to the fact that the place of the USSR in the International Table of Ranks has changed. Having successfully completed protracted negotiations with the Soviet Union, the United States hopes that it has confirmed in the eyes of the world community its right to manage the world order in a monopolistic fashion and its right to determine what this order consists of. As a result of this, it was impossible to expect a fundamental reexamination of the relations and outlines of security existing in the world with the participation of the United States. Therefore the START agreement is doomed to suffer from serious deficiencies.

First and foremost, from the military point of view it has not eliminated the nuclear threat. The levels of strategic nuclear weapons defined in it—1,600 delivery systems and 6,000 warheads for them—is still quite high. Their combat application on a global scale is able to put an end to the existence of humanity.

From the political point of view the treaty has narrowed the sphere of nuclear disarmament. It is limited to only two states, even though they may be the most heavily armed states. But, after all, the weapons that they have at their disposal are for global use. Thus was it justified in such an event to bar from the process of nuclear disarmament within the framework of Soviet-American negotiations other countries whose security is directly connected with their results? Finally, from the technical point of view the treaty did not put any kind of obstacles on the path of modernization of strategic nuclear weapons in the future and in this fashion virtually gave the okay for their further qualitative development. Given such an approach, a third generation nuclear weapon may yet appear in the arsenals of the parties by the end of the second millennium. One that is more deadly.

Given these conditions, what should be the priorities of the Soviet politician in the realm of nuclear disarmament? Judging by everything, disarmament is unthinkable without a continual and active negotiations process to reduce strategic nuclear weapons. Practically any halt on this path will give rise to alarm and uncertainty in the continuation of the process. It is necessary as soon as possible to begin the next consultations for the continuation of negotiations. A certain interval which is projected in the activities of the practitioners of disarmament connected with the implementation of the treaty provisions and with the contemplation of the changed realities of the defense capabilities and the security of the USSR and the United States should not affect the further activities of those who were involved in the preparation of the present treaty. Within the framework of the time (seven years) allotted for its implementation, they should be working toward future negotiations.

As for the participants in the negotiations, their circle must undoubtedly be broadened. It is clear that other countries possessing nuclear weapons (France, the United Kingdom, and China) as well as countries potentially possessing nuclear weapons (Pakistan, India, Iraq, Brazil, Israel, etc.) should be drawn in. Representatives of the world's highly-developed states in the economic sense could take part as observers. For example Germany and Japan, who, while not possessing nuclear weapons, are themselves in a position to render necessary aid for their creation to "third world" countries.

The strategy of such negotiations should consist of the development of long-term mutually acceptable principles and provisions universally limiting nuclear weapons and regulating strict monitoring of their presence and the possibility of their combat application. The tactical courses for the various stages of negotiations could consist of a differentiated approach to the participants of the negotiations and the regions which they represent, a gradual attainment of agreed-upon levels and of regional sublevels for the limitation of nuclear weapons, etc.

I believe that a key part should be played by the principle that he who has the most nuclear weapons should reduce them the most. On this basis the strategic nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States should be reduced by

another 30-40 percent. In other words they could be brought to a level of 1,000 delivery systems and approximately 4,000 warheads for each side. Obviously it is possible to agree with the fact that for France, the United Kingdom, and China the reduction would be more modest and for the time being would reach 10-15 percent of the national levels of nuclear weapons in these countries. For countries potentially possessing nuclear weapons it is necessary, of course, to establish for the present only measures for restricting and monitoring.

As everyone knows, one of the components of nuclear disarmament is the 1972 ABM treaty which, in particular, prohibits the development of ballistic missile defense systems in outer space. This is a fundamental provision. It obstructs the militarization of space through the creation there of orbital weapons for the defense of the territory of state from possible nuclear missile attack. In conjunction with this, one cannot help but note that the United States continues to count on the creation of such a defense system, known by the name of Strategic Defense Initiative—SDI.

Our attitude toward the prospects for its creation is unambiguous—such a system may quickly be reoriented from a defensive system to an offensive one. Then space weapons for the most part will be necessary to contest it effectively. And this means the transfer of the arms race into space. Does the world community need this? Does it expect this from the Soviet-American dialogue and, on the whole, from the disarmament process?

Incidentally, President Francois Mitterrand, commenting on the joint statement of M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush upon the signing of the START agreement, said that one of the preliminary conditions for the inclusion of France in the process of nuclear disarmament was a cessation of the improvement by states of ABM systems. This means that we are not the only ones alarmed by SDI. Voices close to our position are also being heard in other countries at the highest level.

Nonetheless, despite this very unambiguous attitude toward the development of space-based ABM systems, several days after the signing of the START treaty the Senate of the American Congress considered it necessary to vote for the creation of a global system of defense against limited attack (GPALS) [Global Protection Against Limited Strikes].

How should this be viewed? Of course the initial development of 100 antiballistic missiles does not violate the ABM treaty. However in the future the GPALS system can only be effective in the event that it has not hundreds but thousands of antiballistic missiles. As THE NEW YORK TIMES writes, such an approach "may rouse the Soviets to go back on their word and create additional weapons."

That is why no matter what attempts the United States may make to review the 1972 ABM treaty and however tempting for us may be their proposals concerning possible negotiations exchanges, the maintenance of its provisions

in the disarmament process should remain one of the priorities of Soviet policy in the realm of nuclear disarmament.

Nor should one forget the fact that strategic nuclear weapons themselves are the product of testing of nuclear weapons, missile technology, etc. Therefore, it is impossible to attempt to restrict offensive nuclear weapons without limiting nuclear testing and without introducing prohibitions on the modernization and dissemination of missile technology. All of this should be taken as a whole. However, the Pentagon continues to oppose this.

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Cooper Remarks on GPALS Cited

91WC0143A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Aug 91 Union Edition p 7

[Interview with U.S. official Henry Cooper by Interfax correspondent Petr Vasilyev: "'Space Shield' or 'Star Wars'"]

[Text] This summer for the first time a Soviet journalist was invited with a group of foreign news media representatives to visit the Pentagon and a number of U.S. military bases. He was INTERFAX correspondent Petr Vasilyev.

When in 1983 former President Ronald Reagan announced the start of work to develop "Star Wars" (the Strategic Defense Initiative), the United States and the Soviet Union were at the very height of the Cold War. Eight years later, the situation has changed. Since its inception, of course, the SDI program has been thought of as a cosmic shield to be used in the event of a mass Soviet nuclear attack against the United States.

In an interview with the author of this report, Henry Cooper, director of the agency that is engaged in working out the SDI program, declared that attitudes towards the program have been changing in the United States for a variety of reasons. Changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, underlie the changes in the "Star Wars" program, which from now on, he said, is more accurately called a "space shield."

Actually, SDI was conceived of initially as a means of deterring or repelling a Soviet nuclear threat. It was believed that SDI was capable of destroying most of the several thousands warheads that could be used on Soviet ballistic missiles to attack the United States. Subsequently, it was estimated that the number of warheads left (about one third of the total number) could nevertheless cause so much destructive damage to the United States that expenditures on SDI would prove to be unjustified. The earlier scenario, according to Cooper, envisioned military operations starting in Europe, followed by an exchange of nuclear strikes between the United States and the Soviet Union. "Now," he said, "since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Europe ceases to be a potential source of armed conflict between East and West."

At the present time, most American political figures are of the opinion that nuclear war with the Soviet Union is not a realistic prospect. At the same time, however, the destabilization that is taking place within it is forcing Americans to consider the possibility of an unpredictable chain of events and to take measures to insure themselves against such an eventuality.

What eventuality did he have in mind? Henry Cooper declared that a major war between the superpowers was virtually impossible. Nonetheless, he could not rule out the possibility of an unsanctioned or accidental launching of a nuclear missile or several missiles—for example, from a "mutinous" Soviet nuclear submarine.

Still another argument invariably used by adherents of the SDI program is that more and more countries are coming to possess nuclear weapons. By the year 2000, according to the Central Intelligence Agency, 15 developing countries will be able either to engage in the production of ballistic missiles or to obtain them by other means.

Accordingly, the revised SDI program addresses the need to repel missiles launched by mistake. American strategists do not foresee a massive nuclear attack. The maximum realistic number of warheads used in a nuclear attack is now estimated not to exceed 200. According to projections of American strategists, they should be entirely destroyed by the "space shield" system.

Another substantial change in the program lies in the mission not merely to cover United States with a "space shield" but to develop a global strategic defense. The changing situation in the world now makes it possible for the United States to make sufficiently optimistic projections so that cooperation within the framework of the SDI may attract various other countries, and already it is possible to speak of creating regional strategic programs.

Since 1985 when a memorandum was signed with respect to the participation of five countries in developing the SDI, Great Britain, Germany, Israel, Italy, and Japan have become engaged in the program. Moreover, other countries have expressed a desire to join these efforts, including Belgium, Canada, France, and Netherlands, as well as certain other countries. The United States and its SDI partners have distributed among themselves 236 contracts with a total value of \$447 million. U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz stated in this connection; "We encourage in every way possible the participation of other countries in the SDI program, and particularly that of our allies. Such participation helps them to better understand SDI, and it makes it possible for us to use the advanced technology of our allies in joint development projects."

H. Cooper does not rule out the possibility that at a certain stage in the program the Soviet Union might join it. "In principle," he noted, "this is up to the Soviet Union. If such a decision is made, the United States will have no secrets from the Soviet Union." He also expressed himself in favor of starting "serious negotiations with the Soviet Union" with the purpose of making it "a full partner in the

program." He expressed regret, however, that "for the time being there is no unanimity on this subject in the United States."

The entire system of anti-missile defense, it is presumed, will operate in two modes—as a defense against tactical ballistic missiles as well as against strategic missiles. But the principal mission of the system of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system is "to repel an attack by from 10 to 200 warheads launched for any purpose from any point on the earth's surface." In the words of Henry Cooper, "this umbrella will extend across the United States, covering Alaska, Hawaii, and 48 other countries."

The first element of the shield is a field defense system against tactical ballistic missiles. Patriot missile complexes, which distinguished themselves during the Persian Gulf War, will be used in this system—subject, of course, to certain modifications. In addition, Arrow complexes as well as ACE's missiles and the THAAD high-altitude surface-to-air antimissile system will be used in.

The basic elements of the GPALS system will consist of mobile strategic defense forces stationed on land, at sea, and in space. Land-based and sea-based components may be efficiently moved to any region in the world. In the opinion of some U.S. military observers, they should be stationed in a number of hot spots permanently.

One of the basic components of the space shield are Brilliant Eyes sensor satellites and land-based tracking stations operating as a single system in association with them. Brilliant Eyes satellites can obtain a fix on a missile as soon as it separates from its initial or booster stage. Additionally, a part of this system will consist of land-based interceptors, which, according to present plans, will be reduced by 50 percent compared with previous plans.

Another element of GPALS are Brilliant Pebbles, which are automated space systems for destroying enemy missiles, each of which is capable of operating either independently or in synchronization with other similar complexes. When a system shifts into operational mode, it is no longer controlled by ground services and becomes fully independent. However, authorization to switch to this mode requires approval from the ground.

Space Shield strategists express confidence that this system is capable of destroying any missile with a flight distance of more than a few hundred miles, provided that its flight altitude is not lower than 60 miles above sea level. The cost of a single system is estimated to be from \$1 million to \$1.5 million.

In sum, the tasks of the new GPALS program are as follows:

- To provide defense (previously: deterrence);
- To repel limited strikes (previously: a massive attack);
- To deploy a global strategic umbrella (previously: for the defense of the United States only);

—To have limited basing of the three basic components of the space shield, on land, at sea, and in the air (previously planned: a large-scale deployment of SDI systems on earth and in space).

Right now, it is a matter of money. This year's appropriations for the space shield have been sharply cut; so much, in fact, that in the words of Henry Cooper: "It precludes the possibility of completing work on the system in the this century."

Senate Vote for ABM Deployments Criticized

LD1208180891 Moscow TASS in English 1320 GMT
12 Aug 91

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow, August 12 (TASS)—The U.S. Senate chose a strange way to celebrate the signing of a historic treaty with the Soviet Union to reduce strategic offensive weapons, when it voted—merely several days later—to deploy an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, the NEW YORK TIMES reported.

Strange is just the word. Isn't it strange indeed that with the START Treaty finally signed to bolster strategic stability and markedly lessen the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, American law-makers give their approval to the deployment of an ABM system even before 1996 and recommend the administration to enter into talks with the USSR to review the ABM Treaty?

Some people in the United States justify such actions by arguing that the system's deployment will not run counter to the ABM Treaty. The deployment of a system consisting of 100 interceptor missiles will not violate the Treaty indeed. It is also true that the Soviet Union already has such a system in place around Moscow.

The kernel of the matter, however, lies somewhere else. The proposal discussed in the Senate provides for deploying seven to ten more such systems on U.S. territory, which will be a direct breach of the ABM Treaty. In addition, the latter does not allow the deployment of pick-ups and an ABM battle management system in space.

U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told a briefing on July 29 that the Soviet Union was expected to react in a more positive way to plans to emplace an ABM system to guard against accidental launches and cope with the problem of missile proliferation to other countries than to President Ronald Reagan's 1983 "strategic defence initiative" [SDI] announcement.

According to Scowcroft, Soviet apprehensions about the SDI are not so strong as far as precautions against accidental missile launches are concerned. But such claims have no realistic grounds.

The Soviet Union continues to believe that any deployment of a large-scale ABM system destabilises the strategic situation. If Washington follows the policy reflected in the Senate decision, this may eventually destroy everything that was agreed upon in the START Treaty With so much difficulty.

A revision of the ABM Treaty or the U.S. walkout of it may leave the USSR without a stimulus to scale down strategic weapons. The further nuclear arms reduction process may be in jeopardy.

The Senate-charted course has a more sensible and cheaper alternative, namely to observe the ABM Treaty, which is an important element of the existing fiber of arms control, and keep enhancing it, as well as to continue to steadily axe U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Greater strategic stability can be achieved only along these lines.

It remains to regret that the START Treaty has not resolved one fundamental problem, failing to properly reflect the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The Soviet Union agreed to sign the treaty without U.S. guarantees of continued compliance with the ABM Treaty, which is a cornerstone of strategic stability.

The Senate decision makes it appropriate to ask if it does not fortify the positions of START critics in the Soviet Union and will not tell on the treaty's ratification.

Correspondent Questions U.S. SDI Program

*OW1508183991 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1554 GMT 15 Aug 91*

["Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondent Petr Vasiliyev: "The U.S. 'Space Shield': What Does It Hide?"; item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Recently the Soviet press has published several articles on the U.S. Space Defence Initiative (Star Wars). In particular, the Army newspaper, "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA", (15.08.91) has restated its opinion that the SDI programme will come to be a new and thoroughly destructive phase of the arms race.

It is no secret that in the USA itself opinions differ widely on the SDI programme. "DP" [Diplomatic Panorama] produces below material received at first hand—directly from the programme's developers in the United States.

When in 1983 former U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the beginning of work to develop SDI, the Strategic Defence Initiative, the cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States was in full swing. What has changed now that, eight years later, the two countries have reached agreement and signed a treaty on conventional weapons and are ready to conclude the next agreement on strategic strike weapons? After all, the SDI programme was initially conceived as a "space shield" in the event of a massive Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.

The fact that the programme has already undergone certain modifications speaks volumes. But has it been essentially changed? And moreover, should the programme actually be seen as the nuclear sword that the Soviet Union has long claimed it to be?

Henry Cooper, the director of the agency developing the SDI programme, said in a conversation with the author of this article that attitudes to the SDI programme are

changing in the USA for a whole range of reasons. The main reasons behind the changes in the character and content of the "star wars" programme, or, more properly, the "space shield" programme, are the changes in the Soviet Union and in the political landscape of Eastern Europe and also the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

It is true that initially SDI was conceived as a deterrent factor and a reflection of the Soviet nuclear threat. It was thought capable of destroying a large proportion of the several thousand warheads in Soviet ballistic missiles which might be used in a nuclear strike against America. Then it was calculated that the remaining missiles (about one third of the overall total) would cause such serious damage and devastation to the United States anyway that the expenditure on SDI was unjustifiable.

At present the majority of American politicians think that nuclear war with the Soviet Union is not a realistic possibility. But at the same time, domestic instability within the Soviet Union, a situation which many prominent politicians, including the Soviet President himself, have assessed as a threat that could lead the country to anarchy and chaos, forces the Americans to bear in mind the at times unpredictable course of events and take the appropriate measures.

Another argument used by the supporters of SDI is that more and more countries are now coming into possession of nuclear weapons. According to CIA figures, by the year 2000 15 developing countries will be able to begin systematic production of ballistic missiles or acquire them by other means.

Correspondingly, the main adjustment to the SDI programme, to its current conception, was made so that it can ward off a missile released by accident, or a single unit released from it. U.S. strategies no longer foresee massive nuclear attacks. The maximum number of warheads expected in any attack is now estimated at 200 units. According to the American strategists they would be completely destroyed by the Space Shield.

Another vital change in the programme is the function to cover not only the United States with the Space Shield but to create a global strategic defence system. The changing world situation allows the United States to make the fairly optimistic suggestions that some countries might be keen to cooperate within the framework of the renewed SDI programme, and that it is already possible to speak of the creation of regional strategic programmes.

Since 1985, when the memorandum on the participation of five countries in the joint development of SDI was signed, Great Britain, Germany, Israel, Italy and Japan have participated in the programme. Other countries, including particularly Belgium, Canada, France and the Netherlands, have expressed the desire to join the development of the project. The United States' SDI partners have signed 236 contracts to an overall value of 447 million dollars. Paul Wulfowitz, assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State for Defence remarked that "we are keen to encourage other countries, especially our allies, to participate in the SDI programme. It will enable them to

better understand the significance of the programme and us to take advantage of the advanced technology of our allies in joint development projects". Cooper believes that the Soviet Union can join the programme at some point. "It is actually up to the Soviet Union," he said, adding that, if the Soviet Union did take such a decision, the United States would have no secrets from it. He said serious negotiations should be started with the Soviet Union in order to make it a full-fledged participant of the programme. But he admitted that there are various opinions on the score in the United States, in particular one hears diametrically opposite points of view expressed in the Senate. Cooper regrets this, for it means that the Soviet Union will continue viewing the Space Shield programme with mistrust.

The entire antimissile defence system has two basic aspects: countering theatre ballistic missiles and strategic missiles. But the main task of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) is defence against any strike by any number of warheads ranging from 10 to 200 launched from any part of the globe and aimed at any target. One of the elements of the Space Shield is a field defence system against theatre ballistic missiles. This will make use of Patriot missile systems, which proved their effectiveness in the Gulf War and which will naturally be modified and improved, as well as Arrow and Ace missiles and THAAD, a high-altitude antimissile system.

The basic elements of GPALS are to be mobile strategic defence systems deployed in space, on the ground and at sea. Sea- and ground-based elements are to be quickly transferrable to any part of the world. In some "hot spots", the American military believe, they should stay permanently.

A system including a satellite sensor called Brilliant Eyes and ground control stations is to be one of the main components of the space shield. The satellite will spot a missile when the booster is detached. In addition, The ground-based architecture will comprise two types of interceptors, the number of which will be 50 percent of what was originally planned. Both types are being developed simultaneously. One of them, E2I (Exo-Endoatmospheric Interceptor) is to be used for targets in the upper layers of the atmosphere. The other type, GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor), is to be used for the destruction of missiles or warheads before they have entered the atmosphere. In the fiscal year 1988, expenditures on the Brilliant Eyes programme amounted to \$22 billion.

Another element of GPALS is the space-based interceptor portion called Brilliant Pebbles. Each Pebble is an autonomous interceptor which can act either entirely on its own or simultaneously with other similar systems. But, in any case, there is mutual exchange of information, all the neighbouring systems analysing the situation and deciding whether their support is needed. During the battle, each such system acts quite independently and is not controlled by a centralised battle management system, although it must be authorised to enter the battle. The autonomous

mode of operation of these systems ensures their considerable survivability: even if many of them are destroyed, the remaining ones will still be operative.

Each Pebble will cost between one and one and a half million dollars. Research, development, testing and deployment of the Brilliant Pebbles cost more than \$10 billion in the fiscal year 1988 alone.

The tasks of GPALS can be summed up as follows:

protection against limited strikes, rather than deterrence of a massive attack;

global strategic defence, rather than defence of the United States alone;

limited deployment of the three basic elements of the Space Shield system on the ground, at sea and in space, rather than large-scale deployment of SDI systems in space and on the ground.

Today funding is the main problem. This year, Space Shield expenditures have been cut down to an extent which, according to Henry Cooper, makes it impossible to complete the work on it in this century. The pace of research and development is slower than it was in 1985.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Poland Ready for Troop Withdrawal From Germany

LD1408131391 Moscow TASS in English 1241 GMT
14 Aug 91

[By TASS correspondent Piotr Cheremushkin]

[Text] Warsaw, August 14 (TASS)—Poland is ready to cope with large-scale transit of Soviet troops being withdrawn from Germany, Polish Deputy Minister of Transport and Shipping Witold Hodakeiwicz said in an interview with the Catholic weekly LAD.

He said that special groups on the border check the size of cargoes and register what transport enters for the Polish territory and at what time.

Soviet troops leaving Germany will mostly travel by rail. Poland is capable of ensuring the passage of 20 and more trains from the West to the East. Two trains now pass Poland in transit.

Regarding arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet Army units from Poland, Hodakiewicz said they have spur-tracks along which they can bring personnel and equipment to railway junctions. He said that the pay for the passage will be made in Swiss francs.

NUCLEAR TESTING

Scientists Defend Continued Testing

91WC0136A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian
No. 26, Jun 91 pp 17-19

[Article by Igor Andryushin, laboratory chief at the All-Union Research Institute for Experimental Physics (VNI-IEF); Yuriy Trutnev, first deputy science director of the

VNIIEF, Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin and state prizes of the USSR, and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Aleksandr Chernyshev, department head of the VNIIEF and winner of the USSR State Prize: "Nuclear Weapons: Too Serious to Have a Frivolous Attitude Toward Them"]

[Text] Should the Soviet Union stop nuclear testing? The official position: do this simultaneously with the United States. The "Nevada-Semipaltinsk" Movement is insisting on the immediate cessation of explosions. But what do those who have to do with the creation of nuclear weapons think?

The problem of whether the USSR should continue or stop nuclear tests must not be viewed in isolation. It is only part of the more general question of nuclear armament. Its history begins in the mid-1940's, when the United States not only created the atomic bomb but also bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki and demonstrated its willingness to use nuclear weapons to "bridle communism" and to establish an "American" world order. Strategic plans were worked out for the delivery of a nuclear strike against dozens of cities of the USSR in different republics, which threatened the loss of tens of millions of people and the practical destruction of the state.

Our country had the choice between two alternatives. It could meet the American conditions, which would mean the transformation of the political and economic structures of the society, the renunciation of the struggle for political hegemony in the world (that is, the establishment of a world socialist system), and military disarmament. The second alternative meant the establishment of its own nuclear potential, the existence of which would make U.S. military aggression against the USSR practically impossible because of the threat of a nuclear counterstrike.

The second path was chosen. The first Soviet atomic bomb was developed and tested by 1949, the hydrogen bomb by 1953, and an explosive charge that was the prototype of the contemporary thermonuclear weapon of the USSR by 1955. They organized the series production of nuclear weapons and developed strategic delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

Gateway to the Nuclear Age

An era of nuclear confrontation between the USSR and the United States began, an era of intense struggle for world leadership, for an "American" or a "communist" world. In this struggle, despite the continuous confrontation, threats, and pressure of force, each side was obligated to take into account the interests of the other side and to avoid a direct confrontation.

The United States was not able to become the sole military and political leader in the world. Moreover the creation of nuclear weapons meant that for the first time in the last 150 years the United States was vulnerable to a possible strike by the armed forces of another country. Such a development was seen as unacceptable for the United States. Washington tried to find real possibilities to diminish the Soviet nuclear potential, either through the development of strategic systems capable of its guaranteed

destruction through a first strike or through countermeasures that could parry a counterstrike by the USSR or through the realization of a combination of these two possibilities.

The USSR never had the possibilities of delivering a first disarming strike against the strategic systems of the United States, does not have such possibilities now, and will not in the future. The objective of the Soviet military technical efforts was to counteract the potential possibilities of the U.S. first-strike systems and to guarantee a counterstrike, which led to a tremendous quantitative growth in the nuclear arsenal. This was necessary, for if in a first strike the adversary is able to destroy 90 percent, for example, of Soviet strategic arms, then, as calculations show, the necessary arsenal must exceed by a factor of 10 the minimum level sufficient for a counterstrike.

Although the acuteness of the military and political confrontation between the USSR and the United States has diminished significantly, it is possible that the world will see new fundamental conflicts having to do above all with the population explosion, the exhaustion of resources, the shortage of food, the ecological crisis, and the spiritual impoverishment of civilization. The overwhelming majority of humanity lives under conditions that it is difficult to call worthy of man and many people have no chances in life. There are extremely acute disproportions in national wealth in the world. Historical experience teaches that such situations have given rise to a striving for a reallocation of the world and a more equal distribution of goods and resources and all of this has ultimately led to war. In such a situation, it is not difficult to predict the inevitability of the preservation of the military potential of the developed countries of the West and their striving to put the military resources of any other country under strict control.

At this time the defense complex of the USSR faced complicated questions in connection with the task of bringing about a quantitative reduction of strategic arms in the framework of the new policy of detente and the elimination of the confrontation between the USSR and the United States. There is more and more trust between the states and political mechanisms are being established to guarantee security as an element of a fundamentally new world. At the same time that there is a reduction of the number of strategic arms (along with the technical improvement of the U.S. first-strike systems and antiballistic-missile defense), there are fewer possibilities for a counterstrike, deterrence is weakened, and the preconditions are established for the delivery of a first strike by the adversary.

The result is the possibility of a dangerous situation, in which the old power mechanism of peace will no longer work and the new political mechanism will not yet work. Therefore, although the greatest political resolve is needed for the realization of disarmament plans, tremendous prudence is also required.

Status Obliges

Nuclear weapons, being a source of tremendous military power and giving a state a special status (despite its severe political, economic, and social crisis, the USSR is essentially still a military and political "superpower"), impose special obligations on the state possessing them, which it bears with respect to its own people and the world community. The state must be strong and responsible and in complete control of the situation in the country and in the nuclear complex. Own nuclear weapons may be a source of terrible troubles for a weak state.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the establishment of each individual kind of nuclear stockpiles is an absolutely specific development and different types of nuclear warheads may differ from one another no less greatly than, for example, different means of transportation.

The processes taking place in nuclear warheads are so complex that the established scientific-technical base of the project planning of the nuclear weapon is inadequate to guarantee the functioning of the devices. The developed nuclear warheads must without fail be verified in tests at special test ranges. In accordance with the results of the tests, the developed device may go into a subsequent production cycle for modifications, which happens rather often in the practice of development.

In a number of cases in nuclear tests, they obtain information of great importance for other types of nuclear warheads, including those in operation, and this requires the corresponding specific measures. Some warheads in operation go through additional certification in special nuclear tests of various kinds. A separate group of nuclear tests has to do with important questions involving the safety of nuclear weapons and with the development of measures to improve it. Additional complex questions arise and are resolved utilizing special nuclear tests in the development of strengthened weapon systems having greater viability.

Nuclear tests are an integral technological element in the process of the establishment, modernization, and maintenance of the nuclear arsenal of the USSR. If we stop testing, we will not be able, in particular, to carry out the necessary investigations of the established military stockpiles, including work on the analysis of their viability and analogous work in the interests of different types of military equipment. It will be impossible to have a direct verification of the work of the established military stockpiles under the conditions of the creeping change in the technology for the production of nuclear warheads and the materials in use. It will be impossible to perform work on the modernization of the military stockpiles, including for the purpose of resolving various questions in guaranteeing their safety. All of this is fraught with a gradual loss of the deterrence qualities of the nuclear arsenal of the USSR.

Between Two Stools?

The tests of the nuclear weapons of the USSR have basically been carried out at two special test ranges of the USSR Ministry of Defense: at Semipalatinsk and at the Northern Test Range (Novaya Zemlya). Originally (until 1963) the nuclear tests were carried out, as a rule, in the

atmosphere and, in a number of cases, in surface tests. Beginning in 1963, all of the tests of nuclear weapons in the USSR have been performed under ground.

The carrying out even of underground nuclear explosions near residential areas or regions of vital activities of the population imposes a special responsibility on the site chosen for the test range and the work there. In this regard, the location of the Northern Test Range is much more preferable, although its greatest shortcoming is the pronounced seasonal nature of the work there. Apparently in principle some important kinds of tests cannot be performed there. The correct solution to the problem would be to perform nuclear tests at the Northern Test Range and low-power tests at the Semipalatinsk Test Range while introducing a special system of privileges and compensation for those citizens whose vital activities are affected by the work of the nuclear test ranges.

The normal functioning of the nuclear complex has been disrupted in recent years. Tests are not being performed for well-known reasons. A fundamental decision is required: will the USSR remain a nuclear power or will there be unilateral nuclear disarmament? If it remains a nuclear power, then it is necessary to establish elementary conditions for normal work, including the resolution of the problem with nuclear tests. Nuclear weapons are too serious a matter to allow a frivolous attitude toward them.

A Moratorium for the World?

The question of nuclear tests, just as other problems of nuclear arms, has been politicized to a considerable degree. It is asserted that the stopping of nuclear tests by the leading countries will be a substantial barrier to the possible spread of nuclear weapons, whereas their continuation will contribute to the extension of the group of nuclear states and a reduction of security. The appearance of nuclear weapons in third countries will lead to a reduction of security in the world. But each state decides independently how to resolve the question of whether or not to possess nuclear weapons. The circumstance that the USSR is carrying out (or is not carrying out) nuclear tests at this time has nothing to do with this question.

Decisive for the development of own nuclear weapons is not only a political decision but also the possession of the necessary scientific-technical data and special materials. Both may either be established in the state itself or acquired elsewhere. In many cases, primitive but rather destructive kinds of nuclear arms may be developed without any nuclear tests at all (especially when the technology is obtained from other countries).

It is also asserted that the stopping of nuclear tests will freeze the existing military-technical balance and will not allow the development of new destabilizing arms systems. But the objective of nuclear tests is the improvement of the reliability of the nuclear arsenal, the investigation of the behavior of warheads in emergency situations, the improvement of the safety of nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of arms systems in relation to first-strike and antiballistic-missile systems. All of this work is aimed at

improving the stability of the situation, safety, and viability of weapons and has nothing to do with the establishment of destabilizing systems of weapons. It is necessary to understand clearly that the improvement of nuclear weapons themselves cannot disrupt the balance of power or establish fundamentally new military-technical prerequisites for the achievement of decisive superiority.

Destabilizing is work in the application of new nonnuclear technologies, the creation of highly accurate first-strike systems, the development of strategic space-based arms, and work on the SDI program. Especially troubling in this connection is the arming of U.S. nuclear submarines with highly accurate "Trident-2" missiles, which definitely can qualify as a first-strike weapon. We cannot understand why the prepared draft of the treaty on a 50-percent reduction of strategic arms permits the possibility of the extensive arming of U.S. naval forces with this destabilizing kind of weapon.

The opponents of nuclear tests declare that in the long run an unlimited moratorium will lead to a loss of reliability of nuclear weapons and to a reduction of the effectiveness of first-strike systems and hence to greater security. We would agree with this if it were a matter of a universal rather than a unilateral renunciation of tests. One must also bear in mind that parity will also be disrupted if the nuclear arsenal of one side is prepared in advance for mothballing for a long time but is not on the other side; if the possibilities for the freezing of the technologies for the production of nuclear weapons and control of their production differ; and if the sides have different amounts of information on the behavior of nuclear warheads under different conditions. One must not forget the relatively greater role of nuclear tests for the Soviet nuclear arsenal than for the American arsenal, even on account of the general technological backwardness of the USSR and the substantially smaller possibilities of computers. It is also important to note that the leaders of the United States have repeatedly declared that nuclear tests are necessary for the security of the American nuclear arsenal and will be continued.

Do Not Create Threats for Yourself

The nuclear arms race led to such an increase in the size of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and United States that the potential possibility of their use affects the interests of every person. Hence the fundamental problem of the radical reduction of the aggregate power of nuclear arms in ensuring strategic equilibrium at a new and substantially lower level. In other words, it is necessary to reduce nuclear arsenals in such a way as to eliminate the potential threat of global annihilation on the one hand and to maintain the possibility of an adequate counterstrike to guarantee against aggression on the other.

It is necessary to work together with the United States on resolving this problem. A simple arithmetic reduction of the existing arsenals (by a factor of 10 or 50, for example) does not resolve the problem, because in so doing there will be an immeasurable increase in the effectiveness of a first strike and the situation will be destabilized. To avoid

this, a profound change in the structure of nuclear arsenals is necessary. New nuclear tests will be needed to bring about such a process.

It would be wonderful to live in a world without arms and without wars. In a nuclear and militarized world, however, the USSR will be vulnerable to the pressure of force and to any claims on its territory, natural resources, and way of life. It is necessary to understand clearly that even in the event of the voluntary abandonment of the status of a nuclear "superpower" the USSR will be required to provide guarantees (including material guarantees) of the impossibility of its restoration, which may be linked with the establishment of very limited foreign control (including with the utilization of special military units).

We think that we should not be in a hurry to renounce a time-tested means that permitted the preservation of peace for our state. Unilateral nuclear disarmament is not in the interests of the USSR and is not in the interests of the world community. It is easy to foresee the possible consequences of the pressure of force from nuclear states against a nonnuclear USSR, which is also hit by an economic and national crisis. It is not difficult to predict that after unilateral nuclear disarmament by the USSR the military-political hegemony of the United States will be established in the world. The disarmament process is essential as a way to a new secure world but this process must be multilateral and gradual. The nuclear arms complex of the USSR was created over decades and represents a colossal national patrimony, to which all of the republics and peoples of the USSR contributed. We must demonstrate the greatest caution in any situations so that it is not drawn into the vortex of internal conflicts.

Physicist Makes Case for Keeping Nuclear Arms

91WC0146A Moscow DEN in Russian No 12,
Jun 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with V.Z. Nechay, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, professor, Lenin and State prize laureate, and director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, by A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "Half-Life"]

[Text] This is what our science is now going through, oriented as it is on solving the problem of the state's defense capability. The reasons this is happening have been considered by someone who until quite recently was one of the "secret" people: V.Z. Nechay, doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, professor, Lenin and State prize laureate, and director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics, giving his first interview to the press.

[Khokhlov] Vladimir Zinov'yevich: For 32 years you have been engaged in the development and creation of nuclear weapons. Tell us, do we need them now that world politics have started to be built not on strength but on the principles of good-neighborliness and peace initiatives?

[Nechay] Is this what you think? Politics have always been unpredictable. Just think, who would have thought five or 10 years ago that the world's largest power would be

sending tens and hundreds of thousands of its soldiers to restore "justice" on the other side of the world from its own borders.

[Khokhlov] You are talking about the Iraq-Kuwait conflict?

[Nechay] Yes. And also about the military actions of the U.S. Army close to the southern borders of the USSR. Perhaps this was the beginning of a new division of spheres of influence in the world—focusing on the struggle for raw materials, which the world's technological-industrial elite must have to survive in this day and age. In our country it is as if they have already stopped taking this into account in the process of establishing the new "world order," and this is a very alarming symptom. Whether we like it or not, nothing has changed in the world: Only strength is respected. Any weakening of the country's military potential will inevitably entail an economic decline and setbacks in science and industry.

[Khokhlov] So is mankind doomed to an arms race? Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction....

[Nechay] This is a 30-year-old delusion. Yes, they could be used for such purposes. But the machine gun is also a weapon of mass destruction. An ordinary knife can be considered in the same way if it is in the hands of a maniac. In fact, nuclear weapons are designed primarily to destroy military installations.

The Americans realized this before we did, and for quite some time they have regarded nuclear weapons exactly in this way. American scientists understood before we did that the race for super-yields—50 megatons, 100 megatons, and so on—was absolutely unjustified. In fact, why do we need superbombs? What we need today is low-yield but highly accurate weapons. If a war suddenly were to begin, there would be no need to destroy New York or Moscow. Strikes would primarily target launch silos, military bases, and command posts. It is one side's destruction of the other side's military potential that will bring victory in an armed struggle between two equal enemies.

[Khokhlov] Fine, but what do you have to say about the environmental contamination that would result from the explosion of a nuclear bomb? What is the use of victory in war if life on earth is no longer possible?

[Nechay] If all the nuclear weapons available to the USSR and the United States were exploded, then, in fact, the consequences for mankind would be horrible. If there were only a few hundreds of explosions (you can check the facts; this is not the cynicism of a "hawk" from the military-industrial complex but a strictly scientific calculation), nothing particularly horrible would occur. We should not forget that tests have already been conducted in the atmosphere. The contamination then was dozens of times less than what we had at Chernobyl and almost all of it went up into the stratosphere.

I believe that our half-baked environmentalists have done more harm to the people's health than all the nuclear tests conducted in the country. Today a frightened and duped

people are suffering from fear. Instead of receiving medicine in the form of well-considered scientific information, they are being fed new "horrors." This is pure politicking. Incidentally, the Americans very harshly evicted the leader of the Kazakhstan "Nevada-Semipalatinsk" environmental movement, Olzhas Suleymanov, from Nevada. They are surprising people, these Americans: In Nevada they are proud of the fact that it is in their state that the nuclear tests that enable the United States to remain a superpower are conducted. Or are we the ones who are surprising?

[Khokhlov] The Americans are talking a great deal about the "new thinking," are they not?

[Nechay] In my opinion, they mean something very specific by this: what kinds of unilateral concessions the USSR will make. And they welcome this.

[Khokhlov] I have only a very poor idea of the psychology of our leaders, first and foremost the president. Let me remind you of the first year of perestroika: Gorbachev announced that we would never make military concessions. Eighteen months later he made a 180-degree turn: Total capitulation to American interests. If I may be so bold, all of M. Gorbachev's political successes in the international arena have been achieved by one-sided concessions. To whom? To the United States, to Great Britain, and to Germany. We might justify this by saying: Yes, we do not need so many weapons, yes, we could have dozens of times less and would still be someone to be reckoned with.

[Nechay] But they will stop thinking that way as soon as the parity in nuclear weapons disappears.

[Khokhlov] Is it possible to debate the need for an arms race when the country is in crisis? What are more necessary now—missiles or potatoes?

[Nechay] Only a fraction of one percent of budget resources is being spent on scientific work and nuclear weapons testing. But how much is being spent on agriculture? "Linking" a potato shortage with nuclear bomb production is inconceivable. If the people lack something, it is not the nuclear people's fault. The causes lie entirely elsewhere. But it is very convenient for some people to form a new image of the enemy. So now they are creating it out of the defense industry, the military-industrial complex. In fact, at all levels here there is an inability to organize the work. Moreover, today the only advanced sector—ours—is being destroyed.

[Khokhlov] Are you referring to conversion in "defense"?

[Nechay] Conversion is necessary. We ourselves have recognized that it is impossible to restrict ourselves only to military research. We must look further afield. This provides, incidentally, a chance to make technical breakthroughs also in the main sphere of activity—weapons.

But conversion in the country has been started in quite an absurd way. First it was simply "recommended" that we convert 10 percent of the institute's potential, with a steady increase to 20 percent by the year 2000. But in

two-and-a-half years we have reached 40 percent conversion activity.... It is a good thing that the scientific potential of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics is great enough for us to have managed up to now to maintain a high level of efficiency in research and development in the weapons sphere. The main difficulty is what we set for ourselves.

[Khokhlov] Going no one knows where and doing no one knows what?

[Nechay] We did not even discuss it. We ourselves believed that if something had to be done, it was necessary to take action on the global scale. We engaged in the development of fiber optics systems, the development and production of computerized X-ray tomography, the manufacture of ultradispersed diamonds [ultradispersnyye almazy] with unique properties, developing a metalworking base for work with highly ductile materials, and many other questions that require a high level of scientific and technical potential and the ability to work to resolve. All of these things are the very latest technologies.

It is possible to route dozens of cable television programs, stereophonic radio broadcasts, and telephone lines through a single strand of a fiberglass cable. By the end of 1992, factories will be engaged in series production of many tens of thousands of kilometers of first-class fiberglass cables. But... Instead of the R60 million we asked for, the Cabinet of Ministers has allocated only R10 million, even though this is a state program.

It is the same with the development of computerized X-ray tomography. We buy this equipment in the West, paying more than \$1 million for each unit. In late June, our all-Union scientific research institute was assembling a Soviet-built unit at a cost of R1.5 million, in last year's prices. The medical people need it, but they are poor. What about the government? Or is it more profitable to buy them from the West using hard currency?

The position with regard to the diamonds is the same, with universal metalworking rolling mills still using the so-called "potter's wheel" technology. This makes continuous metalworking possible. In the West it is still being mastered only empirically, but already has been included on the Cocom "black list." Do not give it to the Russians...! But we have made this development based on the institute's scientific achievement. No one believes that we could do this in a Soviet Union wracked by crisis. Unfortunately, our leadership also does not believe it. So, no matter where we "turn," no one is as advanced as we are in the development. To make up for this, in five or 10 years we will again be unanimously admired by the Americans or Japanese.

[Khokhlov] Why is this happening?

[Nechay] It seems to me that the country's leadership is now more interested in words than deeds. Many government decisions are totally devoid of healthy common sense.

World experience shows convincingly that during its initial stage, conversion requires significant financial outlays.

Here we are trying to do it by removing from the "defense people" what they had previously. Funding has simply been cut off. But, pardon me, people must be paid. Here, a search for the trivial has started, something that can be put in motion without particular effort. Highly skilled associates are starting to do trivial work. Specialized plants are being converted to the production of saucepans. This is the degradation of a leading sector.

Valentin Pavlov evidently does not think of the return that "defense" may generate in five years, as his task is to rob the enterprises now to somehow bring expenditure into line with earnings. He does not give a damn for anything else.

Today, a crime is being committed: The country's scientific potential is being destroyed.

[Khokhlov] According to your predictions, for how long will it be possible to sustain science with this kind of attitude toward it?

[Nechay] The degradation of our scientific sector has already begun and has been quite precipitous since 1985, when a unilateral moratorium was announced on nuclear testing. When that moratorium was announced we were not asked what we, the scientists, would lose, what the country would lose. It was believed that the party general secretary understood this better than we did....

The trouble lies not only in the government cutting off our funding. The nuclear workers and weapon makers have been operating for a long time on minimum funds and have still been able to maintain nuclear missile parity with America. The trouble is that we are not able to work and do research normally.

Here we should not forget that we are also discussing the country's security. If we want to guarantee the security of our people and of all mankind, we simply must show concern to strengthen the state's defense capability. Today, the main guarantee of security in the world is nuclear weapons. Reagan and Thatcher understood this. Bush understands it, as do the leaders of France and China. So nuclear testing and weapons improvement continue in the world. Last year, 1990, the United States conducted nine tests, France conducted five, China two. It was only we who "eliminated ourselves" by allowing other countries to make a technological breakthrough to develop a new generation of weapons. Thus, the hands of the aggressor who may impose his diktat on the world, us included, by the threat of the use of those weapons have been untied.

[Khokhlov] Is it still possible to halt the "half-life" of science and the degradation of the defense industry?

[Nechay] It is. It is still possible. What is needed is to conduct at least a minimum number of tests. The compensation for their inadequacy can be the powerful development of an experimental base.

[Khokhlov] They are now saying that the military-industrial complex is the main brake on the road of perestroika and democratization. Is this true, are you "applying the brake"?

[Nechay] It is only on us that the brakes are "being applied." But when this is done, it is forgotten that this also applies the brakes to the rest of the country. Behind the vacant talk about politics, many people are now forgetting that only the scientific and technical revolution can move us along the path of progress. Unfortunately, minds are now occupied with something quite different. If this goes on, we will lose what we have.

Are we, then, crossing a dangerous line? Perhaps we should stay where we are and consider it for a while.

'Nuclear Explosions' in Kuzbass Asserted

LD0208091291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0600 GMT 2 Aug 91

[Text] According to a POSTFAKTUM report, Aman Tuleyev, Chairman of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet, has asserted that scientific nuclear explosions were carried out in the Kuzbass. He said this on Oblast Television.

The Chairman of the Oblast Soviet said that he has information about tests but no relevant documents. Having noted that he regards the concealment of official data as a crime, Tuleyev stressed that full clarity is needed in this issue. After all, there are old residents who speak about explosions. The relevant bodies, the chairman of the oblast soviet said, have been instructed by him more than once to sort things out. However, he has not yet received an official confirmation.

Military Analyst Bogachev on Nuclear Test Ban

LD0608153191 Moscow TASS in English 1515 GMT 6 Aug 91

[By Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, August 6 (TASS)—During hearings in the U.S. Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee several legislators asked the new U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Robert Strauss to make necessary efforts in Moscow in order to set into motion the stalled problem of the complete ban on nuclear weapons testing. Strauss agreed to comply with the senators' request without hesitation.

This episode attracted the attention of disarmament experts for two reasons. Firstly, Moscow is not a place where there is a need for agitation in favour of a complete ban on nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union has repeatedly proclaimed its readiness to sign an agreement on the complete ban of all nuclear testing at any moment and agree to the strictest possible verification if the United States joins such an agreement. Secondly, it has turned out that the new American ambassador's position on the test problem is much more consistent with the spirit of the time than that of the U.S. administration's official policy in the vital field of arms control. Representatives of the U.S. State Department insist that tests ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons ensure stability in the world. Because of this, Washington says, it is still a long way to go before the complete ban on nuclear explosions becomes possible.

Twenty-eight years have elapsed since the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere, space and underwater was signed. Enormous changes have taken place in the world. Major agreements have been signed to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles, cut conventional arms in Europe and reduce strategic arms. A line has been drawn under the gloomy cold war period. The Soviet Union is withdrawing its troops from East Europe, the Warsaw Pact has been disbanded. Washington announced its intention to cut its military budget and troops within five years.

Particularly favorable conditions have emerged for the final solution of the issue of underground nuclear tests. The Soviet Union, for instance, has abstained from such explosions for more than a year. However, a treaty on the complete ban has yet to be worked out. First of all, the delay is prompted by the differences in the two sides' ultimate goals. The USSR regards the complete ban as its main objective. The United States aims to work out measures to control continuing tests.

It has been said that nuclear testing is litmus paper making the true stance of one or another state with regard to major problems of war and peace to be defined with utmost clarity.

President George Bush said recently that the United States changes in response to changes in the Soviet Union. These words also reflect the evolution of ideas concerning different ways of ensuring national security. Changes have occurred in the two countries' military doctrines, budgets and military planning. Regrettably, the U.S. negative stance toward nuclear tests has remained unchanged.

Consideration of Swedish Test Ban Proposal Urged

PM1208153991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Aug 91 Union Edition p 5

[Correspondent M. Zubko report: "Key to Nuclear Disarmament. Swedish Government's Military Initiative"]

[Text] Stockholm—During the days of universal expectation preceding the recent Soviet-U.S. summit meeting, an important proposal by Stockholm somehow was not particularly noticed. It was advanced a few days before the talks began in Moscow by Ambassador Maj-Britt Theorin, Sweden's representative on the Geneva Disarmament Committee: With the ending of the "cold war" the time has finally come to conclude a treaty on the total prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests.

Perhaps the Swedes wished to "enrich" the meeting between the USSR and U.S. presidents with their initiative, but the preparations for such a complex and important step, it has to be thought, were already moving according to a previously agreed-upon plan which was difficult to change, and the entire "other world" had already tuned into the Moscow wavelength. I do not know, perhaps the Swedish proposal was discussed in some way in Moscow, but I personally did not find any mention of it in the official reports.

Meanwhile, the initiative is of special significance and can give a powerful boost to those accords reached at the Soviet-U.S. talks.

Yes, the concluded Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty is of great significance. But the question arises: If the USSR and the United States, while eliminating some of their intercontinental missiles, themselves produce new and more sophisticated types of weapons (or other members of the nuclear club do so), will this be in line with the spirit of the concluded treaty? Such a thing could happen.

This is why Sweden's initiative ought to be examined most carefully. It is clear to everyone—and Maj-Britt Theorin particularly emphasized this—that reliable strike systems cannot be produced without test explosions, and this will sharply reduce their significance. The development of nuclear weapons will largely become pointless. It was no coincidence that the ambassador called the test ban “the key to nuclear disarmament.”

It is known that there has recently been a fall in the number of tests in the world. This is reassuring. Eighteen were recorded in 1990—the smallest number for 30 years. But explosions were carried out nonetheless: eight by the United States, six by France, two by China, and one each by the USSR and Britain. These tests mean that new missiles were being produced somewhere in military plants.

There is no denying that it is a complex problem. For years the Soviet Union has been advancing proposals to abandon testing and has repeatedly imposed a unilateral moratorium on the carrying out of explosions, but not everyone has yet been inclined to support it.

The question of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was touched on at the news conference which the USSR and U.S. presidents held in Moscow. I will remind you: M.S. Gorbachev, in particular, described as absurd the situation whereby “some will travel the path of disarmament, the path to a nuclear-free world, while at the same time others will find ways to possess their own nuclear weapons.”

Of course, there are nuances here, but a nuclear test ban, one would think, would also help to resolve the question of nuclear nonproliferation. It is common knowledge that there are now at least several states in the world that are thought to be on the threshold of joining the nuclear club.

“For 30 years, the world's public has been demanding an end to nuclear weapon tests,” Maj-Britt Theorin said at a session of the Disarmament Conference. “The total changes in world politics, the breakthrough in the matter of reaching accords in the sphere of nuclear arms reduction, and the decrease in the number of test explosions carried out attest that the time has come to conclude an agreement banning all kinds of nuclear explosions...”

Now that the USSR and the United States have signed the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty, this is the very time to take note of the Swedish initiative, which could build a bridge to important new agreements.

Festivities To Mark Closure of Semipalatinsk

*LD1208213991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 1400 GMT 12 Aug 91*

[Text] A peace march has begun in Kazakhstan. The resolutions of meetings and the placards of people setting out for Semipalatinsk, a Novosti Agency correspondent reports, express support for the nation-wide actions for the elimination of the nuclear testing ground and mark a date—29 August this year—as the last day of its existence—the testing ground, that is. On 25 August at Semipalatinsk there will be a general gathering of the participants in the peace march. Among those invited to it are U.S. President George Bush, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, and also foreign correspondents. On 30 August, ceremonial Friday Prayers will be held, during which Muslim dignitaries will celebrate the closure of the nuclear testing ground by the people.

Military Writer Urges Nuclear Test Ban

*LD1308092291 Moscow TASS in English 0746 GMT
13 Aug 91*

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow, August 13 (TASS)—Chinese Premier Li Peng declared in Beijing on Sunday that China is in principle ready to accede to the international nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The French Government took the “decision in principle” to join the treaty last June.

So all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council will soon become parties to the international document.

Considering that South Africa, which is believed to have the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons, plans to join in as well, this year may see a dramatic increase in the effectiveness of the treaty, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear arms and thereby reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear catastrophe.

According to the latest data, 141 states are now officially parties to the 1968 treaty.

It binds nuclear weapons nations not to pass these armaments to anyone and those not possessing such arms, not to produce or acquire them.

Some critics contend that the treaty perpetuates the monopoly of major powers on nuclear weapons to the detriment of the security of non-nuclear countries. They argue that the treaty enables nuclear powers to keep what they already have, while denying to others what they do not have.

Formally, this reasoning is not devoid of logic. It would indeed be best of all to maintain equality among countries through an agreement on the immediate abolition of all nuclear weapons stocks. Regrettably, however, some nuclear powers are not yet prepared for such a solution, at least in the foreseeable future.

What should best be done in these conditions? Are there any acceptable alternatives to the non-proliferation treaty? There are obviously none.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons in violation of the treaty's letter and spirit and the entry of more countries into the "nuclear club" will pose the gravest security threat to all nations without exception.

Enhancing the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime in every way is a most important guarantee of preserving peace and stability on the planet.

It should not be forgotten either that the nuclear powers under the treaty undertake to work towards an end to the arms race and towards nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible.

Experts argue with good reason that the shortest way to a stronger non-proliferation regime is through a complete cessation of nuclear weapons testing.

TASS Reports U.S. Nuclear Test in Nevada

*LD1508204791 Moscow TASS in English 2015 GMT
15 Aug 91*

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Kolesnichenko]

[Text] New York, August 15 (TASS)—The United States on Thursday carried out a planned under-ground nuclear test in Nevada.

The test of a nuclear device with a yield under 20 kilotons proceeded successfully, Jim Boyer, U.S. Ministry [as received] of Energy official, said.

This is the fourth nuclear test officially announced by the United States this year and the 711th since the beginning of testing in Nevada in January 1951.

Novaya Zemlya Nuclear Program 'No Big Secret'

*PM1908132791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Aug 91 Union Edition p 2*

["Direct Line" report by Ivan Bentsa, followed by report from USSR Defense Ministry by Viktor Litovkin: "Novaya Zemlya Prepares For Nuclear Explosions"]

[Text] New plans for nuclear research in Novaya Zemlya have been made public.

The Arkhangelsk newspaper VOLNA ["Wave"], citing reliable sources, gave an account of the content of these plans and commented on them.

The new program, proposed by Defense Minister D. Yazov and USSR Atomic Power and Industry Minister V. Konovalov, takes into account the fact that the Semipalatinsk test site will be closed in the very near future and the North will have the only remaining functioning nuclear site. This year one test explosion is planned for Novaya Zemlya, but in subsequent years the number will increase to between four and six. Despite public protests, it is proposed not only to preserve, but also to modernize some northern test site facilities. It is proposed that about 250 million rubles [R] should be specifically earmarked in the state budget to implement the new program in 1992-1993.

There can be no doubt that the plans for nuclear tests on the archipelago will engender another wave of northern protest. The new program is being prepared in secret and it takes into account departmental interests above all.

Viktor Litovkin Reporting from the USSR Defense Ministry:

Your correspondent was told at the Defense Ministry that the materials published in Arkhangelsk are no big secret. They appear in a letter to the presidents of the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] containing the USSR Cabinet of Ministers draft resolution on measures connected with the conduct of nuclear tests. The draft was distributed to USSR people's deputies for discussion in Supreme Soviet committees and then at the Supreme Soviet session...

It proposes that all tests at the Semipalatinsk site should end on 1 January 1992 and that there should be a three- to fourfold reduction overall in our nuclear test program. Only one small nuclear explosion is to be conducted on Novaya Zemlya this year, and then there will be no more than four to six underground nuclear tests per year. The tests will be conducted with the participation of U.S. specialists and are intended to contribute to the program for the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons.

The R250 million mentioned in the Arkhangelsk newspaper are to be earmarked in the state budget not for the testing of nuclear weapons, but for comprehensive organizational and technical programs to improve social and consumer amenities and medical services for the civilian population of the northern region, including the inhabitants of Arkhangelsk Oblast.

The military are keeping no secrets from the local authorities and they are trying to honorably fulfill their obligations to the region's populace.

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Document on CW Inspection in Poland Submitted to CD

*LD0808190491 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT
8 Aug 91*

[By Sergey Sedov]

[Text] Geneva, August 8 (TASS)—A joint Soviet-Polish document was submitted today to a regular session of the Conference of Disarmament [CD] under way here. The document sums up the results of an experimental challenge inspection conducted on April 17-18, 1991, at Soviet military facilities on the Polish territory. The purpose of the inspection was to establish if there is a possibility of the manufacture of chemical weapons [CW] or their components at those facilities.

The presentation of the document was timed for the beginning of a profound and thorough discussion at the conference of the controversial concept of a challenge inspection of various enterprises and facilities. There are suggestions that the concept become one of the main elements of the future mechanism for verification of a

comprehensive convention on banning and elimination of chemical weapons which is being drafted at present.

The main purpose of the experimental challenge inspection of military facilities in Poland was to confirm statements of the USSR that there are no chemical weapons of the Soviet make outside the Soviet territory.

In addition, procedures of conducting such inspections were tried out in practice. These procedures are being worked out at the negotiations on banning chemical weapons. The volume of activity for groups of inspectors to be carried out in future at other facilities has been determined, and international inspectors have undergone training.

The participants in the conference on disarmament showed considerable interest in the joint Soviet-Polish document.

Destruction Plans for Chemical Arms Store Reported

LD1208195291 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1200 GMT 12 Aug 91

[Text] Our correspondent Feliks Tyumakov reports from Izhevsk.

[Tyumakov] Specialists from the Directorate of Chemical Troops and the Planning Institute of the Ministry of Defense have elaborated the first technical variant for the elimination of the regional storage center for combat poisonous substances. Let us recall that 6,000 tonnes of lewisite from the World War II, is stored in the vicinity of the Udmurt town of Kambarka. According to Soviet-American agreements this should be destroyed. Military specialists propose that a terminal be built on the banks of this major river in the Urals area for the Kambarka lewisite to be moved by transport containers. Housing and public social facilities should also be constructed here, with all means of communication. Matters now rest with the Republic's inhabitants who are to discuss the final version of the draft.

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Commentary Supports DPRK Denuclearization Proposal

SK1008094591 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 0900 GMT 3 Aug 91

[By commentator Nikolayev]

[Text] The proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and other areas in Asia is in full accord with the basic goal of Soviet Foreign policy [words indistinct]. The USSR has signed a protocol with [word indistinct] on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific and has positively supported the Indonesian proposal for the creation of the zone in Southeast Asia. These proposals would be helpful in consolidating the overall stability of

regions, expanding detente, reducing (?nuclear weapons) and armaments, and creating an atmosphere for building confidence and cooperation.

Of course, abolishing all nuclear weapons from the areas cannot be regarded as an ideal method for easing tension. The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to abolish medium-range nuclear missiles and long-range missiles. In addition, they signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty some time ago. These are the first steps in easing tension in the areas. The creation of a nuclear-free zone will surely help reduce nuclear weapons, but this will not be easy.

For example, it is impossible to build a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as long as the U.S. nuclear weapons are on the southern half of the peninsula.

For some time Pyongyang has called on the United States to remove its nuclear weapons from the area, and the USSR and the PRC support this just demand. At the same time, linking the fulfillment of an international agreement to the stationing of foreign troops in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, as Pyongyang has done, cannot be considered proper.

This points to the DPRK's statement that it would sign an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency after the signing of the nonproliferation agreement on nuclear weapons, and that it would accept international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

In connection with this, the ROK's [word indistinct] has basically caused Seoul's refusal to accept Pyongyang's proposal for denuclearization.

As long as there are nuclear weapons in the neighboring countries surrounding the Korean peninsula, the ROK declares that it would be reckless to create a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula. This is unreasonable, however, because there is (?a difference between a guarantee on denuclearization and a guarantee on cooperation) and [word indistinct]. The USSR reaffirms its willingness to guarantee a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula.

U.S., ROK Response to DPRK Korean NFZ Proposal Viewed

South's Reaction Hailed

PM1308160191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Aug 91 First Edition p 5

[S. Tikhomirov report: "Ball Is in Southern Side's Court"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 9 August—Bilateral U.S.-South Korean consultations on security questions have ended in Honolulu (Hawaiian Islands). Pyongyang—this may be stated with complete assurance—was an unseen third participant in the meeting.

It was Pyongyang's recent initiative aimed at turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone [NFZ] which, according to the YONHAP agency, was virtually number one on the agenda of the talks.

It is perhaps the first time that a peace proposal by the DPRK has attracted such serious attention from Seoul and Washington. However, the latter is so far not rushing to assume any obligations, especially any which involve withdrawing its nuclear weapons from South Korea. The United States has let it be clearly understood that the question of turning the peninsula into a nuclear-free zone must primarily be discussed between Pyongyang and Seoul.

South Korea reacted extremely promptly to Pyongyang's call and, most importantly, has on the whole responded to it positively. True, provisos were forthcoming, such as, for instance: The North must open up its nuclear facilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency; and the North is not entitled to demand the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, since this is a matter for Seoul and Washington only.

I do not think that Pyongyang is conducting itself with defiant discourtesy in insisting on the withdrawal of missiles from the South. Who would want to have nuclear bombs under his nose? But be that as it may, the ball is now in the southern side's court. But after all, in the recent past such initiatives, whether they came from Pyongyang or from Seoul, were "booted" over to the other side with admirable ease. However, times have indeed changed if the two allies have decided to find an appropriate answer to Pyongyang. This is especially opportune on the eve of the fourth round of talks between the prime ministers of the North and South, which is due to begin 27 August.

'Agree to Consider' Tactical Arms Removal

*LD1308104691 Moscow Radio World Service
in English 2300 GMT 12 Aug 91*

[Excerpts] The United States and South Korea have agreed to consider removing tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula. Seoul papers report this with reference to officials. Vladislav Kozyakov comments and this is what he writes.

The decision was reportedly adopted at bilateral security consultations on the Hawaiian Islands last week. The Seoul paper CHOSEN ILPAO notes when and how the United States will remove nuclear weapons was discussed. The consideration is conditioned on North Korea's consent to an international inspection and its renunciation of nuclear weapons development. This is unlikely to prove an obstacle. Pyongyang and the International Atomic Energy Agency are to sign an agreement on inspections of this kind. Besides, Pyongyang has proposed that a nuclear-free zone be formed on the Korean Peninsula.

What made Washington and Seoul reconsider the positioning of American nuclear weapons in South Korea is the general situation change in the first place. Indeed, more than 30 years have passed since America began bringing nuclear weapons to the south of Korea. Any nuclear program in the north was nonexistent and unheard of at the time. South Korea turned into an American nuclear warehouse in the middle of the cold war. The Soviet-American armed confrontation produced bases in South Korea. Western experts say the United States has more than 1,000 nuclear weapons at these bases, albeit mines and bombs and artillery shells.

Now let us stop to think if there is a necessity to preserve an arsenal that is said to be equivalent to 820 bombs of the kind that was dropped on Hiroshima. What sense does it make for the Americans to have these weapons close to the Soviet Union if the cold war has become a thing of the past and Soviet-American relations are built on cooperation? All the more so Moscow has adopted in Asia, as well as in Europe, a defense sufficiency principle. It has withdrawn troops from Mongolia, reduced hundreds of thousands of troops in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and got rid of some 600 nuclear missiles there under the INF Treaty.

If the Seoul newspapers' reports are confirmed, we can congratulate ourselves on more gains in an important area of international politics. Nuclear arms cuts and efforts to check nuclear weapons proliferation are getting action. [passage omitted]

If America pulled out nuclear weapons from South Korea at this time this would be a step in the right direction.

FRANCE

Defense Council on S45 Missile Cancellation

91ES0983B Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS
in French 22 Jul 91 p 3

[Marc DuFresne article: "No Mobile Missile for France"]

[Text] In an effort to reduce French defense spending further, the head of state is sacrificing modernization of the Albion plateau [missile complex]. The S45, the so-called "missile on wheels," will not be built....

France will not get the mobile ground-to-ground missile that is facetiously referred to as the "missile on wheels." The head of state has decided. Definitively. Or so it seems.

The decision was made at the 10 July meeting of the Defense Council at the Elysee. The purpose of the meeting was to assess the military lessons learned in the Gulf war (see LE QUOTIDIEN of 11 July).

The dilemma was clearly posed at all levels, political and military. In light of serious budgetary constraints, how to give the armed forces the resources they need for external military engagements? Resources which in large part they lacked in the Gulf: an adequate base of professional soldiers, modern heavy tanks, aircraft capable of flying at night or in bad weather, observation and therefore intelligence capabilities. And most keenly felt was the insufficiency of logistical and transport assets. Quite obviously, ways had to be found to remedy the situation, by strengthening the Rapid Action Force (FAR) and giving it the equipment required to carry out its missions. But that entails money. Which is precisely what is in shortest supply. The inevitable conclusion: Something had to be cut.

Right from the start, the experts focused on the nuclear deterrent force. Why? Because alone it absorbs 30 percent of the military equipment budget. That is a lot, considering that the United States, the world's largest nuclear power, devotes only 6 percent of its defense spending to its nuclear strike force. And there is another factor: the changing geopolitical environment in wake of the upheavals in Eastern Europe. While the threat represented by the Soviet Union has not disappeared, it has certainly assumed a different character. The end of ideological confrontation between the two camps, disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and numerous disarmament accords concluded since December 1987 (Euromissiles) have spurred Frenchman to ask whether at least a few of the "fruits of detente" could not be harvested.

Inasmuch as there was no possibility of cutting back on the core component of the French deterrent arsenal, the Strategic Naval Force (FOST)—which, with its missile-launching nuclear submarines in the ocean depths, embodies the ultimate guarantee against possible enemy attack—it was necessary to choose between the other components.

Considered Choice

First of all, the Albion plateau and its 18 missiles. Everyone agrees these missiles should be retired. But no one is thinking of scrapping them. They are what the military calls a "tripwire." An adversary with plans for an attack would first of all have to "take out" the Albion site in order to limit, insofar as possible, France's capacity for nuclear retaliation. It being understood that the undetectable SNLE's [nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines] are by definition invulnerable. As for the Air Force Mirages, they can take to the air in case of an attack warning, thus escaping a direct strike.

There remained two other options with respect to the Albion ground-to-ground missiles: modernize them, that is replace the old S3's with S4's over time, at a cost of about 15 billion French francs [Fr]; or exchange them for the S45, a different and more effective weapon system derived from the submarine missile. Since the S45 could be mounted on a trailer, this "missiles on wheels" received a great deal of support from the military and from experts in the opposition, especially Francois Fillon. The cost: about Fr30 billion. Francois Mitterrand has now decided not to proceed with it. It should be noted in passing, of course, that he never liked this option. As he saw it, a mobile missile in a country with France's demographic density could not fail to excite panic in the populace, since the missile's very mobility would force an aggressor to launch simultaneous strikes at multiple targets inside France, thus endangering the civilian population. (It is difficult, all the same, to see in what respect the tactical Hades system, towed around in a semi-trailer truck, could be any more reassuring to the public.) But there is no talk, at least for the moment, of abjuring the Hades, despite its political disadvantage: Due to its short range (450 km), the only target it can hit when fired from French territory is...Germany! This does not make the Germans very happy, and they have not hesitated to vent their opinion on the subject.

There was yet another possibility, that of eviscerating the Strategic Air Force [FAS]. As everyone knows, its bomb delivery systems, the Mirage IV P and the naval aviation Super-Etendard, are just as obsolete as the S3's on the Albion plateau. Even more so, given the rapid progress in antiaircraft weapons systems. In 1996, the entire FAS panoply will have to be replaced. But the head of state did not want to amputate this component. It would seem that industrial considerations were paramount. Termination of the Mirage 2000 N, which is supposed to replace the squadrons currently in service, would have come as a harsh blow to Dassault. Also, there may have been a desire not to jeopardize negotiations now under way with Great Britain on production of the ASLP (long-range air-to-ground missile), which a Mirage 2000 N could fire from afar with a good chance of defeating enemy antiaircraft defenses.

It is thus Albion and its missiles that will pay the costs of austerity: They will now have all the time in the world to rust in their silos.

The decision was a difficult one. It could easily have gone otherwise. At any rate, it would be disingenuous to attribute it solely to the lessons of the Gulf war. On 11 October 1988, well before the war, Francois Mitterrand spoke of the need to modernize the Albion missiles, pointing out that any attack against that ground component would mean "we were already at war and our strategic force would be instantly unleashed." At the same time, though, the president announced his rejection of a mobile missile because "France's territorial size is too small."

So there will be no "missile on wheels," and even if the Albion site is modernized somewhat, it will remain inadequate and poorly adapted to the challenges of the future.

GERMANY

SPD Defense Expert on Reduction of Bundeswehr
LD0708101591 Hamburg DPA in German 2308 GMT 6 Aug 91

[Text] Hanover (DPA)—SPD [Social Democratic Party] defense expert Manfred Opel expects that, in the long term, the size of the Bundeswehr will be between 200,000 and 300,000 soldiers. In an interview with the Hanover newspaper, NEUE PRESSE (Wednesday edition), Opel said financial and political reasons required this. If the British are reducing their Army to 116,000 soldiers and the French are reducing theirs to under 200,000, the Federal Republic can "hardly maintain a larger number politically." As Germany is integrated into an alliance that is saving soldiers for the individual partners, "we should moderate our military needs," the SPD politician demanded. Also, not every job in the Bundeswehr needs to be done by a soldier, Opel said.

An agreement between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev reached during their talks on the unification of Germany envisages a reduction of the German forces from 500,000 to 370,000 men.

Soviet Officers To Inspect Bundeswehr Divisions
LD2108075191 Hamburg DPA in German 0615 GMT 21 Aug 91

[Text] Oldenburg/Moscow (DPA)—Two staff officers of the Soviet Armed Forces have arrived today at the military airport in Ahlhorn near Oldenburg for a one-day inspection of Bundeswehr divisions within the framework of the CSCE agreements. They flew in from Moscow. The officers intend to examine the check equipment and personnel data at a mechanized division in Oldenburg. They will be accompanied by officers from the center for verification of the Bundeswehr in Geilenkirchen.

NORWAY

Soviet Kola Exercise Force Strength Halved
91EN0769A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Jul 91 p 6

[Olav Trygge Storvik article: "Soviets Halve Gigantic Exercise in North"]

[Text] In the face of strong Norwegian criticism the Soviet Union has halved plans for the season's largest military exercise at the Finnmark border. This means that Moscow is not obligated to invite foreign observers.

A few days ago the Foreign Office was informed by Soviet authorities that the announced large exercise the Soviet Army will carry out in Kola in September has been reduced in size from 17,000 to 7,800 men. Therefore the exercise comes well under the limit where Moscow, according to international agreements, is obligated to invite foreign observers.

First Adviser Rolf Naess in the Foreign Office's sixth policy office says that the reduction is based on "organizational measures being carried out in the armed forces." Beyond this, no details have been given on the planned exercise.

It was in early January of this year that the Soviet Union announced a large troop exercise to be held in Kola in the first part of September of this year. This announcement was made in the so-called "Year's Calendar" of planned military exercises, which according to the CSCE agreements they are obligated to publish each year. The exercise was to include 17,000 men, and the area the forces were to exercise in was to extend all the way to the northern Norwegian border. The size would indicate that the Army leadership in Moscow intended to carry out the exercise with units of a whole army corps. As far as is known, there have never been exercises with such large military formations that extended to the Norwegian border.

Holst Criticism

The announcements caused strong reactions in Norway. Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst chose the prestigious and quasi-official rostrum of the Oslo Military Society to strongly criticize the Soviet plans. He asked what the purpose could be for exercises in a time of relaxation of tensions. At this time it was also clear that there was a buildup of large stores of modern weapons on Kola that had been transferred from other parts of the Soviet Union after the signing of the disarmament agreement. The Norwegians interpreted this to be not only an evasion, but also a direct violation of the CFE agreement. This development was also strongly criticized, and the tone of the policy leadership in the Defense Department became sharper as the weeks passed. Therefore, a connection between the Norwegian criticism and the changed plans for the development of the exercise cannot be ruled out. But this will never be known for sure. In the south as well, in the Odessa military district, Moscow has reduced the size of an exercise that was announced earlier, referring to "reorganization of the armed forces."

According to the CSCE agreements, military exercises of more than 13,000 men must be announced 42 days before they are held. Such an announcement must contain information on exactly where the exercise will take place, what units will take part, how many aircraft, tanks, and artillery will be involved, the purpose of the exercise, and who will lead it.

No Details

Since the Soviet exercise has now been reduced in size to well under 13,000 men, Moscow does not have to give such details. Nor is there a requirement to invite foreign military experts to observe the exercise, as there would have been according to the agreements. However, the Norwegians still have the possibility of asking permission to send inspectors to the exercise area. The Norwegian authorities

availed themselves of this possibility for the first time during a smaller Soviet Army exercise in the Petsyenga area last fall.

No decision has been made yet on whether this will happen this time as well. For its part, the Soviet Union has often asked to inspect Norwegian military maneuvers. The last time was during Exercise Agder, which was launched in southern Norway earlier this year. With 36 hours warning, a group of Soviet officers appeared. They were allowed to travel wherever they wanted to within the exercise area.